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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate corporate governance practices of firms, in 
particular financial institutions, and their impact on the performance of these 
institutions. As such it will contribute to the debate on the importance of corporate 
governance for banks.  The investigation will cover examples from developed and 
transition economies. Corporate scandals in the 1990s and 2000s drew the attention of 
governments to the importance of corporate governance, and induced legislation to 
prevent similar situations in the future. This thesis highlights the differences between 
corporate governance of firms and that of banks and investigates the nature of the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and performance of banks in the 
USA (as an example of a developed economy) and Kosova and Montenegro (as examples 
of South East European (SEE) transition economies). The thesis will also investigate the 
state of corporate governance in the two SEE countries and its developments since 
these countries became independent. This thesis will address two methodological issues 
that have been ignored or not treated jointly by previous research: the endogenous 
nature of corporate governance; and the dynamic aspect of the relationship with 
performance. In the context of SEE countries this thesis represents the first attempt to 
analyse the development of a corporate governance framework for financial institutions 
in Kosova and Montenegro, involving the creation of an index for the quality of 
corporate governance and, to the extent that the data permits, the first analysis of the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and the performance of financial 
institutions.   
The thesis investigates these questions by firstly embarking on a critical review of the 
literature to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the previous work in this area and 
identify the gap in the literature and secondly engaging in empirical investigation of the 
relationship. The data used for the empirical part of the thesis consists of published data 
on corporate governance ranking of US banks and the information on financial 
operations of banks from the Bankscope database. There are no published datasets on 
the state of corporate governance in SEE banks. A bank survey was therefore organised 
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by the author to explore the compliance of these banks with OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles. The data was supplemented with the financial information of 
individual banks obtained from their annual reports.  
Using both, cross section and dynamic panel model techniques, the empirical 
investigation shows that there is a positive relationship between the measure of good 
corporate governance and the market capitalisation of banks in the USA. A similar 
relationship also exists between one dimension of corporate governance (shareholders’ 
rights) and the performance of financial institutions in Kosova and Montenegro. Thus, 
this research contributes to the scarce empirical research on the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance of financial institutions in the developed 
economies, and to the not hitherto investigated relationship in SEE countries. 
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 Preface 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate corporate governance practices of firms, in 
particular those of financial institutions, and their impact on the performance of these 
institutions. At the broadest level, this thesis addresses two methodological issues, 
which have not often been confronted by previous researchers: the endogenous nature 
of corporate governance, which often has been overlooked; and the dynamic aspect of 
the relationship with performance, which has not been addressed in the past. The 
investigation will cover examples from developed and transition economies. Also, it will 
attempt to draw some comparison between corporate governance practices of the two. 
The importance of the topic has been highlighted by policy makers and researchers in 
the last two decades: a well-functioning banking system is crucial to the health of the 
economy and the welfare of its citizens. The corporate scandals in the 1990s and 2000s, 
and particularly the financial crisis of 2008, drew the attention of governments and 
academia to the significance of corporate governance and the consequences of poor 
practices. The failure of large companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat have 
spurred legislation from the governments and interest from the academia. Despite this 
the field remains underexplored thus providing the incentive for this research project to 
aim to contribute to the narrowing of the knowledge gap in this area.  
The specific research questions addressed in the thesis are: what is the nature of the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance, in theory and 
practice; what is the state of corporate governance in South Eastern European banks; is 
there a way to quantify corporate governance practices in the SEE countries; is there a 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance in SEE countries; and 
whether there is any comparison in terms of corporate governance that can be drawn 
between developed economies and SEE countries. 
The thesis investigates these questions by firstly embarking on a critical review of the 
literature to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the previous work in this area and 
therefore the gap in the literature, and secondly engaging in empirical investigation of 
the relationship. For the empirical part this thesis has used some published data and 
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information in the public domain and also engaged in primary data collection ourselves. 
The data on the corporate governance state of banks in the US (as the example of a 
developed market economy) has been obtained from Investor Shareholder Services (ISS) 
and the info on bank performance from the Bankscope database. For Kosova and 
Montengro (as examples of SEE transition countries), a dataset had to be developed by 
conducting a questionnaire survey of banks in the two countries and insurance 
companies in Kosova. The questionnaire was used to construct measures of corporate 
governance that are subsequently used in the empirical investigation.  
The empirical methodology of the research consists of both OLS and dynamic panel 
model estimation. The data for SEE banks is based on the author’s bank survey which 
was conducted for one year and can therefore be analysed only with the OLS method, 
leaving problems such as endogeneity unresolved. However, both ISS and Bankscope 
databases provide data for a longer time span (2005-2009) which allows the use of the 
more thorough dynamic panel analysis which allows a more satisfactory exploration of 
the data, including dealing with the problem of endogeneity. The empirical analysis 
suggests that the corporate governance practices of banks in the two regions have a 
positive and significant impact on the performance of financial institutions measured by 
market capitalisation in the US and return on equity in Kosova and Montenegro.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1  will investigate the concept of 
corporate governance. It will start by considering various definitions of corporate 
governance. The lack of consensus on a single definition indicates that the concept is a 
broad one with each researcher laying emphasis on a particular dimension of the 
concept and different approaches to the analysis of the concept.  The chapter will 
explain the three main approaches to corporate governance: the shareholder value 
maximisation; the property rights; and the stakeholder approach. This chapter will also 
explain the characteristics of the two main classifications of corporate governance 
systems: the Anglo – American system, the single tier management board together with 
dispersed ownership, and the German – Japanese system, the two tier management 
board with large shareholders. Finally, this chapter will investigate the state of corporate 
governance in transition economies. Since 1989, the former socialist countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe (and Central Asia) have been involved in a process of transition from 
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centrally planned economies to market economies. As part of the transition process, 
they have had to develop new corporate governance systems and practices which were 
completely alien to them twenty years ago. The transition economies had to design a 
corporate governance framework from scratch in order to support the privatisation 
element of the transformation programme. The chapter will discuss the development of 
corporate governance framework for transition economies and how this framework 
interacted with the privatisation programmes resulting in concentrated ownership 
structures in most TEs. 
Chapter 2  will investigate the implications of corporate governance practices for the 
economy. Failures of large corporations have induced emerging of new corporate 
governance guidelines and rules which will be discussed in chapter 2. This chapter is also 
concerned with the measurement of the quality of corporate governance and the ways 
to quantify and then rank corporate governance practices of individual companies. The 
methods of measurement used by various agencies and institutions will then be 
discussed. This chapter will introduce the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance practices and firm performance by briefly reviewing some of the main 
contributions to this debate, leaving a fuller review to Chapter 4. The chapter end with a 
detailed discussion of, and comments on, the OECD corporate governance principles.   
The discussion in Chapter 3 will turn to corporate governance practices of financial 
institutions. The focus will be on pointing out the differences between corporate 
governance of banks and firms in other industries. Next, the few empirical studies 
exploring the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance will be 
discussed in more detail. One of the main differences between the corporate 
governance of ordinary firms and that of banks is the fact that banks are heavily 
regulated. With regulation being such an important factor influencing the corporate 
governance of banks, Chapter 3 will review the important legislations and regulations 
which have shaped the practices of banks in the developed economies. The Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act and the Basel II capital accord will be discussed in greater detail from the 
corporate governance point of view. 
Chapter 4 will set up the theoretical framework for the empirical investigation of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. It will start by 
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discussing in greater detail how the key studies in the field, explain develop or construct 
their own measure of corporate governance quality. These measures then can be used 
for empirically testing the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. This chapter will also introduce the model which will be used to estimate 
the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. This estimation 
will use a cross section dataset and the OLS estimation technique and will demonstrate 
that there is a significant and positive relationship between the corporate governance 
and bank performance. The chapter will also provide an analysis of the reasons why 
many previous studies have failed to provide statistically significant results for this 
relationship. Consequently, the reasoning for the model specification using variables not 
used by previous research will be introduced and argued in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 confirms the findings and takes the estimation of the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance, which started in Chapter 4, a step further. 
With the detailed corporate governance data becoming available at a later point, it was 
possible to construct a panel dataset and embark on the more advanced and 
comprehensive panel data methodology.  The potential estimation problems, including 
the endogeneity based on reverse causality, which could not be addressed by the cross 
section technique will be elaborated and dealt with. This chapter aims to point out the 
importance of dynamics in estimating corporate governance related models as the static 
panel model may generate misleading results. By applying the Generalised Method of 
Moments, the positive and statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance is confirmed. 
Chapter 6 will investigate the development of the corporate governance framework and 
the relationship between corporate governance and performance of banks in two SEE 
countries (Kosova and Montenegro). Since there are no previous studies related to 
corporate governance of banks, this chapter analyses the development of the banking 
system and the regulation of banks in the two countries with a focus on the provisions 
concerned with corporate governance. In order to investigate the state of corporate 
governance in the two SEE countries, it is necessary to embark on primary data 
collection.  A bank survey, using a questionnaire based on the World Bank’s reports on 
the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) questionnaire, but adjusted to highlight 
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compliance with OECD corporate governance principles, was conducted during 2009. 
Appropriate indices of corporate governance practice were thus constructed so that 
they could be used in empirical investigation. The results point out the similarities and 
differences between the corporate governance practices of the two countries and those 
between banks and insurance companies in Kosova. The information obtained via the 
survey also allowed the calculation of 5 separate subscores, each representing 
compliance with one of the 5 OECD corporate governance principles (II-VI) for each bank 
or insurance company. Using one of the subscores as a proxy for corporate governance 
and the return on equity as a proxy for performance, this research finds a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the two. The chapter then compares 
corporate governance of developed economies and SEE countries.  
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the thesis and its contributions to 
knowledge. It will also point out the limitations of this research and offer some 
suggestions on the directions in which this research can be extended.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is not merely the governing of a certain form of organization, in 
this case ‘a corporation’, but has a broader meaning. The concept has been used by 
different people differently and still there is no universally accepted definition of 
corporate governance (Rezaee, 2009).  The importance of corporate governance came 
to attention of governments in the 1990s after western economies witnessed a series of 
financial scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Paramalat which were facilitated by 
wrongdoings on the part of the management, auditors and financial market operatives. 
These scandals shook the confidence and trust of the citizens in the institutions of these 
economies and led them to devise stricter regulator mechanisms – which this thesis will 
address elsewhere.  
As a starting point, most of the work in the field of corporate governance takes the issue 
highlighted first by Berle and Means (1932), which is the separation of ownership and 
control. This separation will generate an agency relationship between owners as “the 
principal” and managers as “the agent”. In an ideal world, managers would invest all of 
their abilities and skills to generate the best possible returns for investors. In the real 
world, things are slightly different. 
A series of unexpected corporate failures in the 1990s brought to attention the 
importance of the corporate governance system (Diacon and O’Sullivan, 1995). With the 
shadow of doubt cast over companies and the way they are being managed, obtaining 
external finance was burdened with the need for proof of honesty. As a result, any 
serious listed company has had to allocate a part of annual, or other important, reports 
to addressing and explaining its corporate governance procedures. Furthermore 
international organisations such as the OECD, stock exchanges, and various government 
commissioned reports across the world have devised, and some of them imposed 
corporate governance guidelines. 
There is a vast amount of literature dealing with corporate governance, and researchers 
such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or Becht et al. (2002), and others have produced 
surveys of the existing knowledge in this field. This chapter will adopt the approach by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and will review a selection of the literature produced since 
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1997, although occasionally it will go further back. The main difference with the Shleifer 
and Vishny’s work, which is from a straightforward agency perspective, is the fact that 
this chapter incorporates the stakeholder approach which is frequently encountered in 
the recent research.  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the following questions: What is corporate 
governance? Who are the parties involved? Why and when does it become a problem? 
The main approaches to corporate governance, the shareholder value maximisation, the 
legal and the stakeholder approach, are discussed in more detail starting from section 
1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 respectively below.  
The chapter will also look more closely into other important concepts for corporate 
governance such as: specific governance arrangements and corporate governance 
classification. Specific governance arrangements refer to the mechanisms through which 
the agency problem is addressed. This is closely related to the degree of diffusion or 
concentration of ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The dispersion or concentration 
of ownership is the basis of classification of firms into Anglo-American model, usually 
with a large number of small shareholders, and German-Japanese model where there 
are only a small number of large shareholders prevail. Same as the specific governance 
arrangements in section 1.6, corporate governance classification will be discussed in 
section 1.7. The corporate governance of firms in countries in transition is discussed in 
section 1.8, and finally section 1.9 concludes.  
1.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
Although the term corporate governance is used quite ‘liberally’ nowadays,1 it is known 
to mean different things to different authors. Nonetheless, the following definitions 
should give the reader a general idea about the concept: “Corporate governance deals 
with the ways suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 737). The authors ask the questions: 
Why do investors decide to part with their money and entrust managers with it, when 
there are still no proven mechanisms which would guarantee them a return on their 
                                                          
1 A simple search by one of the popular search engines (google) produced 56,400,000 results 
(accessed in July 2007) and about 109,000,000 results in 2013. 
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investments? Why managers do not run away with the money? Although there are 
sporadic cases, mostly they do not. 
Corporate governance refers to “the design of institutions that induce or force 
management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders” (Tirole 2001, p.4). Another 
definition is: “Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders2” (La Porta 
et al. 2000b, p.1). Along similar lines, from the regulatory perspective corporate 
governance is defined as “the system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations 
at a company” (Gillan and Stark, 1998, p.4). 
“Defined broadly, corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions, 
including laws, regulations and accepted business practices, which together govern the 
relationship, in a market economy, between corporate managers and entrepreneurs 
(corporate insiders) on one hand, and those who invest resources in corporations, on 
the other” (Oman 2001, p.13). 
“The term ‘corporate governance’ essentially refers to the relationships among 
management, the board of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in a 
company. These relationships provide a framework within which corporate objectives 
are set and performance is monitored” (Mehran 2003, p.1).  
A more comprehensive definition where corporate governance is looked at as “the 
process affected by a set of legislative, regulatory, legal, market mechanisms, listing 
standards, best practices, and efforts of all corporate governance participants, including 
the company’s directors, officers, auditors, legal counsel, and financial advisors, which 
creates a system of checks and balances with the goal of creating and enhancing 
enduring and sustainable shareholder value, while protecting the interests of other 
stakeholders” is provided by Rezaee 2009 (p.29). 
Keasy et al. (1997) have identified the inconsistent use of the term ‘corporate 
governance’ by different writers and were unable to find any real consensus on the 
definition. According to Rose (2007) the lack of consensus in defining most of the issues 
                                                          
2 Insiders in this context are managers and controlling shareholders. 
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surrounding corporate governance has provided a fertile ground for the growth of a 
Corporate Governance Industry in the United States. The term refers to a market for 
corporate governance rating agencies which is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
The lack of a precise definition, can give rise to any number of situations in a firm’s ‘day 
to day’ functioning to be qualified as corporate governance problems even when they 
are not. The question then is, when does the corporate governance problem arise? 
1.2.1 The Corporate Governance Problem 
Becht et al (2002) argue that the corporate governance problem arises whenever an 
outside investor wishes to exercise control differently from the manager in charge of the 
firm. La Porta et al. (2000b) identified the risk of outside investors being expropriated by 
insiders as a corporate governance problem. Berglof and Von Thadden (1999, p.4) 
pointed out that the “recent literature is based on the premise that the main corporate 
governance problem is (the conflict between) self-interested management and weak, 
dispersed shareholders”. Similarly, and in the spirit of Berle and Means, Enriques and 
Volpin (2007, p.1) maintain that “the fundamental problem of corporate governance in 
the United States is to alleviate the conflict of interest between dispersed small 
shareowners and powerful controlling managers”. Hart (1995b, p. 678) on the other 
hand, argues that whenever two conditions are present, corporate governance issues 
arise. “First there is an agency problem” and “second, transaction costs are such that 
this agency problem cannot be dealt with through a contract”.  
The situations described above do not account for all possible manifestations of 
corporate governance problems; nevertheless, they give the reader an idea of the 
nature and breadth of the field this thesis is about to tackle. What is more or less 
obvious at first glance is the broad division between outsiders and insiders, something 
that brings the discussion back to Berle and Means (1932) and their distinction between 
ownership and control. However, there are other theories which can serve as grounds 
for nurturing different views for these problems. This chapter will return to these 
theories later.  
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1.2.2 Sources of Corporate Governance Practices 
Rezaee (2009, p.44) mentions four primary sources of corporate governance in the 
United States as: corporate laws, securities laws, listing standards and best practices. 
This certainly is one end of the spectrum and can be considered valid for countries with 
developed legal and economic systems and slightly less so for less developed countries. 
For instance, there are countries that do not have established stock exchanges, thus 
listing standards cannot be considered a source of corporate governance for their 
companies. 
1.2.3 Interested Parties to Corporate Governance 
Perhaps the definition provided by Mehran (2003) and Rezaee (2009) give the best 
representation of the parties to corporate governance and these are according to the 
shareholder approach: management, board of directors and shareholders. If other 
stakeholders are brought into the equation then interested parties will also include 
employees, suppliers, customers, banks, regulators, the environment and the 
community at large.  
There are interested parties which affect corporate governance indirectly but, 
nevertheless, it is argued that they have a substantial impact. “Governance advisers, 
governance rating firms, and proxy advisers (sometimes operating as business units of a 
single company)”, alias, the Corporate Governance Industry who according to Rose 
(2007, p.889) influence the allocation of trillions of dollars. The leader in this industry, 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) “claims to advise “24 of the top 25” and “81 of 
the top 100” mutual funds, all “25 of the top 25” asset managers…” (p. 890). 
Rose suggests that this industry is playing the role of the voluntary regulator for 
corporate governance despite concerns about the ways affairs are handled within the 
industry. There are two roots to these concerns. “First, ISS is providing both governance 
ratings and advice on how to improve the governance score…Second, in the case of ISS, 
the governance adviser also serves as a proxy adviser, which creates a concern that ISS’ 
recommendation in a proxy matter may be affected by whether or not the subject 
company purchases other services from ISS, such as governance advice” (p.906). 
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One of the main questions in respect to corporate governance over which the scholars 
are divided is about ‘whose interests should be taken into account’ in running a 
corporation. One group of scholars like Shleifer and Vishny, La Porta, de Silanes and 
others, those embracing the Berle and Means approach, argue for the primacy of 
shareholder’s interests. The maximisation of returns on shareholder’s investments 
should be the main goal of the firm. This means that the motivation of managers to act 
in the best interest of shareowners is the focus of this approach, which may also give 
rise to the principal-agent problem. 
Another group of scholars (Tirole, 2001; Freeman, 1984; Jansson, 2005) advocate that 
other stakeholders’ interests should be considered when important corporate decisions 
are made. However, the potential problem with this line of thought is the following: 
there is a larger number of types of claimants with a claim on the firm’s profits. Two 
main issues are likely to arise here: (i) In the spirit of Jensen (2001, p.11) “it is logically 
impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at any time unless the dimensions 
are what are known as ‘monotonic transformations’ of one another”, meaning that with 
a large number of stakeholders it would be very hard to maximise benefits of different 
groups simultaneously, and why the shareholders, who are stakeholders in this equation 
too, should bear the financial cost,3 or in the best case, the main share of it? These 
concerns will be discussed in more detail later in a section that explores the stakeholder 
approach. But first, we will start by addressing the issues raised by the shareholder’s 
interest group.  
1.3 The Shareholder Value-Maximisation Approach 
The value-maximisation proposition, according to Jensen (2001), is rooted in two 
hundred years of economics and finance research. This is a very plausible aim for every 
company since by maximizing the market value everybody stands to gain. However, in a 
joint stock company where there is division between ownership and control, the issue of 
how to divide the outcomes of maximization might arise. The managers are in a position 
that enables them to divert the profits for their own private benefits, in other words the 
relationship between shareholders and managers may be characterised by the presence 
of the agency problem. One of the ways to address ex-ante the agency problem are 
                                                          
3 The financial cost here is the foregone profits (opportunity cost). 
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contracts. Incomplete and incentive contracts along with other related aspects will be 
discussed in greater detail in this section.   
1.3.1 The Agency Problem 
The agency problem as presented in Fama (1965; 1980) can be illustrated using the 
concept introduced by Williamson (1975) of the ‘new institutional economics’ and the 
assumption of self-interested rational actors that want to maximise their welfare, 
subject to constraints imposed by the environment. The principal is the actor in 
possession of number of resources but not the exact combination of them which would 
allow him to realize interests (owners are in possession of funds that can be invested 
easily, but not necessarily equipped with appropriate skills) (Coleman, 1990); and the 
agents are managers with the know-how and experience to utilise the investment in 
order to generate profits. Both are rational actors. The principal has to find ways to 
ensure that the agent will use the skills and information in his possession for mutual 
benefits, rather than misusing the advantages he enjoys due to asymmetry of 
information to maximise his own welfare at the expense of the principal’s welfare. Since 
there are no straightforward ways in which the principal can measure whether the agent 
is fully using all his resources in carrying the obligations towards the former, the 
relationship is subject to moral hazard behaviour from the agent. Furthermore, there 
are situations where the principal does not provide all the funds as they are supposed 
to, hence succumbing to moral hazard behaviour (Braun and Guston, 2003). Thus the 
principal-agent or the agency problem arises. This means that at the core of the agency 
problem lays the division of ownership and control or separation between finance and 
management.  This notion, which was elaborated by Berle and Means and subsequent 
writers, can be traced to Adam Smith (1776). The view can be understood from a 
business endeavours perspective where in most cases, a business idea and funding to 
make it happen do not lie with the same entity or person. “A firm [or corporation], 
therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the 
direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase 1937, p. 9), which as 
explained above is characterised by moral hazard and information asymmetry. 
The problems raised here have highlighted the need for a contract to bind all parties to 
meet their obligations and responsibilities. As it stands, owners are in a better position 
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before committing their funds since there is less risk involved. Once they agree to sink 
their capital, they practically have given up their only bargaining tool. Managers, 
theoretically, can take the money and disappear. This is why contracts are signed, as an 
attempt to address the ex-post vulnerability of owners.  
1.3.2 Contracts 
A perfect contract, in theory, lays the ground for the perfect alignment of investors’ and 
manager’s interests. This means that a good contract would be providing ample 
incentives for managers to act in the interest of shareholders. The shareowners, on the 
other hand, apart from exercising their voting rights, are encouraged to intervene in 
underperforming firms and get involved with their boards in order to improve returns 
(Myners 2001).  
Contracts signed by managers and investors, however, should not require too much 
interpretation in case they are to be enforced by courts. Even the most advanced 
countries have legal mechanisms to keep courts out of businesses i.e. business judgment 
rule in United States (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p.741). On the other hand, when the 
funds are gathered from a vast number of small shareowners, the latter often remain 
too poorly informed to be able to exercise their control rights. Because they are 
individually small, there is no interest on their part to learn more about the companies 
they are financing which makes them subject to the free rider problem. 
The question is: who or what forces managers and/or shareowners to honour their 
responsibilities. The contract? Although it is a legal act, it will be just a piece of paper 
without a proper legal system to enforce it. This puts in perspective the role of a healthy 
legal environment. Only in such an environment can contracts be used as a means of 
regulating the relationships between financiers and managers. 
In general, a contract specifies what the manager is expected to do with the funds, and 
how the returns will be divided. In an ideal world, the contract would be a complete 
contract which specifies what the manager is expected to do and how the profits are 
allocated in all states of the world. The problem is that it is impossible to foresee all 
possible future contingencies, hence most contracts are “incomplete contracts”. Such 
contracts are the only tool in the hands of shareholders to impose some control over the 
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management ex-ante when they are unable to exert much control ex-post. The 
consequence is that managers are left in decision making position with a significant 
amount of discretion, which could provide them with the incentive to maximise their 
own welfare. Due to the potential significance of misdemeanour by managers, the issue 
of managerial discretion will be discussed in more detail after the incomplete contracts.  
i. Incomplete Contracts 
Hart (1995b, p.679) suggests that “corporate structure does matter if agency problems 
are present and contracts are incomplete”. He argues that standard principal-agent 
model fails to recognize costs involved in writing a comprehensive contract. 
Nevertheless, these costs are present. The transaction cost literature identifies three 
types of important costs. First, there is the cost of thinking of all possible situations 
which can arise during the course of the contract, and then making plans on how to 
address those. Second, the costs involved in negotiating these plans with others, and 
third, the cost of writing the plans in such a way that they are enforceable by law in the 
event of a dispute. Given the complexity of corporate activities, if the “complete” 
contract would be possible to write, the cost would be immense. Instead the parties will 
resort to writing an incomplete contract which will have gaps and missing provisions and 
where future actions will be specified only partly or not at all. In a world of incomplete 
contracts with the presence of agency problems, “governance structure can be seen as a 
mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in the initial contract” 
(Hart 1995b, p. 680).  
The thinking behind this is actually quite straightforward. If there were a comprehensive 
contract in place, then everything would have been specified ex-ante. All the decisions 
would have been taken prior to signing the contract between the parties involved; 
hence there would be only a need for a monitoring body in case any of the parties falls 
short in fulfilling their duties and obligations. Even this body and the actions to be taken 
by it would have been decided prior to the signing of the contract. The argument of this 
sort can go on forever, and the possible moral hazard issues it can raise are 
incomprehensible. For this reason, a governance structure is needed to deal with day to 
day tasks and problems such as short delays or early deliveries of materials, shortage or 
too much storage space, replacement of an employee who regularly calls in sick, and a 
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huge number of other situations which need to be dealt with on the spot. In theory, 
there is the possibility that these situations will even not occur, but practice shows that 
they are quite common. However, this illustrates the extent of the problem if all of these 
situations were to be addressed by a comprehensive contract. This makes it quite 
obvious that such a contract cannot be written. Hence, the choice of incomplete 
contracts and governance structure is made on the cost effectiveness basis.  
Zingales (1998) takes a slightly different perspective from Hart in arguing the importance 
of incomplete contracts for corporate governance. His approach is built around the 
concept of ‘quasi-rent’.4 However, in order to address corporate governance problems 
through this approach, two conditions have to be met. First, the relationship must 
generate some quasi–rents and second, quasi-rents cannot be perfectly allocated ex-
ante. Zingales (1998) argues that corporate governance matters for the distribution of 
rents. He also argues that there are three main channels affecting the division of quasi-
rents.  
The first channel, ex-ante incentive effects, denoting the process through which the ex-
post division of quasi-rent affects ex-ante incentives to undertake some actions, denotes 
creating or destroying some value in two main ways: (1) if not properly rewarded by the 
governance system, rational agents will not spend the optimal amount of resources, and 
(2) by trying to alter ex-post bargaining in their favour, rational agents will spend 
resources on inefficient activities.  
The second channel is inefficient bargaining through which a governance system affects 
total value by altering ex-post bargaining efficiency. This suggests that a governance 
system is able to affect the degree of information asymmetry between the parties, the 
extent to which a party is liquidity constrained or the level of coordination costs.  
The third channel is risk aversion, through which “a governance system might affect the 
ex-ante value of the total surplus by determining the level and distribution of risk” 
                                                          
4 In the situation where the buyer and the producer have entered into a contractually binding 
relationship, they end up trapped in a bilateral monopoly. The product has more value to the 
buyer than to the market and on the other hand, the producer probably can deliver at the lowest 
cost. The difference between what they can obtain in the marketplace in contrast to honouring 
the contract represents the quasi-rent. For a more elaborate explanation, see Zingales (1998). 
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among the parties involved (Zingales 1998, p.10). Namely, an efficient governance 
system would be able to allocate most effectively the risk to the most risk-tolerant 
party, if that different parties have different degrees of risk aversion. However, Zingales 
(1998) concludes that the incomplete contract approach is heavily dependent on the 
quality of contracts to be written, which is dependent on the ability to foresee future 
contingencies. For this reason this approach is efficient in explaining ownership and 
corporate governance structures when entrepreneurial firms are concerned, but it is less 
so for more complicated large and publicly owned companies. 
Hart and Moore (2007) suggest that the approach to incomplete contracting should be 
broadened to include behavioural elements as well. The usual approach considers 
renegotiation of incomplete contract as the way that leads to ex post efficiency, and the 
focus is on distortions to ex ante investments. To Hart and Moore this is a restrictive 
approach. The theory of incomplete contracts is “based on the idea that a contract is a 
reference point for parties’ feelings of entitlement, and that feelings of entitlement 
affect contractual performance” (Hart and Moore, 2007, p.183). Each contracting party 
feels entitled to the best possible outcome permitted by the contract. Naturally, there is 
a possibility that one or even both parties end up disappointed by the outcome. 
Assuming that the transaction is not going to be a one off exercise, the outcome of 
previous transaction provides the discretion to each party to provide “perfunctory” or 
“consummate” performance. Hart and Moore argue that consummate performance 
does not cost much more than the perfunctory one and the party is more likely to 
provide it if he or she feels well treated.  
However, when a party to a transaction puts up a perfunctory performance instead of 
consummate for whatever reason, the behaviour referred to as ‘shading’ occurs.5 It can 
be argued that shading costs constitute a corporate governance problem. If manager 
(A), for example, resorts to providing only the services specified in his/her contract and 
nothing more, which translates into perfunctory performance, then shading costs are 
incurred by shareowners in respect to manager (A). The argument is underpinned by the 
                                                          
5 Shading in the context of Hart and Moore (2007) is the situation where one of the parties does 
not engage all of its capacities in fulfilling their end of the contract to the fullest due to the 
improper incentives laid in the contract. 
 19 
 
Introduction to Corporate Governance 
 
Hart and Moore assumption that this behaviour cannot be observed or penalized by an 
outsider. The final assumption they make is that parties cannot shade if they do not 
trade. They do, nonetheless, make the note that shading costs might be capturing other 
kinds of transaction costs such as haggling, influence or rent seeking costs and so on. 
The relevance to corporate governance of such a view is that if feelings of entitlement 
for either party, owners or managers, fall short of their expectations, then shading costs 
are expected to be incurred by the corporation. Shading costs are similar to shirking, 
hence they increase the overall cost of the company. This means that the residuals left 
in form of profit to be shared by owners are lessened. However, it is expected that 
shading costs are very unlikely to be incurred by large shareholders. In the spirit of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), this thesis confirms that large shareholders are the market 
response to poor governance laws and poor legal protection of investors, which is the 
remedy for shading costs also. In a system which encourages dispersed ownership, 
however, shading costs are a reality of corporate structures. 
ii. Managerial Discretion 
This part is more relevant to corporate governance systems characterised by dispersed 
ownership rather than to the concentrated ownership systems. The key element here is 
the absence of monitoring of managers. This and the fact that managers end up with 
substantial control rights (discretion) puts them in position to expropriate owners. 
“Straight-out expropriation is a frequent manifestation of the agency problem that 
financiers need to address” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 742).  
The number of ways in which managers can expropriate owners ranges from cases of 
Ponzi schemes where they abscond with the money to more elaborate ones like transfer 
pricing. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in their survey depict cases of managers setting up 
private companies and then buying at lower prices from, or selling at higher prices to, 
the corporation they manage. Other cases illustrate situations where managers will 
undergo a loss on behalf of the company if they can derive a profit for themselves.  
There are few mechanisms to stop mangers behaving in this way, or rather encouraging 
them to act in the interest of shareowners. Some of these mechanisms are: incentive 
contracts, large shareholders, effective legal protection and others will be mentioned in 
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the rest of this chapter where they will be discussed in more detail as they all deal with 
the agency problem in one way or another.  
1.3.3 Incentive Contracts 
Tirole (2001) points out that recent economic analysis has identified three mechanisms 
which contribute to partial alignment of managerial decisions with the interests of 
shareholders/investors. First, management responds to monetary incentives; second, 
managers will try to satisfy their shareholders because they are concerned with their 
future careers; and third it is ‘active monitoring’ by the board of directors. It is quite 
obvious that the first two mechanisms are managerial incentives, the former explicit and 
the latter implicit, while the third mechanism relates to the control structure.  
If owners want to ensure that managers will take the decisions which are in line with 
value maximisation of the company, then one of the ways is to link the compensation of 
managers with the performance of the company. Granting a manager “a highly 
contingent, long term incentive contract ex ante” will help in aligning his interests with 
those of the investors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 744). However, for these incentive 
contracts to work, they should feature some measure of performance. This measure 
must be highly correlated with the quality of the decisions taken by the manager and 
must be verifiable in court. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), one of the problems with incentive contracts is 
that they create vast opportunities for self-dealing for managers. This problem becomes 
worse if managers negotiate these contracts with poorly motivated boards rather than 
with large investors. This means that managers will negotiate contracts including share 
ownership if they know that share earnings or stock price are expected to rise. They can 
also manipulate the financial reporting system to overstate their performance. The 
strengths and shortcomings, as identified and explained above, make incentive contracts 
a mechanism perceived as helpful in aligning manager’s and owner’s interests but it can 
hardly be said that they solve the agency problem. 
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1.4 Property Rights Approach 
According to this line of thought, most of the corporate governance problems, as 
defined above, are at odds with the property rights theory where ownership is seen as a 
source of power. “One very simple implication of the theory is that, ceteris paribus, a 
party is more likely to own an asset if he or she has an important investment decision 
(where the investment decision might represent figuring out how to make the asset 
more productive or looking after the asset)” (Hart 1995a, p. 49). What this theory is 
suggesting is that, whenever possible, control is taken over by the owners since they 
stand to lose the most, or, one might speculate that managers will take ownership in 
order to avoid profit sharing or monitoring. In that case, there should be no corporate 
governance problem, since there is no more division between ownership and control.   
However, when elaborated in more detail, the situation depicted above is not very likely 
to happen often. Namely, it is impossible for a single person to own and manage all the 
activities of a modern corporation. For one, the sheer size of trans-continental 
corporations makes it physically impossible. Perhaps, the property rights approach in 
respect to corporate governance, is valid only for firms of certain size, i.e. sole-
proprietor or small family businesses.   
1.5 Stakeholder Approach 
According to (Cooper 2004, p.20) one of the fundamental features of this approach is 
that “it attempts to identify numerous different factions within a society to whom an 
organization may have some responsibility.” Hence, corporations should not be 
managed based on the profit maximising function if this means that by doing so, some 
of the stakeholder s’ interests are adversely affected. The view propagated by this group 
of researchers is explained by the following example: If a mining site closes down 
because it is no longer profitable for the shareowners and managers who stands to lose 
the most? 6  
Economic theory predicates that it is very likely that the shareowners have a diversified 
portfolio of investment (in our example this could be a larger number of mining sites 
                                                          
6 We are keeping the scenario very simple because we do not need to get involved in deeper 
argument for the purposes of this example. 
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and probably in different countries). The managers, as they belong to specialized and 
highly trained end of employment spectrum, have very good chances of getting another 
job fast. Hence, it is the actual miners who stand to lose the most since their human 
capital is mostly only their work experience in this particular mine. For this reason, if the 
employees would have a say in the decision to close the mine in our example, then most 
probably they would object. However, having the mine running means that the owners 
will have to suffer losses, or in a more optimistic scenario, they are making small profits 
but not as much as if they would if they closed the mine and moved the operations to a 
more profitable site or business.  
“Stakeholder theory holds that managers should make decisions that take account of 
the interests of all the stakeholders in a firm” (Jensen 2001, p.8). The challenge then is 
how to reconcile the interests of different stakeholders. One can argue that, if the 
decisions taken by a firm have more effects on other stakeholders than shareholders, 
then it is not irrational to ask that these stakeholder’s interests be taken into 
consideration during the decision-making process.  
The OECD Principle number IV of corporate governance (OECD 2004) addresses the role 
of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
As it can be seen from the citation above, OECD does not propose ‘forcing’ the 
corporations to take into consideration the interests of other stakeholders as 
encountered in Jensen (2001); it is calling for recognition of their rights.  
The extent of decision making process can be illustrated if the mine example used 
earlier is elaborated little further. Let us assume that the miner’s interest was 
considered during the decision-making process and the decision is to keep the mine 
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running. This decision would entail some opportunity cost7 for owners. The question 
then is why is it that only one faction of stakeholders has to bear the cost of improving 
the social wellbeing of all stakeholders? The other question is why would the 
shareholders accept to do this? One can argue that they are pressured by the 
government to take these losses. However, it is hard to sustain such assumption since by 
doing this, the government would be signalling the interference in the business affairs of 
companies, hence risking the loss of any future investment.  
However, defining who qualifies to be a stakeholder in a firm seems to be one of the 
shortcomings of this approach. Freeman (1984, p.31) refers to stakeholders as: “those 
groups without whose support the organisation would cease to exist.” Another 
definition by Freeman (1984, p.46) states that “any group or individual, who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of organisation’s objectives, is a stakeholder.” Jansson 
(2005, p.6) suggests that “each firm is unique and stakeholder groups have to be defined 
for each case”. She also finds that there is no unified way as to which stakeholders are 
given decision-making rights. According to her, although there are cases of these rights 
being granted to stakeholders, the way it is conducted is highly country specific. In the 
United States and the United Kingdom the stakeholders sometimes have 
representatives on the board of directors. Countries with two-tier systems will always 
have the supervisory board including worker representatives who in certain countries 
comprise up to one third of the board (Taylor, 2006). 
The ambiguity in defining the stakeholders and how they retain decision-making rights 
has adverse effects on the governance system. Jensen (2001, p.13) claims that “any 
theory of corporate decision-making must tell the decision makers, in this case, 
managers and boards of directors, how to choose among multiple constituencies with 
competing and, in some cases, conflicting interests.” The stakeholder theory, according 
to Jensen (2001, p.14) does not offer boards of directors and executives in firms any 
principled criterion for deciding which groups should be entitled to the stakeholder 
privilege. 
                                                          
7 The most straightforward of these costs would be in the form of lost profits. 
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Discussing the future of the stakeholder approach, Jansson (2005) points out the impact 
of capital markets and the convergence of governance structures. This impact, according 
to the author, will probably be of adverse nature for the stakeholder approach. That is, 
since the capital markets are now global and the movement of money is hardly 
restricted at all, it gives better opportunities to capitalists to chase short-term high-
return investments instead of low-return long-term ones, thus maximising the return on 
investments and downplaying the social responsibilities of the corporations as much as 
possible. Jansson suggests that the governance structures have a trend of moving 
toward a system which incorporates the power of large investors with the sort of control 
that is provided by the markets. 
Other researchers have been exploring the potential of stakeholder model, but they 
seem to have come up with more negative rather than positive attributes. Some argue 
that in contrast to shareholder approach, the concept of stakeholder society fails on 
three accounts. “(1) It makes up for the dearth of pledgeable income. (2) It provides 
more focus and sharper incentives to managers. (3) Undivided control prevents foot-
dragging and deadlock in decision-making” (Tirole 2001, p.32).  
Furthermore, according to Hansman and Kraakman (2001), corporate governance 
should protect only the shareholders’ interest while contractual and regulatory means 
should protect other corporate constituencies such as creditors, employees, suppliers 
and consumers. They do, however, recognize the importance of permitting boards to 
consider interests of stakeholders in special situations such as mounting takeover 
defences.  
1.5.1 Legal Protection 
In a series of papers La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the legal approach is the best way 
to understand the corporate governance problem. To them, the main corporate 
governance problem, as stated before, is the expropriation of outside investors by the 
insiders. Furthermore, minority investors stand to be expropriated by large investors too 
(La Porta et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). By now, there is a vast number of ways 
in which expropriation can take place and for this group of researchers, it is up to the 
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legal system if, and to what extent, the insiders are allowed to misuse their position for 
their own benefit. 
The methodology utilized by La Porta et al. (2000) classify legal systems into four groups: 
English and German - common law systems; and Scandinavian and French - civil law 
systems. They state that international differences in investor protection are of historical 
nature and they argue that each system carries from the past characteristics which are 
embedded in the structure of the legal system. They further show that there is a direct 
correlation between the quality of the law and the quality of corporate governance in a 
country.8 They also find through empirical research that Civil Law countries (based on 
the Roman law) underperform in comparison to Common Law countries when 
protection of outside investors is concerned. 
Commenting on the ‘legal origin approach’,9 Pagano and Volpin (2005) say that one of 
the problems of this approach is that it lacks predictive power. However, building on the 
work of La Porta et al., they investigate if the political theory can explain international 
differences in regulation. 
In their model of an economy there are three types of agents: entrepreneurs, rentiers10 
and workers. The Political system and political vote play a crucial role in this model since 
there is a possibility that in elections, after the firm has been set up, the law can be 
changed by a political vote. For this reason, when people enter into agreements, they 
should consider the possible outcome of elections. The willingness of external investors 
to provide equity finance is affected by the degree of protection they expect to enjoy 
from company law.  
In accordance with corporate governance theory, rentiers in this model, as well as 
minority shareholders, want strong investor protection in order to limit entrepreneurs’ 
opportunities to misuse their powers. Pagano and Volpin argue that if the political 
debate would be concerned only with the level of investor protection, then the solution 
                                                          
8 However, one must be careful when talking about the quality of the law not to take into 
account only the written law but also the enforcement of the law. A perfect written law is 
worthless without proper enforcement.    
9 Approach introduced by La Porta et al. (2000) 
10 “Rentiers are people whose main source of income is financial wealth. In the model they are 
non-controlling shareholders” (Pagano and Volpin 2005, p.1006) 
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could be found in balancing the powers between rentiers and entrepreneurs. However, 
another important class of stakeholders in firms is their employees.  
Interests of employees are crucial to the model since as a group they tend to be 
ideologically cohesive. They also constitute a large fraction of the vote. In other words, 
employees are capable of extending political debate to labour issues like protection 
against dismissal, etc.  
For these reasons, Pagano and Volpin model the political agenda focusing on two sets of 
laws that affect stakeholders: company law, setting the extent of shareholder 
protection; and labour law, determining employee protection against dismissal.  
Their main result is that a proportional voting11 system provides strong employment 
protection and weak shareholder protection. This is consistent with the Continental 
European countries and Japan which tend to have proportional electoral systems. They 
all have weak investor protection and strong employee protection. In contrast to that, 
Anglo-Saxon countries with their majoritarian electoral system have strong investor 
protection and weak employee protection.  
i. Large Investors 
In most countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom and the United States, 
large investors, often owning more than half of the shares, are very much present and 
involved in governing companies. Roe (1994) finds that large ownership in United States, 
especially majority ownership, is not that common because of the laws in place. Such 
laws restrict large ownership by banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and other 
institutions to prevent excessive control. However, in other countries such as Germany 
and Japan, large shareholders are the norm. German banks, often through proxy voting 
arrangements, exercise substantial control in major companies. The logical explanation 
for this, in accordance with La Porta et al. (2000), is that it is a substitute for the legal 
protection of investors.  “If legal protection does not give enough control rights to small 
                                                          
11 Proportional electoral system is the one where winning the majority of votes is crucial while a 
Majoritarian electoral system is when a contestant needs the majority of districts to win.  
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investors to induce them to part with their money, then perhaps investors can get more 
effective control rights by being large” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 753).12 
Large shareowners are able, and have the incentive to monitor management. They also 
have enough power to exercise control and enforce their decisions through boards since 
they usually are adequately represented. As such, the free rider problem is not an issue 
with large shareholders. Also the agency problem in respect to management is remedied 
to a large extent.  
The power concentrated in an organized group of shareholders means that they can 
stand up to the management and in the extreme, they can target and deal with an 
individual ‘disobedient’ manager. This element adds to other contractual incentives to 
align manager’s and shareholder’s interests, the latter general being profit-
maximization.  
Of course, when a company is controlled by one single shareholder (or a family), other 
problems might arise as a result of excessive control. One potential outcome is that the 
rest of the shareholders might be expropriated. To prevent outcomes of this nature, 
laws which prevent large ownership or laws that protect the rest of the shareholders are 
put in operation. 
In practice this means that in order to ensure monitoring and control, functions 
performed by laws in some countries, shareholders concentrate the ownership in the 
hands of few large investors. The common forms in which large investors are organized 
are: takeovers and large creditors. 
                                                          
12 A good example of large investors is when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a family. 
As the research by Morck et al. (2005) has shown, the family firm uses a control pyramid to force 
their decisions on the underlying firms through, for example, the following mechanism: The 
family firm controls more than 50 per cent of a firm, which controls more than 50 per cent of the 
lower level firm and so on. This way, the family firm with relatively low percentage of cash flow 
stakes, can control all the firms to the bottom of the pyramid.  Family firms are present in most 
countries except for the United Kingdom and the United States, and their existence can raise a 
number of corporate governance concerns. The biggest concern is the fact that most of the 
country’s corporate sector is in the hands of very few, and they can manoeuvre capital allocation, 
deter entry by outside entrepreneurs and impede growth in general.    
  
Introduction to Corporate Governance 
28 
ii. Takeovers 
“One of the most radical and spectacular mechanisms for disciplining and replacing 
managers is a hostile takeover” (Becht et al. 2005, p.13). In a hostile takeover, the 
bidder makes an offer to the owners of outstanding shares or a fraction of them, and if 
the targeted shareholders accept the offer, the bidder “acquires control of the target 
firm and so can replace, or at least control the management” (Shleifer and Vishny 
p.756). Thus, takeovers can be considered as a very efficient tool for disciplining 
management and for ownership concentration.  
The fact that takeovers usually target poorly performing firms supports the view of 
those who claim that takeovers address corporate governance problems. However, 
according to Becht et al. (2005) this is a highly costly and disruptive mechanism and 
apart from United States and United Kingdom, where it is rarely used, it is virtually non-
existent. There are valid reasons why this is so, and especially with respect to their 
effectiveness as a corporate governance tool.  
Firstly, because of their costs, takeovers are usually seen as the last resort to address 
only major performance failures. Secondly, “acquisitions can actually increase agency 
costs when the bidding management overpay for acquisitions that bring them private 
benefits of control” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p756). Thirdly, in a hostile takeover, 
bidders need to have access to vast amounts of capital on very short notice. Only a 
liquid capital market can provide such support and it is not a secret that these markets 
are a luxury that only a few developed nations can afford. Finally, hostile takeovers are 
strongly opposed by managerial lobbies, hence very prone to political influences. “In the 
mid-1980s, several US states passed legislation making hostile takeovers more difficult” 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000, p.203). In other countries the non-existence of hostile 
takeovers in the first place can be explained by such political opposition. 
iii. Large Creditors 
Large creditors are brought into the corporate governance picture by their possession of 
liquid funds. Banks, insurance companies, pension funds and others have funds they can 
lend at short notice. However, when a company is credited with a large loan by one of 
these institutions, then it is quite natural that they will be interested and concerned 
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about how this loan will be used and how it will perform. For this reason large creditors 
will attempt, and in many cases succeed, to influence the decision making process of the 
company they are crediting. “Pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies 
often buy large stakes in corporations and could take an active role in monitoring 
management” (Becht et al. 2005). The advantage of greater activism by large creditors, 
according to Becht et al. is that fund managers are not very likely to engage in self-
dealing hence they are almost the ideal monitors of management. The down side to this 
argument is that fund managers themselves do not have any direct financial pledge in 
the companies they invest thus they lack the incentives for monitoring that large 
shareholders may have.  
The effectiveness of large creditors and large shareholders as corporate governance 
mechanisms depends heavily on their legal rights, which are different in different 
countries. The powers of the banks in respect to companies are very significant in 
Germany and Japan. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), this is because they own 
blocks of shares, they sit on boards of directors, and they operate in a legal environment 
which is favourable to creditors.  
Still, all large investors need some legal protection. The main advantage of large 
investors (except for takeovers) is that they rely on simple legal interventions, which can 
be handled even by poorly motivated and informed courts (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Thus, it can be said that large investors burden the legal system less than the small ones. 
This could be the explanation why they are so prevalent in most countries of the world. 
1.6 Specific Governance Arrangements 
This section will briefly discuss some financial arrangements which are customarily used 
by large investors to address the agency problem through giving the owners more 
monitoring and control powers. Such arrangements are: (a) the debt versus equity 
choice, and (b) Leveraged buyouts or LBOs. 
1.6.1 The Debt Versus Equity Choice 
“An essential feature of debt is that a failure by the borrower to adhere to the contract, 
triggers the transfer of some control rights from him to the lender” (Shleifer and Vishny 
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1997, p. 762). This essential feature of debt is derived from the specific nature of this 
kind of contract. Namely, the lender agrees to lend funds to the borrower based on the 
promise of pre-specified flow of future payments. Additionally, the borrower must 
promise to respect a string of covenants such as maintaining the value of assets inside 
the firm. Such covenants may include, but not be restricted to, constraining future 
borrowings by the incumbent or other lenders, imposing their approval on important 
decisions, and so on. These constraints (covenants) increase the level of control by 
creditors thus reducing the agency problem. If any of the covenants is violated, or there 
is a failure to meet any of the promised payments, certain rights pass to the lender and 
he is able to repossess some assets or throw the company into bankruptcy.   
The opportunity to get extensive control in a relatively short period of time13 
presumably gives extra confidence to the investors that they can intervene to save all or 
most of their investment. Another very important factor is that “the rights of creditors 
are clearer, and violations of those rights are easier to verify in courts” (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, p.763) which supports the fact that debt provides better protection to 
outside investors than equity in situations where higher risk is involved. 
1.6.2 LBOs 
To Roden and Lewellen (1995) the capital structure of a typical LBO firm resembles an 
inverted pyramid. Large amounts of senior secured debt provided by banks are at the 
top. The middle, ‘mezzanine’ financing, consists of unsecured subordinated long-term 
debt which can be raised from both public and private offerings to individual and 
institutional investors. They are commonly referred to as ‘junk’ or ‘high-yield’ bonds, 
and usually are securities which generally have longer maturities than the senior bank 
debt (p.79). Comparatively small amounts of preferred and common equity, most of 
which are provided by the buyout group, including the management of the newly 
acquired firm, are at the bottom of the pyramid.  
Since the assets of the targeted firm are used as the leverage for the buyout, there is a 
certain expectation to perform by the acquired firm as the operations should generate 
                                                          
13 The assumption here is that violation of covenants foreseen in the debt contract are as easily 
spotted as a failure to meet the payment on time. 
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enough cash flow to service the debt. This helps the alignment of interests of the 
providers of finance from the top, mezzanine to the bottom level of the pyramid where 
management usually is, thus ameliorating the agency problem (Roden and Lewellen, 
1995).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 766) find that, consistently with the idea that agency 
problems are reduced by large investors, the available evidence indicates that LBOs are 
efficient organizations. However, other reasons why this mechanism appeals to large 
investors might include the enormous returns. Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987, p. 318) 
suggest that these returns come primarily through “cost savings realized through the 
elimination of both agency costs and transaction costs attributable to a public 
corporation, as well as the possible tax savings associated with debt financing”. They 
also find empirical evidence of abnormal returns to shareholders as a result of buyout. 
Thus, leveraged buyouts often are viewed as a very lucrative value-generating 
mechanism affordable only to a few investors. 
1.7 Classifications of Corporate Governance 
Researchers have identified, very broadly, two systems of corporate governance: the 
Anglo-American market-based system and the German-Japanese, long-term large 
investor models or system (Becht et al., 2005, p.32). Or as some other researchers put it: 
Anglo-Saxon market-oriented (which is Anglo-American) division against Japanese 
network-based that is adopted by some European countries too (Groot, 1998). This 
section will adopt this over-simplified broad division of corporate governance systems 
and highlight the main features of each. This division is suitable since all corporate 
governance systems have elements of one or the other.  
1.7.1 Anglo-American Model  
Countries that adopt this corporate governance system, led by the United Kingdom and 
the United States, generally have well developed and deep capital markets, widely 
diffused ownership structure and well established rules and regulations governing the 
capital market, and rely on markets to guide their companies. Although the two 
countries are put together in one category, there is a significant difference between the 
United Kingdom and the United States corporate governance practices. While in the 
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United Kingdom the position of the Chief Executive Officer is not held by the Chairman 
of the Board, in the United States, despite significant reservations of the practitioners 
and academics, it is the norm to do so (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al. 2000). 
On the positive side, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance highlights the 
shareholder interests. The non-executive, or independent, directors of a single-tiered 
Board of directors are elected by shareholders. In most cases they hold key positions 
such as compensation and audit committees, and outnumber the executive directors. 
The markets are generally able to reward or punish the good or bad performance of the 
companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al. 2000).  
On the negative side, this system gives more discretion to managers due to shareholders 
being small and dispersed, and not engaged in monitoring or other corporate 
governance activities. Among other reasons why shareholders are not active, even when 
they are in a position to be so, is the free rider problem. Also, La Porta et al. (2000) find 
that countries that provide better legal protection usually have dispersed and small 
shareowners who are not so active in exercising some of their rights such as monitoring. 
“One of the main criticisms of Anglo-American market-based corporate governance has 
been that managers tend to be obsessed with quarterly performance measures and 
have an excessively short-termist perspective.” (Becht et al. 2005, p. 33). This behaviour 
is induced by the threat of hostile takeovers, thus managers are interested in 
performing well in the short term. This has caused some researchers to call the Anglo-
American model ‘the myopic’ model (Charkam, 1994; Keasey et al., 1998; Becht et al., 
2005).  
Sceptics of this model use the example of Enron to blame corporate governance 
structures for its collapse. According to Becht et al. (2005, p. 36), “Enron had all the 
characteristics of an exemplary ‘Anglo-American’ corporation.” Yet, as stock prices of 
the corporation were dropping, the remuneration of the executives was not. Similar 
behaviour was observed during the last financial crisis where top managers of bankrupt 
or loss making banks were awarded hefty bonuses for the same period. 
Despite these criticisms, the economies of countries belonging to the Anglo-American 
classification of corporate governance, especially the United Kingdom and the United 
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States, have continued to grow, and their corporate governance systems which allow 
exit of shareholders at relatively low cost, have proved to be efficient systems. The focus 
of this system being shareholder value maximisation appears to be one of the strong 
points of Anglo-American corporate governance system which allows these economies 
to grow. There are those who question whether the German corporate governance 
system is converging to the Anglo-American system due to German firms progressively 
applying the shareholder value principle in the future (Goergen et al. 2008). 
1.7.2 German-Japanese Model 
The key feature of this model is the existence of large investors such as banks and other 
financial institutions. Because they are able to invest large funds, they are interested in 
getting more involved in the corporate governance of the company they are funding. 
This, on its own, addresses the free rider problem of the Anglo-American model. Also 
large investors are able to commit to and facilitate long term investments while 
monitoring the managers, which addresses another of the main problems of the Anglo-
American model. 
Proponents of this model argue that the close relationship maintained with banks and 
other long-term debt and equity holders gives companies access to capital at lower cost 
than their counterparts in the United States and United Kingdom. This means that 
projects which would be refused by American or English financiers on the ground of 
profitability would be embraced by the German or Japanese financiers (Keasey et al. 
1998). 
Most researchers agree that the Japanese culture and mentality has strongly influenced 
their corporate governance system. “One aspect of Japanese corporate governance that 
has been praised in the 1980s, is the long run nature of relationships between the 
multiple constituencies in the corporation14, which made greater involvement by 
employees and suppliers possible” (Becht et al. 2005, p. 33).  
The main problem with this model, though, is the position of small shareholders. 
Because the practice in these countries is based on the presence of large shareholders, 
                                                          
14 One can argue that this greater participation has helped with the introduction of ‘just in time’ 
or ‘lean production’ methods in Japanese manufacturing firms. 
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there is a chance that small shareholders and/or small investors are in a 
disadvantageous situation and run the risk of being expropriated by large shareholders. 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the lack of legal protection for small shareholders 
induced these countries to end up with large investors as a solution to the agency 
problem.  
1.7.3 Is There a Best System? 
Some researchers consider the Anglo-American corporate governance system to be 
better than its continental counterpart (Hansman and Kraakman 2001). The relative 
flexibility of entry to, and exit from, shareholding at low cost make this system appealing 
to many. However, the legal and regulatory standards for being able to run this system 
of corporate governance are relatively high, which makes the Anglo-American system 
only suitable for developed countries with developed financial markets and democratic 
political systems, something which, on a global scale, is more exception than rule.15  
On the other hand, the German-Japanese system of corporate governance is a system 
that has successfully managed to overcome the agency problems in successful 
corporations in the two countries. This system, as pointed out by Keasey at al. (1998), 
has the necessary institutions in place to provide large amounts of financial support at 
competitive cost and short time, in order to assist the realisation of big projects. 
Although historically associated with weaker legal systems, this is not the case at least 
for the European countries and Japan that adhere to the German-Japanese system of 
corporate governance.  
In a survey of empirical studies, Khanna et al. (2006) find that there is no convergence to 
a single corporate governance system. Rather, countries create corporate governance 
systems similar to their regional neighbours. With each system having their positive and 
                                                          
15 This is not to be taken as a statement that countries belonging to the German-Japanese system 
are not developed economies or democratic societies. This cannot be further from the truth for 
the two countries that lend the name to the category. However, Megginson and Netter (2001) 
point out the case of the denationalisation of two corporations in 1960s where the German 
Government had the majority ownership, Volkswagen and VEBA, in a public offering which was 
designed to favour small shareholders, but within four years, the small shareholders needed to 
be bailed out by the government.     
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negative sides, it is hard for academics and/or markets to produce a clear cut answer to 
which system is best. 
Charkham (1994) discusses corporate governance in the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Japan, pointing out their similarities and differences against two 
criteria: the ‘dynamism’ and the ‘accountability’ of the system. His study does not draw 
clear cut conclusions; however, the German system performs slightly better than the 
others when compared against these criteria. As for the quality of the corporate 
governance, Charkham (1994, p.353) argues that “the test of a good system is not the 
number of companies from which poor CEOs are removed, but the number of times a  
CEO is so competent that he or she can reach retiring age in place”. In contrast to 
Charkham, Graff (2005) finds that the system in common law countries (Anglo-
American) is better compared to the civil law countries (German-Japanese system) 
based on the nine criteria of investor protection laws that the systems are pitted 
against.16  
The conclusion Graff draws from the literature is that the common law system generally 
provides a more favourable basis for financial development and economic growth. The 
idea that the legal tradition has pronounced effects with respect to shareholder 
protection is supported by this analysis (p. 20).  
In conclusion, since the economic and legal development of any given country plays such 
a significant role in the corporate governance, it can probably be said that the system 
which is the best for a given country is dependent on the level of economic and legal 
development of that country at that particular moment. However, this can change over 
time and a country for which the German-Japanese system was best up to a certain 
point in its development, might change to the Anglo-American one as it suits it better, or 
vice-versa.  
                                                          
16 The criteria used are: 1) One-share one-vote; 2) Proxy by mail; 3) Shares not blocked; 4) 
Cumulative voting; 5) Oppressed minority; 6) Pre-emptive rights; 7) Extraordinary meetings, 8) 
Anti-director rights; and 9) Mandatory dividend. 
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1.8 Ownership and Corporate Governance in Transitional 
Economies 
The 1990s witnessed one of the most dramatic events of the 20th Century: the implosion 
of the socialist system in Europe and the start of the so-called “transition process”, the 
transformation of these countries to market economies. These transition economies 
(TEs) went through a series of major reforms in order to build the foundations and 
institutions of a market economy. As Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1999) point out, transition 
can be broadly defined as a set of actions toward:  
 Liberalization (prices, foreign trade, market operations and other economic 
activities); 
 Macroeconomic stabilization (by market-oriented instruments); 
 Privatization (to improve enterprise management and economic efficiency);  
 Institution building and rule of law (to secure property rights, transparency, 
etc.). 
The Corporate Governance debate began when the discussion of privatisation and the 
transformation of ownership reached the agenda of the government in these countries. 
In this section therefore we will briefly consider the experiences of TEs in the process of 
ownership restructuring before discussing the effect of ownership on corporate 
performance and the particularities of corporate governance in TEs.  
1.8.1 Ownership Restructuring in TEs  
Privatisation was considered a cornerstone of the transition process as the evidence 
from middle-income and developed countries suggested that this helped enterprises 
improve their efficiency (Estrin et al. 2009).  Privatisation in post-communist countries 
was a major task (compared to Western economies) because there was no experience of 
private ownership, and the citizens did not have much saving to pay for the privatised 
assets. Different methods of privatisation were tried in different countries and the issue 
of corporate governance arose in the course of the implementation of these methods. 
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A quantitative survey by Djankov and Murrell (2002) finds a positive relationship 
between privatisation and enterprise restructuring, and that enterprises with state 
ownership are among the least effective form of ownership. Estrin et al. (2009) too find 
that privatisation to foreign owners has improved the performance of firms in all 
transition economies.  This is supported also by Megginson and Netter (2001) as their 
survey supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more 
profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms. When the foreign ownership 
is concentrated, the positive relationship between performance and privatisation is even 
stronger (Estrin et al. 2009).      
These studies generally maintain that privatisation would lead to improved performance 
of companies because it creates an incentive for owners to monitor the managers and 
ensure that the managers’ interests are aligned to theirs. They also face the same 
problem as in market economies: when ownership is dispersed, there is greater agency 
problem and managers have greater discretion which they may use for their own 
benefits. Thus the idea of large shareholders or concentrated ownership as a means of 
pursuing owners’ interests becomes very relevant in these countries (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
Another conundrum faced by the governments was which method of privatisation to 
apply. The inability of price liberalisation and other reforms to provide sufficient 
incentives for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to reform and become competitive 
combined with potential de-capitalisation of firms by managers and workers in the 
absence of rapid clear property rights, favours fast privatisation. On the other hand, 
enabling the government to use a strategy which results in fewer employees (voters) to 
be fired, favours slow/gradual privatisation (Estrin et al. 2009). More broadly, countries 
which employed rapid privatisation methods managed to eliminate the dependence of 
firms on the state budget quickly, while countries which were reluctant to pursue 
reforms rigorously still finance losses of large state-owned companies (Djankov, 1998).    
The transition literature discusses four types of privatisation (e.g., Megginson and 
Netter, 2001): i) Privatization through restitution is a method which is appropriate when 
land or other easily identifiable property that was nationalised by communist 
governments in the past can be returned to either the original owners or to their heirs. 
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ii) Privatization through sale of state property for cash. This category can take two 
forms: direct sales to an individual or a group of investors; and share issue privatization 
through a public share offering. iii) Mass (or voucher) privatization, whereby eligible 
citizens can use distributed vouchers (which may be free or at nominal cost) to bid for 
stakes in assets being privatized. iv) Privatization to employees of SOEs whereby the 
ownership of companies are transferred to management and/or employees (in some 
cases a minimum proportion of employees had to sign up to a proposal for it to be 
accepted). 
Djankov and Murrell (2000) present three groupings of owners in terms of their 
effectiveness as owners. At the top, also representing the most effective ownership 
group, are managers, concentrated individual ownership, investment funds, and 
foreigners. Insiders, dispersed outsiders, banks, and commercialized state ownership are 
clustered into the middle level. Traditional state ownership and diffuse individual 
ownership which produce similar corporate governance effects lie at the bottom.  
A broader approach groups privatisation methods applied in TEs into three categories: 
Privatisation to outsiders (usually foreign investors); Privatisation to insiders or 
management-employee buy-outs (MEBO); and Mass (or voucher) privatisation. Each of 
these methods has its implications for company performance and more importantly to 
this thesis, for corporate governance structures. 
Privatisation to foreign investors would imply that the company potentially would 
benefit from well-established corporate governance practices in the country of origin of 
investors and pay more attention to business ethics. In most cases, foreign investors 
would apply these standards as per requirements in their country of origin, thus 
exercising peer pressure on the local TEs industries where they operate and regulatory 
bodies. Also, this form of privatisation generates concentrated share ownership 
meaning that the agency problem is smaller compared to other forms of privatisation. 
 Privatisation to insiders through MEBO proved to be successful in the initial stages of 
transition since the new owners (old managers) had extensive knowledge of the 
companies, invested in new technology, laid off the surplus workforce, looked for 
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foreign partnerships and were ready to sell controlling stakes to outsiders in order to 
generate fresh financial capital.  
Mass (or voucher) privatisation has the advantage of providing the citizens, who have 
contributed (albeit involuntarily) during the socialist system to establish and maintain 
these companies, a chance to obtain a stake in ownership for free or at symbolic prices. 
However, this form of privatisation creates a dispersed ownership structure and makes 
the company vulnerable to all kinds of agency problems. As Błaszczyk et al. (2003) point 
out, mass privatisation creates diffuse ownership structures which, in the environment 
of weak legal frameworks, lead to poor corporate governance and the lack of deep 
restructuring. In order to address these problems, new financial institutions, usually 
referred to as privatisation investment funds were introduced to serve as financial 
intermediaries in the post-privatisation period with the intention to provide an 
opportunity for ownership concentration and portfolio diversification, but without 
excessive fragmentation of individual holdings (Uvalic et al. 1999). But investment funds 
themselves were dispersed institutions with poor corporate governance and in many 
cases, especially in the Czech Republic, were associated with the expropriation of 
owners through the so-called ‘tunnelling’ process (Błaszczyk et al. 2003, pp. 35-36). 
The trade-offs among three prevalent privatisation methods are summarized in the 
following Table 1-1. 
Table 1-1 - Privatisation Methods in TEs and their Implications 
Method Better 
Corporate 
Governance 
Speed and 
Feasibility 
Better 
Access to 
Skills Capital 
More 
Government 
Revenue 
Greater 
Fairness 
Sale to 
Outsiders 
for money 
+ - + + - 
MEBO - + - - - 
Mass 
Privatisation 
? + ? - + 
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Source: World Bank (1996) 
A simple glance at this table shows that the method of privatisation through sale to 
outsiders is the one that generates more benefits for the company and the state. 
Certainly it has a positive impact on corporate governance of the privatised company in 
contrast to the manager-employee buyouts or mass privatisations. With MEBO and mass 
privatisation, governments had to encourage and facilitate further, secondary 
privatisation (Błaszczyk, Hoshi and Woodward, 2003). 
Kozarzewski and Woodward (2001) investigating the MEBO type privatisation, also 
referred to as the direct method, in Poland find that immediately after the initial 
privatisation the ownership structure of the employee – leased companies was 
dispersed, but then the structure tends towards more concentrated format by shares 
changing hands from non-managerial employees to insider elites and outside investors. 
In addition, they find that, during the secondary privatisation, it is more often the poor 
performing companies that favour concentration and ‘outsiderization’17 which have 
implications for the corporate governance of these companies also.  
In a subsequent study, Woodward and Kozarzewski (2004) looking at data from 84 large 
companies selected from Poland’s 500 largest privatised companies and employee – 
leased companies for the period 1997-2000 used in their previous study, find evidence 
of a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and the performance of 
employee – leased companies as measured by total revenues. This relationship was not 
statistically significant for the 84 large companies.  
The surveys of the literature on privatisation process in transition economies 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Estrin et al., 2009)   as well as 
the studies referred to above seem to suggest that the concentrated ownership is more 
likely to result in improvements in the performance of companies and, in addition, 
foreign concentrated ownership is more favourable. One of the reasons can be better 
corporate governance practices of companies with concentrated or foreign ownership. 
                                                          
17 By this term authors describe the process of ownership changeover from polish to foreign 
shareholders. 
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1.8.2 Corporate Governance in TEs 
Privatization is usually accompanied by changes in a country’s legal system with some, 
the industrialized countries, that often need to make some changes to their corporate 
governance systems, and the others, usually transition economies, that have to create 
such system almost from scratch (Megginson and Netter, 2001). With the privatization 
processes occurring at the same time as other significant changes in the economy, 
including the legal system, it is hard to isolate the impact of corporate governance alone 
on firm operations.  
Mládek and Hashi (1993) point out a potential corporate governance problem that 
privatised companies may face. The transition period for many enterprises is an 
”interregnum”, a period in which the question of corporate governance remains 
unsettled, thus opening a gap for managerial abuse of resources. This is because during 
the transition, the government's control on enterprises has largely weakened but private 
owners who may influence the enterprise management have not yet taken control of 
enterprise affairs fully. During this period, the control of enterprises rests largely in the 
hands of the incumbent managers who might choose to maximise their own welfare 
rather than that of the government or the eventual owners of the companies. Their 
finding is supported by the empirical research of Sachs et al. (2000) who find that only 
functioning legal and regulatory institutions which support ownership can ensure that 
owners can exercise their rights to pressure firms to improve their performance. This is 
just one aspect of the agency problem which accompanied the transition of ownership 
in former communist countries. 
Transition economies needed a corporate governance system which helps in building 
well-functioning institutions for economic growth; contributes to efficient capital 
allocation and development of financial markets; and assists in attracting foreign 
investment (Nestor et al., 2000). In addition to fresh foreign capital for the core business 
activities, corporate governance practices in transition countries are enriched as foreign 
investors routinely bring the top level managers from their own countries and they 
impose corporate governance practices which are more advanced than those of the 
transition economy. In addition, they invest in training of personnel and because in most 
cases they tend to sell to markets of developed economies, they impose high standards 
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of corporate governance and business ethics (Estrin et al. 2009). Also, foreign 
investment usually is represented in a concentrated form of ownership, which helps the 
alignment of interests of managers and shareholders, thus lessening the agency 
problem. 
This is important in view of the fact that the transition economies hardly possessed the 
financial culture of shareholding. In a study of corporate ownership of companies 
privatised through mass privatisation, Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) find that in 
cases where initially the number of shareholders was below 100,000 this number 
increased within five years, while in companies with 250,000 shareholders or more, the 
number of shareholders reduced on average by 33 per cent within the same period. The 
conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that the markets have adjusted the 
number of shareholders somewhere in the interval between more than 100,000 and less 
than 250,000. Megginson and Nettel (2001) find evidence that most of the shareholders 
of large privatised companies do not hold other stock, but since the long term results 
are generally positive, thus inducing stockowners to hold on to their shares, this might 
imply that governments can rely on stock exchanges and the corporate governance to 
be able to absorb future floatation (privatisation) of large publically owned companies. 
They also find that mass privatisations provide a spur to corporate governance of 
transition economies, as usually these processes are preceded by the creation of a legal 
framework and institutions needed to support the diffused ownership.    
Claessens et al. (1997) show that in case of the Czech Republic, mass privatisation 
managed to effectively improve firm management after it resulted in a concentrated 
ownership structure. Using a cross section sample of 706 firms for the period 1992-95, 
they find a positive correlation between concentrated ownership and firm’s market 
valuation and profitability. Particularly important in improving corporate governance is 
large ownership through bank-sponsored investment and strategic investors. Although it 
is often argued that possession of (indirect) control by the firm’s bank can be viewed as 
a conflict of interest, the empirical analysis here shows that such control has positive 
and significant influence. In general, banks owning equity stakes in a firm exert a 
positive influence on the firm’s corporate governance.  
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In contrast to Claessens et al., Błaszczyk et al. (2003) find that the high ownership 
concentration as a corporate governance control tool is not effective in dealing with 
agency problems. High concentration is expected to improve corporate governance, as it 
might lead to the replacement of old management with a new one, which may have a 
role in improving company performance. This was certainly true for some companies in 
the Polish National Investment Fund program. However, in most Polish companies, their 
findings suggest that the concentration process was not associated with improvements 
in performance. 
Black (2001) finds that in context of Russian companies, the ones implementing best 
corporate governance practices were valued a hundred times more by stock markets 
compared to the companies with worst practices, which indicates that improvements 
may be achieved if more effective institutions are in place. Djankov and Murrell (2002) 
also offer some indirect evidence on the importance of corporate governance 
institutions. They find that the owner category which is most dependent on institutional 
support (i.e. corporate governance) are diffuse individual owners and outsiders. 
Countries which managed to provide better institutional support in their sample had 
more foreign owners and a larger dispersion of ownership. 
The Estrin et al. (2009) survey suggests that the mass privatisation method is a 
hindrance to the establishment of effective corporate governance in transition countries 
due to the chain of agency problems it creates by the appearance of financial 
intermediaries in possession of privatisation vouchers. Also, this way of privatisation 
may be responsible for the delay in the appearance of secondary capital markets in 
transition economies (Estrin, 2002). 
Kozarzewski and Woodward (2001), following the ownership transformation of 
employee owned companies, note that the transformation tended to result in one of 
three structures: 1) perpetuation of a dispersed shareholding structure, with dominance 
of insiders; 2) consolidation of ownership in the hands of insider elites; and 3) 
concentration of ownership in the hands of outside investors. A number of factors 
influence the dynamics and the direction of ownership changes, with the economic 
condition of the company being amongst the most important ones as, when the 
company is poor, concentration and "outsiderization" of ownership is most likely to 
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ensue. However, the study suggests that despite the outsiderization process, the 
position of insiders in terms of corporate governance was strengthened for the period 
1997-1998. The employee-owned companies continue to concentrate ownership in the 
hands of insiders, while companies owned by outsiders encourage the involvement of 
employees in bodies of corporate governance. Some other specifics related to corporate 
governance of Polish companies presented by the study are: the supervisory board was 
introduced as a new body into the governance of Polish enterprises, and this body 
becomes more active in companies which are in economic distress and where there is 
no dominant owner group. In employee-owned companies the management (executive) 
boards were dominated by the same people that used to manage the companies before 
their privatisation, and the changes in management had most often happened in 
companies where outside ownership was in excess of 50 per cent. In companies where 
the ownership was concentrated in the hands of single or few strategic investors, the 
owners were very active in the decision making process. 
Błaszczyk et al. (2003) investigated the role of investment funds in the corporate 
governance of companies in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia. These funds are 
considered to be one of the worst by-products of privatisation, as they were intended to 
address the principal-agent problem by helping concentrate ownership in companies 
with dispersed ownership. They were expected to sell their shares and perpetuate 
further concentration of ownership, thus reducing the principal-agent problem. In 
practice, however, the investment funds did not live up to these expectations. The funds 
did not have the capacity nor the incentives to get involved in improving corporate 
governance and company performance, but rather they did the opposite and got 
involved in schemes used to drain companies of their assets, a concept that has been 
known since as ‘tunnelling’ (Błaszczyk et al. 2003, pp. 35-36). The inability of investment 
funds to solve corporate governance problems in transition economies is attributed to 
the poor level of development of capital markets in these economies (Uvalic et al. 1999).  
This summary of the literature review on transition economies shows that the 
privatisation process had a significant impact on corporate governance of these 
economies. The intensity of the impact depended on the method of privatisation. 
Different methods had different effects on corporate governance (some facilitated or 
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encouraged better corporate governance practices and some did not). Privatisation to 
foreign investors provided most advantages in respect of corporate governance as they 
were subjected to corporate governance standards and practices of the mother 
company which were far more advanced than the ones imposed by legal and regulatory 
requirements of the transition country (Estrin et al. 2009). The second best method of 
privatisation was MEBO as this allowed for the continuity of activities with more or less 
similar pace as before the privatisation, yet due to the properly aligned incentives of 
management, who became owners after privatisation, the agency problem was not a 
major issue. However, for this form of privatisation relies on corporate governance 
framework, and legal protection to be successful (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). The least 
favourable method of privatisation in terms of corporate governance was the mass-
privatisation. This method produced dispersed ownership that the legal systems of the 
transition countries were unable to cope with. As a consequence, governments or 
markets had to intermediate a process of ownership concentration through secondary 
privatisation which in some cases lead to outsiderization of ownership (Błaszczyk and 
Woodward, 2001; Kozarzewski and Woodward, 2001). 
1.9 Conclusion 
So far, corporate governance research has raised more questions than answers. What 
causes the corporate governance problems and what might be the consequences of 
particular governance structures are difficult to define (Mehran 2003, p.3). Hart (1995a, 
b) and Mayer (1996) suggest that lack of trust and commitment are at the core of the 
corporate governance problem, thus identifying two important factors which might play 
a significant role in corporate governance. This may entail situations where managers 
wish to maximise their welfare at the expense of shareholders, or when large 
shareholders in collusion with management want to expropriate minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000b; Berglof and Von Thadden, 1999). 
Nevertheless, researchers keep looking for solutions to corporate governance problem, 
which many argue stems from the separation of ownership and control as identified by 
Berle and Means (1932).  
The way relationships between these entities are regulated depends on the level of 
economic development and the development of the legal system of a country. Countries 
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with better developed legal systems, mainly the common law system, seem to better 
support the diffused ownership as the corporate governance of these countries provides 
sufficient protection for minority shareholders. The countries with civil law systems, 
without prejudice to the quality of their legal system, seem to host more concentrated 
ownership. Historically, large shareholders were the market response to poor legal 
protection and corporate governance frameworks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In the 1990s, the socialist system in Europe collapsed, paving the way for the transition 
of these economies from planned to market oriented systems. This required a process of 
transferring state ownership of companies to private ownership. This was achieved by 
privatising enterprises using several methods, but the lack of legal heritage to deal with 
dispersed ownership meant that these processes were often followed by corporate 
governance problems. As a consequence, the governments or the markets responded to 
these problems. In some cases like Poland, the government responded by creating the 
National Investment Funds with the purpose of consolidating more concentrated 
ownership to support Polish mass privatisation. In other cases, the markets corrected 
these deficiencies by concentrating ownership in the hands of insider elites or outside 
investors. However, concentrated ownership did not always play out as predicted by the 
current knowledge on corporate governance and theory of the firm and produced a 
diverse range of effects. In some cases, the empirical evidence shows a positive 
correlation between ownership concentration and firm’s market valuation and 
profitability, but in other cases concentrated ownership was used as a tool to drain out 
the assets of companies.  
Finally, despite the large number of definitions, significant number of parties involved, 
various stages of transition or levels of legal development, corporate governance has an 
important role to play in modern economies. Protecting the interests of stakeholders 
and maintaining high confidence of investors seems to be one of the main roles of 
corporate governance. 
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 2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated corporate governance from different aspects. A 
number of definitions of the concept and several approaches relevant to corporate 
governance were explored and the key actors involved in corporate governance of a 
company were identified. The first chapter also highlighted some of the most ‘common’ 
corporate governance problems and discussed them in more detail. Such problems were 
argued to have given rise to corporate scandals like Parmalat, WorldCom, Enron and 
others.  Consequently, there was a response in the form of various corporate 
governance principles and guidelines issued by different institutions. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) took the lead with the ‘OECD 
principles of corporate governance’.1 Later on, this chapter will explore in more detail 
the corporate governance guidelines and regulations which emerged in all countries in 
response to corporate failures. 
This chapter is also concerned with the question of ‘What is “sound” corporate 
governance?’ What benefits would good corporate governance yield for companies or 
more important, what are the costs of bad corporate governance practices? There are a 
number of researchers linking corporate governance practices, or certain provisions of 
corporate governance, to the market valuation of the company (Gompres et al. 2003; 
Bebchuk et al. 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004). Other researchers have found evidence 
of the correlation between good corporate governance and lower cost of equity capital. 
These findings are consistent with the suggestions that improved governance reduces 
agency costs (Derwall and Verwijmeren 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2004).  
Furthermore, this chapter will look at the work of agencies that evaluate the quality of 
corporate governance. Here, the role of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
Governance Metrics International (GMI*)2 as well as the role of other institutions and 
agencies such as Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)3, Glass Lewis & Co., 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), Standard and Poor’s (S&P) will be explored in 
more detail. All of the above listed institutions/agencies have developed tools to rate 
                                                          
1 Available from: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. 
2 The accent (*) is put to distinguish Governance Metrics Index GMI* from the Gompers et al. 
(2003) study which is elsewhere in this study referred to as GMI. 
3 IRRC was acquired by ISS in 2005. 
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the corporate governance practices of companies (Dunev and Kim, 2003; Brown and 
Caylor, 2004). However, there are those who are sceptical about the real impact of 
corporate governance rating on improving governance of corporations. Some argue that 
companies being rated get access to the rating methodology and start addressing only 
areas which would impact their rating without actually improving their corporate 
governance practices (Koehn and Ueng, 2007). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the corporate 
governance problems and how they contributed in creation of corporate governance 
rules and guidelines. Section 2.4 discusses corporate governance measurement and 
ranking agencies. Section 2.5 introduces the discussion on corporate governance and 
company performance, section 2.3 discusses the OECD corporate governance principles 
and section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2  The Emergence of Corporate Governance Regulation  
Failures in corporate governance practices were considered widely responsible for the 
Russian debt default and the Asian financial crisis in 1998 according to World Bank’s 
Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).4 After experiencing the systemic 
effects of such failures, the G7 leaders added the corporate behaviour and incentives to 
their priority list.5 Shortly after that (mid-1999), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted a set of basic principles which were 
updated in 2004.6 The OECD principles are not legally binding. Rather they are used as a 
benchmark by the World Bank and other key institutions to compare the existing 
corporate governance of a particular country or company with this benchmark. A more 
comprehensive discussion of the OECD principles will follow at later stages of this 
chapter, while here they are laid out in broad terms to provide an impression of their 
scope of coverage with respect to corporate governance. The OECD principles start by 
focusing attention on the corporate governance framework. 
                                                          
4 For more details follow link under footnote 5. 
5 For more details see: http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cgoverview.html - accessed in Nov. 
07. 
6 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf - last accessed in Nov. 07. 
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The importance of a good legal and regulatory framework is great as it has a direct 
impact on the corporate governance that will ensue. As demonstrated by La Porta et al. 
(2000) there is a positive relationship between good legal protection and dispersion of 
shareholders (the opposite is implied as the lesser the legal protection, the more 
concentrated ownership structures). In line with most of the existing theory on 
corporate governance, the first chapter explained that most of the corporate 
governance problems stem from the separation of ownership and control. This 
separation gives rise to the potential agency problem which is argued, in this case, to 
give managers the possibility to behave opportunistically and misuse company 
resources. The agency problem of this nature, which then translates into the corporate 
governance problem, is more likely to emerge, hypothetically, in countries with 
dispersed share ownership like United Kingdom and United States. In these countries 
the management is in stronger position because it is harder for individual shareowners 
to monitor and influence managers’ performance. It can be argued the second OECD 
principle of corporate governance is designed to address this potential problem and 
ensure the rights of shareholders. 
 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework. 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
Source: (August 2004). 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
II. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
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It is expected that different countries experience the agency and corporate governance 
problems differently. Using the legal system as a proxy La Porta et al. (2000) find that 
countries with better legal protection for shareholders tend to have more dispersed 
ownership. From this it can be deduced that large shareholders are a market response 
to weak legal protection provided by law. However, as explained in the first chapter, La 
Porta et al. (2000) identified as a potential corporate governance problem the risk of 
outsiders being expropriated by insiders (insiders are large shareholders and managers). 
This means that managers and large shareholders can collude and jointly exploit 
minority shareholders. Thus, it can be argued the following OECD principle was devised. 
 
The company cannot be seen as a body consisting of only managers and shareholders 
(be that large or minority ones). It is far more complex exercise involving employees, 
suppliers, general public, environment and many more which jointly are considered to 
be the stakeholder group. The first chapter discussed the stakeholder approach in detail 
and the possibilities as well as the problems of including different stakeholders in the 
decision making process of companies. Involving a single stakeholder in this process, 
even if this stakeholder represents employees7, will add a lot to the complexity of 
governing the corporations. Weil et al. (2002) report states that the largest difference in 
corporate governance practices among European Union member states is related to the 
position of employees in corporate governance, a difference often embedded in law 
(p.3). Given the complexity of the trade-offs, it can be observed that in respect to 
stakeholders OECD takes a more lenient approach towards shareholders in the context 
that it provides more detailed guidelines on how to protect their right. Nevertheless, the 
stakeholders’ interests are recognised by OECD principles. 
                                                          
7 Or miners, if one wants to be consistent with the example in the first chapter. 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
III. The equitable treatment of shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment 
of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
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The famous Enron and Parmalat corporate scandals which happened in 2001 and 2003 
respectably, is said to have been caused by the lack of transparency and disclosure. The 
simplified explanation is the following: companies have used accounting methods which 
reported profits that were not real, and this practice forced both of them to bankruptcy 
and in the process shake the confidence of investors. It is expected that these scandals 
increased awareness for the future, hence the fifth principle is concerned with 
disclosure and transparency. 
 
The sixth OECD principle is concerned with the board and its responsibilities. The 
purpose of this principle, presented in a very concentrated format, is to make the board 
of directors responsible for the running of the company. Also, the board is liable to the 
shareholders and stakeholder groups. 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of 
the company. 
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The OECD principles are designed to guide companies regarding their corporate 
governance practices. A similar approach but aimed at countries is used by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In September of 1997 EBRD 
published their guidelines for corporate governance named Sound Business Standards 
and Corporate Practices.8 Helping companies and governments understand the broader 
concerns of lenders and investors is the objective of these guidelines.9 In the same year, 
EBRD published 10 core principles10 which evaluate the corporate governance 
framework (CGF). These principles which are based on international best practices and 
standards can help in assessing a country’s CGF in estimating the need for reform. The 
EBRD principles are designed as guidelines with the purpose to identify the aims to be 
achieved rather than outlining the process by which to achieve these aims. 
Another document produced by EBRD, ‘principles of corporate governance and 
corporate governance checklist’,11 offers countries a tool to evaluate and improve their 
corporate governance practices through 70 questions divided into five groups.12 EBRD 
has gathered data using this checklist in all transition countries and rated the results 
from fully-conforming, strongly-, weakly- to non-conforming. The Legal Transition 
Programme Review13 – report published in June 2012 presents the impact of the legal 
transition programme during the period 2001-2010 in the countries that EBRD operates. 
This report confirms that the programme was successful for the aforementioned period 
                                                          
8 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/guides/standards.pdf 
9 EBRD claims that these guidelines preceded the OECD Corporate Governance Principles. 
10 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/corporate/cgprin.pdf 
11 Template available at: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/corporate/checklst.pdf  
12 These five groups are identical to OECD corporate governance principles II-VI. Because the 
EBRD checklist document was produced in 2000 it is assumed that this is the main reason why 
the first OECD corporate governance principle was not included. The 1999 version of OECD 
principles, before they were updated in 2004, had only five principles. 
13 Available at: www.ebrd.com/downloads/ about/evaluation/121109legal.pdf  
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance 
of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and 
the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders 
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and that it had made a significant positive contribution to the legal environment for 
business in transition countries. 
The Polish Corporate Governance Forum in 2002 presented a draft of the Corporate 
Governance Code for Polish Companies which is designed with the self-regulatory 
bottom-up approach with the intent to address the lack of faith in the Polish capital 
markets.14 The main problem in the Polish capital markets at the time was the abuse of 
minority shareholder rights. As a consequence and with the aim to regain market 
confidence, a better framework for protection of minority rights had to be developed. 
For this purpose, the Polish Corporate Governance Forum, relying a lot on OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles and other similar documents, provided a set of seven 
principles to be adhered by the Polish companies. The seven principles are: Principle 1 – 
The main objective of the company should be to operate in the common interest of all 
the shareholders, which is to create shareholder value; Principle 2 – The composition of 
the supervisory board should facilitate objective oversight of the company and reflect 
interests of minority shareholders; Principle 3 – The powers of the supervisory board 
and company by-laws should ensure an effective supervisory board process and duly 
secure the interests of all shareholders; Principle 4 – The shareholders’ meetings should 
be convened and organised so as not to violate the interests of any shareholders. The 
controlling shareholder should not restrict the other shareholders in the effective 
exercise of their corporate rights; Principle 5 – The company should not apply anti-
takeover defences against the shareholders’ interests. Changes in the company share 
capital should not violate the rights of the existing shareholders; Principle 6 – The 
company should provide effective access to information, which is necessary to evaluate 
the company’s current position, future prospects, as well as the way in which the 
company operates and applies the corporate governance rules; and Principle 7 – The 
appointment process of the company’s auditor should ensure independence of the 
auditor’s opinion. It has to be mentioned here that there are other transition economies 
apart from Poland that have contributed to corporate governance guidelines, regulation, 
laws, hence the Polish experience is introduced here just as an example. 
                                                          
14 Available at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_final_complete.pdf  
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2.3 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
The OECD principles of corporate governance have been first issued in 1999 and since 
then became a benchmark for corporate governance in many countries of the world. 
The current version of OECD principles of corporate governance were agreed in 2004 
and they continued the role of being a guideline for policymakers, regulators and other 
market participants for creating a sound institutional framework which underpins good 
corporate governance. 
In practice, banks are far more concerned with implementing Basel rules rather than 
OECD principles, partly because most of the regulatory authorities require that. 
However other financial institutions rely heavily on OECD principles for their industries. 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) uses the OECD principles of 
corporate governance as a benchmark, hence all member countries must implement 
these principles. 
The first set of OECD corporate governance principles consisted of only five 
subheadings, while the final version (2004) has six subheadings (principles) and these 
are: 
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework;15  
II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions;  
III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders;  
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance  
V. Disclosure and Transparency  
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board  
In the preamble of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles document it is stated that 
the principles are updated with experiences from OECD area and non OECD countries to 
accommodate the legal and cultural circumstances and differences. Therefore, the 
                                                          
15 This principle/subheading was not present in the 1999 version of OECD Principles. 
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principles are intended to help governments to evaluate and improve the legal and 
regulatory frameworks to improve corporate governance. Also, the principles are 
designed to provide guidance for stock exchanges, corporations, investors and other 
parties of interest with a role in the building good corporate governance. OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles are intended for publicly traded financial and non-
financial companies. Each of the principles listed above is supported by additional sub-
principles which are intended to clarify the purpose of the principle and help the 
interested parties, either the governments, regulators/supervisors on one side, or the 
companies on the other, with the implementation in practice. With this in mind, each 
principle is going to be discussed in more detail and where relevant commented. 
Principle 1, Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework is 
supported by the following statement: “The corporate governance framework should 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities”. This statement is then broken down into four sub principles, 
each addressing a separate section. Namely, the first sub principle notes that the 
corporate governance framework should take under consideration its impact on overall 
economic performance, and the incentives created for market participants and the 
promotion of transparent and efficient markets. The second sub principle advises that 
any regulatory requirements should be in line with the rule of law of the country, be 
transparent and enforceable. The next sub principle talks about the division of 
responsibilities which should not generate any ambiguities and make sure that the 
public interest is served. The last sub principle advises the regulatory and supervisory 
bodies to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. Furthermore, any 
rulings by these bodies should be timely, transparent on the logic and basis of such 
ruling and fully explained to all the relevant parties. From what is said above, it can be 
deduced that this is a very important principle which creates the grounds on which good 
corporate governance can be built. As such, it is a positive addition to the 1999 version. 
Principle 2, The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions has the following 
supporting statement: “The corporate governance framework should protect and 
facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights”. This is a very important principle which 
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addresses some of the key building blocks of good corporate governance. The rights of 
the shareholders to be able to register the ownership of the shares, be able to transfer 
that ownership should they chose to do so, remain informed regarding the activities of 
the corporation on a timely basis, to participate in the shareholders’ meetings, vote on 
electing or firing of board members and ultimately share the profits of the corporation 
are all addressed on the first sub principle, and this principle has the most of them, 
seven. The rights of shareholders to remain informed on timely basis regarding 
fundamental changes such as amendments to the statutes, authorisation of issuance of 
additional shares and extraordinary transactions which may result in the sale of 
corporation are addressed on the second sub principle. The third sub principle talks 
about the rights of the shareholder to participate actively in the general shareholder 
meetings, which means that they should be informed in advance about the procedures 
and rules of voting. In addition shareholders should be informed in timely manner 
regarding the date, location, agenda and issues to be decided. Also they should have 
access to the board and management and be able to ask questions on various issues 
including the external audit and suggest resolutions. Furthermore, participation in key 
corporate governance decisions such as nomination and election of board members 
should be facilitated and remuneration schemes for board members and employees, 
especially if they involve the equity component, should be subject to board approval. 
The right of the vote should be able to be carried in person or in absentia. The remaining 
sub principles are concerned with the concentration or dispersion of shareholder power 
i.e. if there are capital structures that allow disproportionate power to the equity 
ownership, should be disclosed. Also, here there is a mention that anti-takeover 
defences should not be used to protect the board and management from accountability, 
and that the exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders should be facilitated. It can 
be argued that this is one of the most fundamental principles of corporate governance, 
which might be the reason why the 1999 OECD principles had it as the first principle. 
Although it may appear that there are some items that are repetitive, due to their 
importance, items like the right of shareholders to actively participate in the appointing 
of the board, the repetition is justifiable.  
Principle 3, The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders is supported by “The corporate 
governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
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including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights”. Through this 
principle OECD aims to achieve equal treatment of shareholders’ of the same class of 
shares. All shares of the same class should carry the same rights, the abusive actions 
against minority shareholders should be prohibited, and any impediments to cross 
border voting should be removed and so on. This principle basically addresses the 
potential discrimination of shareholders of the same class of shares based on the 
number of shares and country borders. The implications of proper observing this 
principle are a more liquid market for equity which stretches beyond the borders of 
individual countries. 
Principle 4 concerned with The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance, is 
supported by the following statement: “The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements 
and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises”. The principle mainly 
talks about stakeholder groups as established by law or through mutual agreements. In 
this context, the stakeholder rights should be respected and in case of violation of such 
rights, there should be legal means in place to ensure the effective redress of such 
violations. Employees are considered an important stakeholder group, thus employee 
participation is encouraged and free communication of observed unethical or illegal 
behaviour of their superiors to the board, and they should be protected from suffering 
any consequences for doing so. In the current form, however, this principle does not 
take any consideration of externalities, be those positive or negative, of the business 
related activities of companies. Such externalities can span from the noise of lorries 
passing by to supply the production process and distribute the final products (in case of 
large production facilities), or employees of a service providing company generating 
additional traffic and rendering roads less safe, thus affecting the immediate 
community, to the consumers of the final products and/or services. This illustrate the 
vast number of stakeholder groups whose interests are not being addressed by OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles. However, the practice has shown that more serious 
corporations tend to carry a number of activities and investments, usually labelled under 
‘corporate responsibility’ thus acknowledging and addressing more stakeholder groups 
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than described under this principle. The independent board members very often are in a 
better position to represent the interests of the stakeholder groups at the board level. 
Principle 5 named Disclosure and Transparency has the following statement to support 
it: “The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company”. 
Observance of this principle has proved to be very important for investor confidence, 
and the lack of disclosure and transparency has been blamed for at least one of the 
spectacular corporate failures in the late twentieth century, Enron. With this in mind, 
the fifth principle asks for the following information to be disclosed, but not to be 
limited to: financial and operating results, company objectives, major share ownership 
and voting rights, remuneration for board and key executive officers, related party 
transactions and so on. The information should be disclosed in accordance with high 
accepted (usually international) standards and should provide ample financial and non-
financial explanations. The channels of dissemination should be practical and easy to 
access. An annual external audit should be carried to provide objective evaluation of 
compliance with laws, regulations and procedures and the auditors should be 
accountable to shareholders and owe a duty to company to exercise due professional 
care in carrying the audit. The final bullet pointed item under this principle encourages a 
corporate governance framework which would utilise financial analysis by analysts, 
brokers or rating agencies. However, in later days, the Dodd-Frank Act, as mentioned in 
earlier parts of this chapter encourages the opposite as rating agencies are held partially 
responsible for the last financial crisis.  
Principle 6, The Responsibilities of the Board has the following statement supporting it: 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders”. As the name suggests, this 
principle outlines the role and responsibilities of the board by outlining few of the key 
functions the board should fulfil such as: reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, 
major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; monitoring the 
effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making changes as needed; 
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selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession planning; aligning board and key executive pay with long term 
objectives of the company, and so on. Furthermore, board members should act in fully 
informed basis, in good faith and with the best interest of the company in mind. Also, if 
any board decision might affect different share classes differently, they should treat 
fairly and honestly all shareholders. In order to carry these and many other duties not 
mentioned here but listed under principle six, the board should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information. Hence, through this principle OECD aims to firmly 
establish the board of directors as the body that is in charge of running the company 
and consequently is liable for the company’s performance. 
2.4  Measurement and Ranking of Corporate Governance 
In order to be able to assess the impact of corporate governance, it is necessary to be 
able to quantify corporate governance practices. Given that corporate governance has 
many aspects and each aspect has many dimensions, the measurement is a complex 
problem. Various institutions have been working on measuring, quantifying and ranking 
corporate governance practices. These rankings have been used by researchers in trying 
to establish a relationship between performance and corporate governance.   
“Corporate governance industry” is a concept introduced by Rose (2007) referring to a 
market for rating corporate governance of companies which is emerging mainly in 
United States. The influence of the agencies that conduct corporate governance on the 
market is argued to be immense and not necessarily always good (Kohen and Ueng, 
2007; Rose 2007). There are many agencies for rating governance and to name but a few 
like ISS, GMI*, Glass Lewis and Co. The market leader ISS, is adviser to clients that jointly 
exceed 25 trillion USD in assets and gives advice to 25 out of top 25 asset managers and 
17 of the top 25 public pension funds in United States. Next, some of the mechanics 
behind the function of these agencies will be explored.  
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2.4.1 ISS 
ISS is a dominant company in the corporate governance industry and influences 
corporate governance decisions in a number of ways.16 However, this chapter will only 
concentrate on this company’s model for rating corporate governance. ISS uses 
proprietary weights for the construction of their Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). 
There are 64 indicators (see Appendix 2-1)17 which are divided into seven broad 
categories. The categories are: Board; Audit; Charter; State; Compensation; Progressive 
Practices; and Ownership. The CGQ provisions are constantly changing as ISS includes 
new ones while dropping the ones that proved superfluous through practice (Rose, 
2007).  
The ISS model ranks companies on per centile basis and how they perform against other 
national and worldwide companies. Currently the CGQ covers around 7500 companies 
and the indicators fall under four, more aggregated, governance categories: board, 
compensation, anti-takeover and audit. ISS weights the variables according to their 
importance and all variables under the “board” area add up to 40 % of the CGQ, while 
“compensation”, “anti-takeover” and “audit” areas add up to 30%, 20% and 10% 
respectively. 
Another service provided by ISS worth mentioning here, offered for a fee, is the 
possibility of companies to use CGQ “dynamically” to evaluate their own corporate 
governance practices. In practice, “dynamically” means that companies can buy the CGQ 
template from ISS and then compare their practices to what they are doing wrong 
according to the CGQ. This has raised a number of worries since it, indirectly, allows 
companies to improve their corporate governance rating through addressing only the 
symptoms and not the real causes. A more practical explanation of the ISS ratings is 
provided in the empirical chapters which use the ISS data as a proxy for the quality of 
the corporate governance of the observed banks. 
                                                          
16 For a more detailed explanation see Rose (2007); Aggarwal and Williamson (2006). 
17 A moderately updated version of ISS provisions is used by Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) 
which is used here. 
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2.4.2 GovernanceMetrics International – GMI* 
GMI* developed a database that collects information on over 600 indicators and then 
divides those in six broad areas. Each category is further dividend in a number of 
research topics (Appendix 2-2). GMI* like ISS has developed a methodology which 
results in “yes”, “no” and “not disclosed” answers. The information is primarily obtained 
from public documents and filings. The companies are rated from 1 to 10 indicating best 
and worst practices respectively. In 2010 GovernanceMetrics International was merged 
into GMI* Ratings together with The Corporate Library and Audit Integrity. 
2.4.3 Glass Lewis & Co. – BAI 
Glass Lewis & Co. is not as involved in corporate governance rating as ISS or GMI*. 
However, they do use the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) database of 500 companies to 
establish for Board Accountability Index (BAI). This exercise is based on the work of 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) which focuses on five entrenchment features that according to 
their study suggest a strong correlation of corporate governance practices with 
performance.  
2.4.4 The Corporate Library 
Founded in 1999, The Corporate Library (TCL) provides independent research and 
ratings designated to help institutional investors evaluate corporate governance 
practices of firms as part of investment risk. The Corporate Library using a proprietary 
set of governance risk factors, rates companies listed in the Russell 3000, S&P 1500 and 
TSX60, by providing a score which allows businesses to have an indication of governance 
practices of the rated firms. The Corporate Library also provides portfolio assessment 
regarding the risk exposure and environmental, social and governance (ESG) research 
services. Furthermore, and the most important aspect as far as this thesis is concerned, 
the Corporate Library claims to employ the best corporate governance analysts which 
can provide shareholder proposal and engagement advisory services to institutional 
investors. In 2010 The Corporate Library was merged into GMI* Ratings together with 
GovernanceMetrics International and Audit Integrity. 
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2.4.5 Audit Integrity  
Founded in 2002, Audit Integrity developed Accounting and Governance Risk (AGR) 
ratings for approximately 18,000 public companies worldwide. The Audit Integrity 
Accounting and Governance Risk (AGR) rating reflects the transparency and statistical 
reliability of a corporation’s financial reporting and governance practices. The aim of 
AGR analysis is to focus on identifying the measures which are most likely associated 
with potential fraud. 
Audit Integrity uses more than 100 accounting and governance metrics extracted from 
company’s publicly filed information. The computed AGR produces a per centile score 
ranging from 0 to 100, with corresponding ratings from Very Aggressive to Conservative. 
In their experience they find that companies more likely to face class action litigation 
and financial restatements are companies rated Very Aggressive or Aggressive, which 
has led to these companies suffering severe equity losses as well. In contrast, the 
companies that have been consistently rated Conservative have shown to be more 
trustworthy. In 2010 Audit Integrity was merged into GMI* Ratings together with 
GovernanceMetrics International and The Corporate Library. 
2.4.6 GMI* Ratings  
GMI* Ratings as mentioned above, was formed in 2010 through the merger of three 
independent companies: The Corporate Library, GovernanceMetrics International and 
Audit Integrity. Each of the predecessor firms, explained in more detail above, had 
developed tools for addressing systemic shortfalls in risk modelling and mitigation. Using 
the intellectual capital of its predecessor firms, GMI* Ratings claims to provide ratings 
which are reflective of risks affecting the performance of public companies worldwide. 
The GMI* Metrics Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) rating provides evaluations 
for more than 6,000 companies worldwide by using more than 150 ESG metrics to help 
investors assess the sustainable investment value of corporations. The GMI* ratings 
provide information in five categories named as Rating Quintiles ranging from 1 – 
highest risk to 5 the lowest risk.  
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2.4.7 The Polish Corporate Governance Forum 
The Polish Corporate Governance Forum advises the Warsaw Stock Exchange to enforce 
these requirements on all listed companies. In addition they constructed a model 
consisting of 60 variables categorized in 9 groups, which enables it to rate companies 
from A (best) to E (worst) complying companies. The model incorporates the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach which gives the option to companies not complying with specific 
requirements to explain why they have not complied. 
It is expected that there are more similar efforts undertaken around the world, but the 
Polish case is explained here as an example of individual countries addressing their 
problems arising from corporate governance issues and circumventing reliance on global 
rating agencies alone for providing such ratings. 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Company Performance 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is very important 
to researchers in this field and central to this thesis. This is the reason that some of the 
most relevant studies dealing with this question are presented here and then explained 
in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
There is a growing body of research relating corporate governance to some aspect of 
company performance. The search for the link between returns and good governance 
remains the academics’ and practitioners’ search for the Holy Grail (Bradley 2004, p. 8). 
In their review of literature in this field Van den Berghe and Levrau (2003) using data 
from emerging markets, found that there is strong evidence of a positive correlation 
between corporate governance and company performance. They argue that companies 
can no longer ignore the pressure from the investor community in respect to their 
corporate governance.  
However, there is no one single measure for corporate governance. Thus researchers 
have used a wide range of approaches allowing them to explore various ingredients of 
governance.  
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Daines (2001) presents evidence of the impact of state corporate law on the value of 
companies. In the sample of 4,481 firms obtained from Compustat’s database 
accounting for 47,001 firm years between 1981-1996, Daines finds that the Delaware 
state corporate law increases the value of public companies traded in this state. By using 
Tobin’s Q18 as an estimate of firm value, Daines (2001) finds that Delaware firms are 
worth significantly more than similar firms elsewhere in the United States. His argument 
is that the Delaware state corporate law reduces agency costs and private benefits for 
managers hence investors are willing to pay more for these firms. The increased 
likelihood of takeovers as well as specialized courts and judges in this state appear to 
play an important role in boosting shareholder welfare thus the willingness to pay the 
“Delaware premium” for companies. 
There is evidence that financial reporting oversight by an independent audit committee 
is inversely correlated to cost of equity capital.19 Namely, firms that have their reports 
supervised by independent audits will have lower cost of equity capital. It is argued that 
such effect is achieved due to smaller agency risks faced by shareholders. (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2004); Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007)). 
Gompers et al. (2003) explore the relationship between shareholder rights and 
corporate performance. They construct a “Governance Index” as a proxy for the balance 
of power between managers and shareholders. For every corporate governance 
indicator that reduces shareholders’ rights they add one point. This means that firms 
with highest value of the index are placed into the “Dictatorship Portfolio” which fosters 
firms with weakest shareholder rights and highest management power. The other end of 
this spectrum is the “Democracy Portfolio” with strong shareholders and weak 
managers. This study found that the Democracy Portfolio outperformed the Dictatorship 
Portfolio by 8.5 per cent per year. 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) basing their empirical research on 24 IRRC provisions claim to have 
identified six which are negatively correlated to company performance. Their argument 
is that these provisions impose constitutional limitations on shareholder power. The six 
                                                          
18 Tobin’s Q in this case estimates the firm market value divided by its replacement cost 
19 The cost of equity capital is the discount rate that a rational investor applies to firm’s expected 
future cash flows for the purpose of determining the current stock price. 
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entrenching provisions have had negative effects on firm valuation as measured by 
Tobin’s Q as well as with stock returns for a four year period. These authors argue that 
these limitations do not merely reflect but bring about lower firm value.  
Based on the findings from Bebchuk et al. (2004), Professor Bebchuk and Dr. Cohen in 
cooperation with the Glass, Lewis & Co. dataset developed the  board accountability 
index (BAI)20 based on five, very similar to previous 2004 study, variables.21 The BAI uses 
a modified market-cap weighting algorithm that calculates a company’s weight taking 
into account the presence or absence of five critical corporate governance features 
mentioned earlier. This index uses all the companies in the Standard and Poor’s 500, 
with the latter agreeing to act as the BAI’s calculating agent for daily weighting of 
companies’ corporate governance.  
The relationship between corporate governance and operating performance, is explored 
by Brown and Caylor (2004). Their index of firm-specific governance, “Gov-Score” is 
constructed on ISS data consisting of 51 indicators that cover eight corporate 
governance categories.22 This study draws attention to “governance committee meets 
annually” and “independence of nominating committee” as factors which represent 
good governance and are associated with good performance but rarely used, in contrast 
to some factors which represent good governance but are associated with bad 
performance like “consulting fees less than audit fees paid to auditors”, “absence of a 
staggered board” and “absence of poison pill”. Brown and Caylor’s (2004) results reveal 
that, as measured by Gov-Score index, firms with better governance are more valuable, 
have higher profit margins, higher returns on equity, pay out more cash dividends and 
repurchase more shares from their shareholders. 
Dunev and Kim (2003) conduct a research based on CLSA data on 859 firms in 27 
emerging economies. They find evidence that higher governance rating is associated 
                                                          
20 For more details, visit: http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/bai.php accessed in Jan. 2008. 
21 On a country level, Morck et al. (2005) look at the entrenchment from the perspective of the 
controlling owner. In a world of controlling owners, which is everywhere but United Kingdom and 
United States, controlling owner is able to utilize corporate resources not owned de jure by 
him/her, to fund private benefits without much risk of hostile takeover or any other form of 
successful shareholder revolt. 
22 Audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director 
compensation, ownership, progressive practices and state of incorporation. 
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with better company performance. The motivation for firms to improve their 
governance practices according to Dunev and Kim (2003) is the need for external capital 
and more growth opportunities. Their research suggests that firms in weak legal regimes 
structure their own corporate governance practices more than required to make up for 
shortcomings of the law and provide themselves with better investment opportunities 
(see Appendix 2-3 for explanation on categories used for the corporate governance 
measure). There is evidence that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter 
more in countries with weaker legal systems (Klapper and Love (2002); Dunev and Kim 
(2003); Van den Berghe and Levrau (2003)).  Using the CLSA data, Klapper and Love 
(2002) find that better corporate governance is associated with higher operating 
performance (ROA – Return on Assets) and higher Tobin’s Q. 
As can be seen above, the research so far has successfully identified correlations – 
rather than causal relationships - between corporate governance and firm performance. 
This limitation can be due to the endogeneity and the dynamic nature of the 
relationship not being addressed properly. Studies carried out in relatively similar 
conditions did provide relatively similar findings, but without an indication of the 
direction of causality. However, results as expected are highly dependent on the 
indicators included in construction of each governance index, legal environment and the 
stage of development of economies as well as datasets used by researchers.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The chapter started by pointing out the necessity for corporate governance practices 
redress as a consequence of Asian financial crisis in 1998. This seemed to be the event 
that set to motion the activities of governments and multinational interest groups to 
enact by first acknowledging that the problem lies with the lack of good corporate 
governance, and then by offering various guidelines on how to improve it. The European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development was among the first to offer a set of 
corporate governance guidelines in 1997 in the form of a two page document labelled 
Core Principles of Corporate Governance which were addressed to both, countries and 
firms. In 1999 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development published 
the first OECD Corporate Governance Principles comprised of five principles and then 
amended those to six OECD Corporate Governance Principles in 2004. There are also a 
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significant number of efforts by individual groups of experts such as the discussed Polish 
Corporate Governance Forum, which due to the concentrated area of influence could 
not make it across different industries or state borders. The impression is that there is a 
silent consensus throughout the developed and developing world that OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles are the benchmark and the main guideline for governments, 
firms and other relevant interested parties such as regulatory and supervisory bodies.  
The chapter then briefly explores the relationship between corporate governance and 
company performance. Several studies find a strong correlation between the two, and 
this is justified with the fact that companies can no longer ignore the pressure from the 
investor community with respect to their corporate governance. 
The review of the literature reiterated once more the lack of a persisting relationship 
between the same performance and corporate governance indicators. Most of the 
studies discussed in this chapter generate their own corporate governance ratings and 
then use those to test the relationships. Some of these studies then develop further 
their model of rating corporate governance into quasi rating agencies for other listed 
firms. 
With all the attention that corporate governance was receiving, the need arose for 
agencies which would be able to evaluate the quality of corporate governance of 
companies and then rate it in such a way that it allows comparison amongst them. Early 
2000s showed a surge of these agencies. The International Shareholder Services (ISS), 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI*), Glass Lewis & Co., The Corporate Library and a 
number of others were competing for the approval and acceptance by markets. The vast 
number of mergers and acquisitions, as well as disappearance of some of the agencies 
shows that they were not very successful in this attempt. The information they provide 
however, is relevant both for investor groups, regulatory bodies and academics. This 
thesis for one, is going to use the ratings of ISS as a proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance in estimating the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation. 
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 2.1 Introduction 
The role of banks and other financial institutions is to provide financing to enterprises, 
facilitate various transactions and other services which makes their position integral to 
the economy at large. A healthy governance of the bank will have spill-over effects onto 
the enterprises it lends to, since by having a proper system for evaluating each loan, 
potentially ‘bad’ projects are not funded by the bank. This should be a deterrent for 
firms with poor ideas, which indicates that a positive selection process may take place 
and an economy with more successful enterprises will ensue.  
However, the complex nature of finance means that the concepts and daily activities of 
financial institutions are not easily grasped by the majority of population, therefore they 
need to rely on others (the bankers) for information. Thus a key element for well-
functioning of the financial systems, which at the same time exacerbates the principal-
agent problem, is trust.1 The position of trust that banks and other financial institutions 
hold within a community makes them different from other non-financial institutions 
(Trayler, 2007).    
Almost all researchers, some more explicitly than others, agree that the principal-agent 
problem is more complex for banks and other financial institutions because managers of 
the bank should not make maximisation of returns for shareholders as the sole aim, 
since this may have adverse implications for depositors (as primary stakeholders) and 
taxpayers in general2 (Alexander, 2006; Mullineux, 2006).  
The more extreme view within the group calling for different approach in corporate 
governance among industries states that there is a large enough distinction between 
corporate governance of financial institutions themselves let alone in comparison to 
other firms, and that corporate governance of each type of financial institution should 
                                                          
1 While for most goods or services, the quality is ‘observable’ before, during or immediately after 
the transaction is made between the parties, it is not so straight forward for transactions 
between let’s say depositors and a bank, or an insured and an insurer. The depositor (and/or the 
insured) in this case will have to trust the bank (and/or the insurer) that they will keep their end 
of the deal if it is required in the future. The depositor has to believe the bank will have his/her 
moneys when he/she wishes to withdraw them, and the insured has to believe that in case of the 
claim, insurer will meet its obligation. 
2 In case deposit insurance is offered by the state. 
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be studied separately.3 However, at the opposite end of the spectrum, there are those 
who suggest that there are no differences between the corporate governance of 
financial institutions (banks) and other firms (Flannery et al. 2002) and that they are all 
subject to the same core corporate governance principles.  
Overcoming the principal-agent problem in banking requires reducing the information 
asymmetries among the relevant stakeholders. For depositors as one of the key 
stakeholders, the principal-agent model does not provide a solution for protection of 
their interests. The financial industry requires another actor to ensure that a solution is 
found, and this is the regulator. According to Alexander (2006) the role of the regulator 
is to devise corporate governance standards which will balance the interests of all 
parties involved. “The financial system usually is among the most heavily regulated 
sectors and banks among the most heavily regulated of financial institutions” (Mishkin 
2004, p. 260). Having said that, regulation is sometimes perceived as interference since 
as some argue, there has been some overlap of bank regulation with corporate 
governance since the earliest days of modern banking (Shull, 2007). 
The differences in the way the regulation is implemented as well as differences in the 
risk management are considered the main elements which contributed to distinguishing 
of banks within the European Union in light of the recent financial crisis. While two 
major Spanish banks announced profit of € 14 billion for the year ending on 31st of 
December 2008, three Belgian banks announced losses exceeding that figure by far. The 
Spanish banking supervisor seems to have drawn lessons from the banking crisis of 1977 
and imposed stricter capital requirements on local banks than is normal for European 
banks. In addition, during the good years, the banks are required to put aside more 
provisions for bad loans. This approach appeared to have worked until the recent 
financial crises (Lannoo, 2009).   
This chapter will investigate the specificities of corporate governance of financial 
institutions that separate this industry from others. Section 2.2 will deal with the 
corporate governance of financial institutions in more detail, section 2.3 will explore 
                                                          
3 There are researchers who argue that there are distinctions between banks and other financial 
institutions (i.e. money market mutual funds, nonblank credit card companies etc.) hence 
advocating studying corporate governance of banks separately (Macey and O’Hara 2003). 
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which corporate governance characteristics have an impact on the performance of the 
financial institutions. Section 2.4 will be concerned with the regulatory actions of 
governments and finally, the chapter will end with a conclusion in section 2.5. 
2.2 Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions 
As mentioned earlier, the principal-agent problem is more complex for banks and other 
financial institutions and this has implications for the corporate governance of these 
institutions. Adding depositors to the principal-agent model, in addition to managers 
and owners, increases the likelihood of the effects of asymmetric information such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
The concepts of moral hazard, adverse selection, and asymmetry of information can 
help in understanding the form of banking regulation in many countries (Mishkin, 
2004).4 According to Alexander (2006), the rationale for bank regulation is the 
protection of depositors and the safety and soundness of the financial sector. However, 
the existence of ‘safety nets’ poses natural incentives for banks to take on more risk 
than they should and policies should be designed to counteract those incentives 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). 
The main studies in this area show that the basic elements distinguishing financial 
institutions from other firms  are more or less the same, i.e. opaqueness, regulation, 
moral hazard by managers (alone or in collusion with shareholders), to name but a few. 
The researches are marginally different though in the level of detail they explore, hence 
reported individually below. The following studies should be looked at, having the 
principal-agent and asymmetry of information contexts in mind. 
Caprio and Levine (2002) discuss the special characteristics of banks and other financial 
institutions that intensify the corporate governance problem. They identify three 
features of banks which makes them different from other firms. First, banks are more 
opaque, a characteristic that amplifies the agency problem. The opacity in banking 
makes it (i) more difficult for equity and debt holders to monitor managers, (ii) easier for 
                                                          
4 Eight basic regulation categories according to Mishkin (2004) are: the government safety net, 
restriction on bank asset holdings, capital requirements, chartering and bank examination, 
assessment of risk management, disclosure requirements, consumer protection, and restrictions 
on competition. 
 73 
 
Corporate governance of Financial Institutions 
 
managers and large investor to exploit the benefits of control, rather than maximise 
value, (iii) unlikely for potential outside bidders to generate an effective takeover threat, 
and (iv) more likely that a situation of monopolistic behaviour by banks will ensue, and 
this will lessen the impact of corporate governance mechanisms through competition.5 
Second, banks are heavily regulated and this, more often than not, imposes a natural 
hindrance to corporate governance mechanisms. Measures like, deposit insurance, 
regulatory restrictions on concentration of ownership, regulatory restrictions on entry, 
takeovers, bank activities etc., all have adverse effects on mechanisms to control the 
management by the shareholders. Hostile takeovers as a disciplinary tool, as well as 
limitation of stock ownership by a single owner in many countries which strips owners 
from concentrated ownership, another corporate governance mechanism, are 
eliminated because of regulation and the opaqueness of banks, argues Levine (2003). 
Government ownership is another factor which, Caprio and Levine suggest, makes 
corporate governance of banking industry very different from other industries. 
Levine (2003) supports the view that banks are more opaque and more regulated than 
other firms and looks at the implications for corporate governance of these features. 
Governance implications for equity and debt holders because opaqueness stem from 
the greater informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders which make it 
very difficult for diffuse equity and debt holders to monitor bank managers. While there 
are incentives for controlling owners to increase the bank’s risk profile, there is no 
                                                          
5 Morgan (2002) and Iannotta (2004) provide evidence supporting the view of Caprio and Levine 
(2002) that banks are more opaque. Using the divergence between two major bond-rating 
agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, Morgan (2002) argues that if the risk is harder to 
quantify for a particular firm/industry, this should cause different rating by the agencies. Based 
on the ratings for approximately 8000 new bonds issued between 1983 and 1993, the study finds 
that raters split significantly more over banks and insurance firms than over other types of firms 
which leads to believe that ‘banking firms’ are more opaque than other firms. Applying similar 
methodology to new bond issues completed by private sector firms during the period of 1993-
2003 in 14 European countries Iannotta (2004) furthers Morgan (2002) by concluding the 
following: i) banks appear to be among the more opaque industries; ii) bank size, asset mix and 
capital structure can explain bank opaqueness, and iii) lower bond seniority increases 
opaqueness. In contrast to the previous study, Flanery et al. (2002) using two proxies for firm 
opacity, the stock market microstructure properties and the analysts’ ability to forecast firm 
earnings, find that large bank holding companies traded on NYSE have very similar trading 
properties to their matched nonfinancial firms. They conclude that bank stocks are not unusually 
opaque, especially for large institutions (they do, however, find statistically and economically 
significant differences for the smaller firms which are traded in NASDAQ). 
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upside potential for debt holders from increased risk taking but due to the greater 
opacity of banks it is more difficult for debt holders to control banks from risk shifting. 
Governance implications for the bank regulation by shareholders and competition are 
explained in the light of restrictions on concentration of bank ownership and the ability 
of outsiders to purchase significant proportions of bank stock without regulatory 
approval. The implications for governance by depositors according to Levine (2003) arise 
since deposit insurance, as part of regulatory policies, reduces their incentives to 
monitor banks, and it induces banks to rely less on uninsured creditors with incentives 
to monitor and more on insured depositors which have no real incentives to exert 
corporate governance. Moreover, the existence of deposit insurance in conjunction with 
central banks as lenders of last resort, have contributed in producing banks with very 
low capital-asset ratios6 relative to other firms. With the fall of capital-asset ratios, the 
controlling owners, as mentioned above, have more incentives to increase the risks 
taken by the bank. Thus, the effect of regulation in the form of deposit insurance has 
two-fold adverse effect on corporate governance of banks giving rise to moral hazard 
problems: first, it increases the incentives for risk-taking of owners, and second, it 
reduces the incentives of insured depositors to monitor the managers. This problem is 
peculiar to corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions.  
The fact that financial institutions in general and banks in particular are heavily 
regulated means that corporate scandals are not as spectacular as Enron (Gup, 2007), at 
least not until the recent world financial crisis. However, regulation could not prevent 
the debacles like the one of The Bank of Credit and Commerce International.7 
Ciancanelli and Reyes-Gonzalez (2000) argue that commercial banks are distinguished by 
a more complex information asymmetry due to the regulation. Regulation limits the 
power of market to discipline banks and it should be considered as an external force 
which alters the parameters of governance in banks. The more complex agency problem 
due to information asymmetry between owners and managers, in banking is 
                                                          
6 Calculated as: the company's capital (net worth) / asset (capital employed) ratio. 
7 The Bank of Credit and Commerce International was established in 1972 in Abu Dhabi. The bank 
at one point was present in 73 countries and in 1990 ranked the seventh largest private bank in 
the world.  The bank was involved in all kinds of illegal affairs such as money laundering, arms 
trafficking, support for terrorism etc. The scandal was discovered in 1990s and the bank was 
globally closed in 1991 (Gup, 2007). 
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exacerbated by the existence of at least three more relationships between: depositors, 
the bank and the regulator; owners, managers and the regulator; and, borrowers, 
managers and the regulator. The authors summarize that what differentiates corporate 
governance of banks and other firms is: (i) the problem of governance will be more 
complex, (ii) the relationship principal-agent is unique because it is mediated by an 
external force, and, (iii) the owners may be considered as the single most important 
source of moral hazard. 
Macey and O’Hara (2003) identify four points to distinguish banks from other firms. 
First, the liquidity production role of banks, which is explained through the capital 
structure of banks, is argued to be unique in two aspects. One, banks usually have very 
little equity compared to other firms, and two, banks’ liabilities are in form of deposits, 
which are available to their creditors/depositors on demand, while the banks’ assets are 
loans that on average have longer maturities (than the liabilities).  The mismatch 
between liabilities and assets can become a problem with corporate governance 
implications in the unusual situation of a bank run.8 Theoretically, bank runs can happen 
to solvent banks as well. In order to mitigate this problem, the deposit insurance fund 
was devised which, according to Macey and O’Hara, is the second distinction between 
corporate governance of banks and other firms. The deposit insurance fund9 proved to 
be very successful in preventing banking panics. However, the regulatory cost of deposit 
insurance is that it gives the managers and shareholders of insured banks incentive to 
engage in excessive risk taking. The moral hazard problem may occur for two reasons. i) 
Bank shareholders are able to pass some of their losses onto innocent third parties (the 
healthy banks whose contributions to FDIC pay the depositors of the failed banks, or 
consequently the taxpayers who refill the federal insurance funds if they are drained 
out); ii) Unlike in insurance industry where the premium is related to amount of risk, in 
banking this is not the case and the FDIC is not fully compensated for the excessive risk 
                                                          
8 Bank runs are a collective action problem among the depositors. If for any reason, large 
withdrawals begin at a bank, the individual depositors, in fear that they will be left without 
anything if the reserves drain out, start withdrawing their deposits also. This is a classical 
prisoner’s dilemma, where depositors would be better off if they would refrain from 
withdrawing. However, in their inability to coordinate their actions they end up causing the bank 
run. 
9 The Banking Act was passed by the Congress in 1933 establishing Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and gave the federal government the power to insure deposits in qualified 
banks. 
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taken by a particular bank. The moral hazard problem is exacerbated in situations where 
a bank is at financial distress. An insolvent (or near insolvent) bank’s shareholders have 
incentive to increase risk if this behaviour can generate gains, and they have the option 
to allocate their losses to third parties, i.e. “a nearly insolvent bank can continue to 
attract liquidity in the form of (government-insured) deposits” (Macey and O’Hara, 
2003, p.98). 
The third distinction is the conflict between fixed claimants and shareholders.10 What 
makes banks different from other types of firms is the lack of significant discipline of 
other fixed claimants. The existence of FDIC insurance removes the incentives that 
insured depositors control excessive risk-taking since their funds are safe regardless of 
the investment strategies selected by banks.  
The fourth distinction is the asset structure and loyalty problems. A large proportion of 
financial institutions’ assets is held in highly liquid form. This enables managers to shift 
funds around easily, making it more difficult for monitoring, which in turn may increase 
the likelihood of insider lending hence causing loyalty problems. Since the existence of 
federal insurance fund decreases the incentive for monitoring, it naturally increases the 
risk of fraud and self-dealing. Shareholders do not have the incentive to individually 
monitor the management due to free-rider principle, and they rarely organize 
themselves because of the collective action problems. Thus, under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), regulatory agencies were required to 
issue guidelines or regulations which would create standards for safety and soundness in 
several areas such as: internal controls, loan documentation, credit underwriting, 
interest rate exposure, asset growth, compensation, asset quality etc.  
Macey and O’Hara (2003) also look at the role of directors and managers of banks as a 
factor which contributes to different corporate governance practices among industries. 
                                                          
10 In the view of corporation as a set of explicit and implicit contracts there are different 
claimants to corporation’s cash flow. The group of claimants includes not only shareholders, but 
also creditors, employees, managers, the local communities in which the firm operates, suppliers, 
and, of course, customers. In the case of banks, these claimants also include depositors and the 
regulators in their roles as insurers of deposits and lenders of last resort and in their capacity as 
agents of other claimants. 
  
 77 
 
Corporate governance of Financial Institutions 
 
They argue that due to the nature of banks’ assets and liabilities, the importance of 
banks for the overall financial system stability, existence of deposit insurance schemes, 
to name but a few, bank directors should be held to a broader, if not a higher, standard 
of care than other directors, a view supported by Mullineux (2006) too.  
Bathala et al. (2007) using a comprehensive database of the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) for  5298 firms in the US, argue that corporate governance practices are 
affected by the regulatory oversight and the size of the firm.11 Differences are more 
pronounced in corporate governance practices of smaller firms mainly due to 
exacerbated information asymmetry, increased agency cost and monitoring differences 
between regulated and non-regulated industries.  
The study reports a superiority of banks over non-banking firms in respect to the CGQ 
index score and executive compensation12 but inferior with respect to the audit 
mechanism. One of the explanations put forward by the authors is that by having better 
corporate governance structures, banks attempt to satisfy both stockholders and 
regulators. The lower sub-score in the audit mechanism seem to suggest substitution 
effects between monitoring on industry and firm level.13 These results lead to believe 
that corporate governance structures are more shareholder friendly in banks than non-
banks. 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Performance of Financial 
Institutions  
Given the importance of corporate governance, one assumes intuitively that good 
performance of financial institutions is related to good corporate governance. However, 
due to their complexity it is not a straight forward answer to find which element of 
corporate governance will improve (or worsen) the performance of a given institution. 
                                                          
11 ISS provides two CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient): CGQ index score (comparing firm’s 
CGQ relative to the average CGQ of firms within S&P 500), and CGQ industry score (comparing 
firm’s CGQ relative to an industry peer group). 
12 CGQ is calculated using 61 ‘items’ in eight categories: 1) board of directors; 2) audit; 3) charter 
and bylaw provisions; 4) anti-takeover provisions; 5) executive and director compensation; 6) 
progressive practices; 7) ownership; and 8) director education. 
13 The study also reports some differences on corporate governance practices between small and 
large banks. 
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Most studies, though, find that addressing the principal-agent and information 
asymmetry problems increases the chances of improvement in performance. 
Spong and Sullivan (2007) consider a sample of 143 state-chartered community banks in 
America’s Midwest, and consistently with financial theory, report a positive correlation 
between improving bank performance and the reduction in principal-agent problems.  
Anticipating that agency problems will be more prominent in banks with hired managers 
they divide their sample in two groups. One group consisted of banks whose managing 
officer is the largest stockholder or belongs to a group that controls the largest block of 
bank stock. The other group consisted of banks that have hired managers outside the 
controlling group. 
They used their profit efficiency of each bank relative to other banks in the Tenth 
Federal Reserve District to measure the performance of banks in the sample. Also they 
developed an econometric model utilising the mentioned performance measures and 
estimated an efficient profit frontier for Tenth Federal Reserve District banks against 
which all sample banks were compared. The authors suggest that this approach allows 
them to better measure managerial performance than if they had used standard 
accounting measures like ROA or ROE. They find that small changes in the ownership 
stake of hired managers have a notably larger positive effect on profit efficiency than in 
the case of manager-owners, who have a very small profit efficiency response to small 
changes in ownership. 
By comparing the combined cost efficiency and revenue tests, they find that the 
difference between the ‘most efficient’ and the ‘least efficient’ community banks in 
terms of board size, average age of directors, and length of tenure is not very significant. 
However, they find that the directors of more efficient banks have higher median net 
worth, a greater ownership stake in their banks, and are less likely to be outside 
directors.14 The more efficient banks also feature more frequent meetings, have better 
attendance rates, and higher director fees. These findings suggest that directors with 
                                                          
14 Although the role of independent directors is important, in the case of community banks 
according to Spong and Sullivan (2007) it seems that it is inversely correlated with the bank 
performance since most efficient banks have on average 25.9 per cent in contrast to 34.3 per 
cent outside directors in least efficient banks. 
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higher financial stake in their banks are likely to be more actively involved in those 
bank’s affairs and in monitoring the performance of management, which can translate 
into better overall bank performance. A similar argument, as financial theory suggests, 
holds for officers that are also major stakeholders. Their incentives to control costs and 
improve bank performance stem from the fact that they will directly benefit through 
improved stock returns. Spong and Sullivan (2007) report that an ownership stake held 
by managers of community banks of up to 17 per cent is likely to improve the average 
profit efficiency of the bank significantly.15 This indicates amelioration of the principal-
agent problem through the increase in the ownership stake. They also claim that 
ownership is underutilized as a tool to address agency costs and governance problems 
of banks.  
Using the ranking of 2000 companies by Forbes.com in 2005, Trayler (2007) looks at 100 
top banks in the world. The ‘average bank’ in his sample has the following board 
characteristics: board size is 14.6 persons with 25 per cent (3.7) being internal members. 
The number of years directors served on a board is approximately 7.7, and the number 
of board meetings per year is 10.2. The average bank will incorporate the following 
governance characteristics: a board statement on corporate governance, an audit, as 
well as compensation and risk committees. 
Compared to the average bank, some difference in bank governance can be noticed 
between countries in the sample. For example, United States has the lowest number of 
board meetings with average of 8.7 while Italy has the average of 16.2 meetings in one 
year. The board structure of Japanese banks was different in the sense that the board 
was small16 and the majority of directors were internal. The Italian banks have the 
highest number of board directors (average of 19.6) and boards of French banks consist 
of 50 per cent internal directors, many of whom are staff-elected representatives.  
                                                          
15 In this study, 17 per cent ownership stake for hired managers improved average profit 
efficiency ratios by 9 percentage points. The banks operating with higher percentage than 17 
showed adverse effect on performance coming from entrenchment and conflicts with principal 
owners. The authors do call for caution in interpreting these results (17 per cent as a magical 
solution) since the performance of managers depends on other variables such as their own skill 
set. 
16 On average 9 board members. 
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Trayler (2007) uses key governance variables which are based on board characteristics 
(such as number of directors, percentage of inside directors, independent chairperson, 
statement from the board on corporate governance, statement from the board on risk 
direction for bank, and the existence of a risk committee) to evaluate return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), BIS capital adequacy, equity to assets, and provision for 
loan losses to loans. The multiple regression analysis results show that the coefficients 
for internal directors and independent chairperson are negative and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent. This means a lower proportion of internal directors will improve 
the bank performance. The same is true for an internal chairperson, which is at odds 
with the legal requirement by some countries and or stock exchanges for an 
independent chairperson. 
Adams and Mehran (2003) describe the differences and similarities of unregulated 
manufacturing firms and regulated bank holding companies (BHCs).17 In their sample of 
thirty five BHC companies for the period 1986-199618, they consider a number of 
governance variables or proxies such as: the board size and composition, number of 
committees and meetings, compensation schemes for CEOs, ownership structure, and 
few other that have received attention by researchers in economics, law, management, 
and organisation and who say these variables are correlated with governance 
practices.19 
They find that on average, Bank Holding Companies have slightly larger boards of 
directors than the manufacturing firms. BHC’s boards of directors have a larger 
proportion of outside directors too and are found to have more committees and 
meetings than the manufacturing firms; however this can be attributed, according to 
authors, to the regulation that defines the number of meetings per certain period of 
time. The study found that BHC boards tend to rely less on long-term incentive-based 
compensation schemes for CEOs. It also found that CEO ownership for BHCs is smaller 
                                                          
17 The authors examine bank holding companies (BHC) and not banks because of the availability 
of information on the former. 
18 The sample size dropped to thirty two at one point because of the merger and acquisition 
activities. 
19 Their empirical research is not based on regression analysis but rather the descriptive statistics 
of the selected variables. 
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both in percentage and market value, when measured in direct equity holdings by 
directors. 
In the light of the recent subprime mortgage crisis, Adams and Mehran (2008) examine 
the relationship between banking firm board structure and performance. With Tobin’s 
Q20 as a proxy for performance, they concentrate on two dimensions of the board 
structure: board composition and size. Their data set on 35 BHCs spans the period of 
1959-1999 and has detailed information on governance variables. The study identifies 
three factors that are believed to play an important role in defining bank board 
structure. First, bank lending relationships influence board composition. If the bank has 
issued loans to directors or directors’ employees, without being properly disclosed, this 
may lead to overstatement of board independence. Second, Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A) activity affects bank boards by adding some of the target directors to acquirer 
boards following acquisitions. The banking industry is not prone to hostile takeovers and 
M&A active BHCs would augment their boards with target directors, resulting in larger 
sized boards, which is consistent with Adams and Mehran (2003). Finally, organizational 
structure, in particular, the fact that publicly traded banks are all organized as BHCs, 
seems to influence bank boards. The organizational structure accounts for one of the 
most important differences between BHCs and manufacturing firms. By definition, BHCs 
are holding companies with a number of subsidiaries each of which has its own board.21 
The number of subsidiaries of BHCs is argued to contribute to the increased board size 
due to the need for representation and coordination between boards of the same BHC. 
They find that the proportion of outsiders on the board is not related to Tobin’s Q, in 
contrast to board size which is positively and significantly related to the performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. There are two possible explanations for the positive relationship 
between board size and performance. First, it is possible that the results are driven by 
the M&A activity and the board size increases due to the incorporation of some of the 
target directors, and, second, the possibility that the organizational structure is 
                                                          
20 The measure of Tobin’s Q in their study is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value. 
21 In contrast, manufacturing firms often organize themselves along functional lines which do not 
need separate legal identity. This enables manufacturing firms to coordinate their activities 
through means other than boards. 
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contributing to the increase in size through inclusion of directors with regional expertise 
on the BHC boards. 
The impact of ownership as an important factor of corporate governance in bank 
performance is shown by the following studies.  Caprio et al. (2007) looking at the data 
for 244 banks in 44 countries find that, in terms of ownership, banks are generally not 
widely held. For banks with a controlling owner they find that it is a family more than 
half of the time and it is the state in 19 per cent of the time. They also find that stronger 
protection of shareholders is positively related with countries having widely held banks. 
Using bank-level data, the authors evaluate the impact of legal protection, bank 
regulatory policies and ownership structures on bank valuations. As a measure for bank 
valuation Caprio et al. (2007) use Tobin’s Q. They find that: a) larger cash-flow rights by 
the controlling owner boosts valuation; b) weak shareholder protection laws lowers 
bank valuation; and c) regulatory policies have no effect on bank valuation.  
Using the data on banks in Argentine in 1990s Berger et al. (2005) test the effects of 
governance on bank performance. In their model, they include the static,22 selection,23 
and dynamic24 effects of: domestic ownership, foreign ownership, state ownership, 
events like: domestic M&A, foreign acquisitions, privatizations, state restructurings, (the 
latter refer to events in which state-owned banks were restructured without 
privatization) on bank performance. Findings in terms of static effects of bank ownership 
on performance suggest that banks which are state-owned have poorer long-term 
performance than domestically- and foreign-owned banks. The main findings in terms of 
selection indicate that banks that underwent domestic M&A perform slightly poorer 
than average before the M&A events, while the main dynamic effect results suggest that 
there is hardly any impact on performance of banks with either domestic M&A or 
foreign acquisitions. In contrast, privatisation of banks seems to improve their 
                                                          
22 The static effect measured by a dummy variable equalling 1 if the governance of domestic, 
foreign, and state owned banks has not changed across the sample (Berger et al., 2005). 
23 Selected for Domestic M&A, Selected for Foreign Acquisition, Selected for Privatization, and 
Selected for State Restructuring, are dummies equalling 1 if banks underwent one or more 
changes in governance over the entire period (Berger et al., 2005). 
24The Dynamic Governance Ce dummy variables equalling 1 if the bank: underwent Domestic 
M&A, underwent Foreign Acquisition, underwent Privatization, or underwent State Restructuring 
(Berger et al., 2005). 
 83 
 
Corporate governance of Financial Institutions 
 
performance significantly. This is achieved due to the decline in the number of 
nonperforming loans and a steady increase of the bank’s profit efficiency rank.25 
To sum up, the relationships between corporate governance and the performance of 
financial institutions are present but in most cases the evidence is related to specific 
types of businesses and is not applicable to all financial institutions. What emerges as a 
significant relationship in one study seems to change in another. The inconsistency of 
methodology and variables used by different researchers to estimate the relationship 
corporate governance and performance, which varies across studies, seems to 
contribute to this situation. An example is the proportion of independent directors on 
the board: some suggest that the larger this proportion, the better the performance, 
others argue the opposite, while a third group find no relation between the 
independence of the board and performance. This indicates that more studies which 
would provide stronger evidence on the existence (or nonexistence) of this relationship 
are needed. 
2.4 Regulations 
The soundness and the safety of depositors has traditionally been the rationale of the 
bank regulation. The model of the principal-agent problem is more complex in the case 
of financial institutions and regulation should help reduce it (Alexander, 2006). 
Charkham (2003) suggests that sound structures and processes are required for good 
governance and to ensure that power is not abused, checks and balances are vital.  
In the light of the most recent global financial crisis, a white paper on reforming financial 
markets was presented to the British Parliament in July 2009 by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.26  Serious failures in corporate governance of many banking institutions are 
identified as one of the factors which contributed to the crisis. Failure of bank boards to 
understand and question the risk-management processes and the failing of senior 
management to scrutinise the nature and sustainability of the high returns being 
achieved summarize the corporate governance failures mentioned above. The paper 
                                                          
25 Profit Efficiency Rank indicates how well a bank is predicted to perform in terms of profits 
relative to other banks in the same period for producing the same set of outputs (Berger et al., 
2005). 
26 Available from: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf 
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suggests that major changes must be made to the way that bank boards function. These 
changes include improved risk management processes at board level, changes to 
balance of skills, more experienced and independent board members, and better and 
more transparent approaches to audit, risk and remuneration are required. The 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) has proposed the incorporation of a Code of Practice 
on remuneration into the FSA handbook which should be applicable to banks among 
other firms. The general requirement of the Code is that firms must put in place and 
respect remuneration policies, practices and procedures which promote effective risk 
management. Furthermore, the Chancellor has asked the FSA to annually provide a 
report on remuneration practices which would report the compliance of the firms with 
the new Code too. The chairman of the FSA has been asked by the Chancellor to conduct 
a review of the corporate governance of banks and other financial firms and respond to 
the lessons learnt from this crisis.  
On the other hand there are those who say that the most recent financial crisis was 
faced with regulatory framework left over from the Great Depression, which was 
designed on the premise of the lender of last resort protection being the Federal 
Reserve (Williams 2012, p.3). This framework enabled the supervisors to protect the 
depositors and prevent bank runs, and in the perspective of the last crises, it is 
considered microprudential. However, the concentration on individual depository 
institutions is not appropriate in a globally interdependent markets setup. The last crisis 
showed that well regulated banks have suffered the consequences of activities of non-
banking firms. This is one of the reasons why the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System in order to better supervise compliance with stronger capital standards, 
has adopted two tools which incorporate dynamic, macroprudential elements, which 
are: stress testing; and firm-specific capital planning (Tarullo, 2012). This has lead the 
Federal Reserve to advance itself from a supervisor of specific type of financial 
institutions to an agency with a broader focus on systemic stability as well (Bernanke, 
2012).  
The regulation of the financial industry, for the purpose of this chapter is going to be 
discussed from the United States regulations and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision guidelines perspective. 
 85 
 
Corporate governance of Financial Institutions 
 
 
2.4.1 The United States Regulations 
As mentioned earlier, the financial industry is among the most heavily regulated and the 
following Table 3-1 illustrates the extent of banking legislation in the United States in 
the Twentieth Century. 
Table 3-1 – Legislation in the United States 
 
Major Banking Legislation in the United States in the Twentieth Century 
Federal Reserve Act (1913)* 
Created the Federal Reserve System 
McFadden Act of 1927* 
Effectively prohibited banks from branching across state lines 
Put national and state banks on equal footing regarding branching 
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) and 1935* 
Created the FDIC 
Separated commercial banking from the securities industry 
Prohibited interest on checkable deposits and restricted such deposits to commercial 
banks 
Put interest-rate ceilings on other deposits 
Bank Holding Company Act and Douglas Amendment (1956)* 
Clarified the status of bank holding companies (BHCs) 
Gave the Federal Reserve regulatory responsibility for BHCs 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980* 
Gave thrift institutions wider latitude in activities 
Approved NOW and sweep accounts nationwide 
Phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits 
Imposed uniform reserve requirements on depository institutions 
Eliminated usury ceilings on loans 
Increased deposit insurance to $100,000 per account 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St. Germain)* 
Gave the FDIC and the FSLIC emergency powers to merge banks and thrifts across state 
lines 
Allowed depository institutions to offer money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) 
Granted thrifts wider latitude in commercial and consumer lending 
Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987* 
Provided $10.8 billion to the FSLIC 
Made provisions for regulatory forbearance in depressed areas 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989* 
Provided funds to resolve S&L failures 
Eliminated the FSLIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
Created the Office of Thrift Supervision to regulate thrifts 
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Created the Resolution Trust Corporation to resolve insolvent thrifts 
Raised deposit insurance premiums 
Reimposed restrictions on Saving and Loans (S&L) activities 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991* 
Recapitalized the FDIC 
Limited brokered deposits and the too-big-to-fail policy 
Set provisions for prompt corrective action 
Instructed the FDIC to establish risk-based premiums 
Increased examinations, capital requirements, and reporting requirements 
Included the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA), which strengthened 
the Fed’s 
Authority to supervise foreign banks 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994* 
Overturned prohibition of interstate banking 
Allowed branching across state lines 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999* 
Repealed Glass-Steagall and removed the separation of banking and securities industries 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 
Call for the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversights Board (PCAOB). 
Outline of responsibilities for the accounting firms. Among others, the lead audit and 
reviewing partner must rotate off the audit every 5 years. 
Prohibits loans to any of the firm’s directors or executives. 
Rapid disclosure of material changes in the financial conditions of the firm. 
Whistle blower protection. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 
Creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“Council”) to address the oversight 
failures and the regulatory gap created by various agencies. 
Creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority which in cooperation with the Council 
should monitor the activities of large institutions deemed as “too big to fail”. 
Title VII of the act to be known as the “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act 
of 2010” 
The Volcker Rule, restricts the ways banks can invest and regulates trading in derivatives. 
* Source: Mishkin, F. S. (2004) 
All these regulations, some more directly than others, have shaped corporate 
governance practices of banks. Among the ones that had a more significant impact was 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
i. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom and alike prompted the governments to act so future 
similar failures can be avoided. In 2002 the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act, also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed by 
congress.  
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SOX was built around five fundamental areas according to Rezaee (2009) 1. Corporate 
governance; 2. Financial reporting; 3. Audit functions; 4. Federal securities law 
enforcement; and 5. Others. For the purposes of this study, only the provisions 
addressing corporate governance will be mentioned in the following table. 
A summary of provisions of SOX concerned with corporate governance is presented in 
the following Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 - Sarbanes Oxley Act's Provisions 
Section Provisions  
202 Audit Committee Preapproval of Audit Services 
205 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
301 Public Company Audit Committees 
303 Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits 
304 Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits 
305 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
306 Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods 
402 Extended Conflict of Interest Provisions 
403 Disclosures of Transactions Involving Management and Principal Stockholders 
406 Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers 
407 Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert 
705 Study on Investment Banks 
806 Whistleblower Protection 
1105 Authority of the SEC 
1106 Criminal Penalties for Violations of the 1934 Exchange Act 
Source: Rezaee 2009 
Section 202 of SOX requires that all auditing and non-audit services provided by an 
auditor to be preapproved by the audit committee of the company. Section 205 amends 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 among others with the term AUDIT COMMITTEE 
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which is the body established by the board of directors for the purpose of overseeing 
the accounting and financial reporting processes of the company. Section 301 specifies 
the formation of an independent and competent audit committee as a committee of the 
board of directors, which is responsible for hiring, setting compensation, and supervising 
the publicly registered accounting firm’s (auditing) activities. SOX calls for each member 
of a firm’s audit committee to be a member of the board of directors and to be 
independent27. Section 303 prohibits directors and officers of the audited company to 
mislead or manipulate in any way the information provided to the independent audit for 
the purpose of rendering the audited reports and financial statements materially 
misleading. Section 304 obliges the CEO and CFO to forfeit any bonuses or profits for the 
period of previous 12 months if the company is required to prepare accounting 
restatements as a result of material noncompliance of the company, due to the 
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirements under the securities laws. Section 
305 amends a section of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in respect to Unfitness 
Standard and section 306 prohibits insider trading for officers and directors. Section 402 
prohibits personal loans to executives and section 403 postulates the requirement of 
disclosure of transactions involving management and principal stockholders who directly 
or indirectly own more than 10 per cent of any class of any equity security. Section 406 
puts the requirement for code of ethics28 for senior financial officers. Section 407 
postulates that the audit committee of a company must have at least one financial 
expert as its member. Section 705 requires from the Comptroller General of the United 
States to conduct a study on whether investment banks and financial advisers have 
assisted the failed Enron Corporation and Global Crossing to misrepresent their real 
financial situation. Section 806 puts in place protection mechanisms for whistleblowers. 
Section 1105 sets the authority of the Securities Exchange Act to prohibit persons from 
serving as officers or directors if such person is found to have violated rules set by this 
                                                          
27 To be considered “independent” a member of an audit committee may not, other than in his or 
her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board 
committee— (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the firm; or (ii) 
be an affiliated person of the firm or any subsidiary thereof. 
28 Code of ethics means standards that are required for promotion of: 1. Honest and ethical 
conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between 
personal and professional relationships, 2. Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable 
disclosure in the periodic reports required to be filed by the company, 3. Compliance with 
applicable governmental rules and regulations 
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act, section 1106 amends the act by increasing criminal penalties as foreseen by Section 
32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
To summarise, SOX provisions influence corporate governance in several ways Rezaee 
(2009) argues. First, new components29 are introduced to internal governance as 
gatekeepers. Second, fiduciary duties and legal status of directors and officers, 
particularly CEO and audit committee have been enhanced significantly and third, some 
aspects of state law were replaced30 and federalised.  
ii. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
The last financial crisis brought to surface a lot of problems and gaps with the then 
current laws and regulations. As a result, the United States Congress, on January the 5th, 
2010 passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.31 This is 
a cumbersome piece of legislation addressing almost all areas of financial activities in 
the United States. At the current state, the Act resembles more a framework which will 
require a lot of studies and rulemaking to enable the enactment of the provisions. This 
seems to be the status of the legislation addressing the issues of corporate governance 
as well. 
Out of 1601 sections of the law, only two sections, SEC. 971 and SEC. 972 under Subtitle 
G – Strengthening Corporate Governance are dedicated to corporate governance. On 
the 848 pages of legislation, corporate governance is mentioned only six times including 
the table of content. On the official page, the link about corporate governance and 
public companies provides very limited information. In brief, one can read that the 
Dodd-Frank Act significantly impacts the proxy process and the annual meeting with 
nonbinding say-on-pay votes. It also mentions the additional disclosures regarding 
executive compensation and permitting shareholders to include director nominees in a 
company proxy statement. There is also a bit that talks about compensation committees 
needing new procedures when retaining compensation consultants, legal counsel and 
other advisors. The word count on the page is 113 and it closes with: “Check back soon 
                                                          
29 Auditors, analysts, legal counsel. 
30 For example laws in some states would allow loans to directors and officers, but SOX prohibits 
such loans. 
31 Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173enr.pdf  
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for more information about corporate governance and public companies”.32 A more 
detailed discussion of sections follows. 
SEC. 971. Proxy Access of Dodd-Frank Act amends Section 14(a) of the Securities Act of 
1934 by adding a section about the “(A) solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorisation 
by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on 
the board of director of the issuer”; and, “(B) a requirement that an issuer follow a 
certain procedure in relation to a solicitation described in subparagraph (A)”. 
SEC. 972. Disclosures regarding chairman and CEO structures amends the Section 14A of 
the Securities Act of 1934 by adding the following “SEC. 14B. Corporate Governance” – 
which states that “Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
subsection, the Commission shall issue rules that require an issuer to disclose in the 
annual proxy sent to investors the reasons why the issuer has chosen – (1) the same 
person to serve as chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer (or in 
equivalent positions); or (2) different individuals to serve as chairman of the board of 
directors and chief executive officer (or in equivalent positions of the issuer)”. 
From what has been written above regarding the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to 
corporate governance it is obvious that a substantial bit of rulemaking is required to 
make the Law usable by both supervisory bodies and the institutions that are being 
supervised.  
2.4.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a committee within the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the oldest international bank established in 1930. With 
the aim of harmonizing bank supervision and capital adequacy among the countries of 
G1033, the BCBS has issued several accords commonly known as Basel I, Basel II, Basel 
II.V and Basel III in 1988, 2004, 2009 and 2011 respectively. Basel I, II.V and III do not 
address corporate governance issues directly, but due to its importance for banking 
industry are explained briefly below, while Basel II touches upon corporate governance, 
                                                          
32 Available at: http://dodd-frank.com/dodd-frank-and-corporate-governance-and-public-
companies/ (accessed on September 30, 2013; the last update of the page: July 25, 2010). 
33 Only countries belonging to the G10 group are obliged to comply with these standards. 
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hence, it is elaborated in more detail. Also, the BCBS provides further guidance for 
supervisors via Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision which are discussed at 
the end of this sub-section. 
i. Basel I - International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards  
This document represents the original Basel Capital Accord, which is known to set down 
the agreement of the G10 central banks34 to apply common minimum capital standards 
to their banking industries. The Committee’s work on regulatory convergence targets 
two fundamental objectives: First, the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system should be served by the new framework, and, second, with the view to 
diminish an existing source of inequality among international banks, the framework 
should be fair and have a high degree of consistency in its application to banks in 
different countries. 
The document is comprised by three sections with the first two describing the 
framework: Section I the constituents of capital and Section II the risk weighting system. 
Target standard ratio is dealt with in Section III. 
ii. Basel II - The New Basel Capital Accord 
The new Basel Capital Accord, commonly known as Basel II consists of three pillars: (1) 
minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, and (3) 
public disclosure. Although designed to help with proper capitalisation of banks, Basel II 
in contrast to Basel I, addresses corporate governance issues in pillars 2 and 3 which will 
be discussed below. 
Pillar one - A major innovation of the Basel II accord is the introduction of three distinct 
options for the calculation of credit risk35 and three others for operational risk.36 These 
                                                          
34 The group of G10 is consisted of eleven economies: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (as 
defined by BIS, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/g10.htm). 
35 Credit Risk: (1) Standardised Approach; (2) Foundation IRB Approach; (3) Advanced IRB 
Approach 
36 Operational Risk: (1) Basic Ce Approach; (2) Standardised Approach; (3)Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA) 
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approaches are intended to increase risk sensitivity and to allow banks and supervisors 
to select the approach/es they believe are most suitable for them.   
Pillar two - This pillar covers the Supervisory Review Process and describes the 
principles for effective supervision. Banks are required to evaluate their activities, 
corporate governance, risk management and risk profiles in order to determine whether 
they have allocated the appropriate amount of capital for their risks. Supervisors and 
management of the bank are expected to jointly find the best internal control processes 
and risk assessment systems. These are peculiar to each bank since they depend on the 
bank’s organisational structure, business practice and regulatory framework. 
Paragraph 725 identifies four principles37 of supervisory guidance complementing the 
principles outlined in the BIS document Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
which will be discussed in more detail later on. Paragraph 728 provides guidance on 
board and senior management oversight. The board and senior management are 
advised to view capital planning as a crucial element in enabling the achievement of 
strategic objectives (paragraph 729), while 730 calls for bank’s board of directors 
responsibility to set the bank’s tolerance for risks and the need for management to 
establish a framework for assessing various risks, a system to relate risk to the capital 
level, and establish methods for monitoring compliance with internal policies. Paragraph 
743 asks for adequate monitoring and reporting system which would enable bank’s 
senior management and board of directors to evaluate risk exposures and potential 
need for capital. The bank’s internal control structure is addressed in paragraph 744 
suggesting that effective control of capital assessment process includes an independent 
review and if necessary the involvement of internal and external audits. 
Pillar three - addresses corporate governance issues through transparency and market 
discipline mechanisms which would improve the flow of information among investors 
and bank management. Paragraph 810 suggests that banks’ disclosures should be 
consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess and manage 
the risks of the bank. Pillar three bestows upon the management’s discretion to 
determine the appropriate medium and location of the disclosure in situations where 
                                                          
37 Principle 1 discusses the need for banks to have processes in place for assessing their capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy to maintain their capital levels. 
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the disclosures are made under accounting requirements or are made to satisfy listing 
requirements promulgated by securities regulators. In these situations banks should 
explain material differences between the accounting or other disclosure and the 
supervisory basis of disclosure (paragraph 814). For those disclosures that are not 
mandatory under accounting or other requirements, management may choose to 
provide the information through other means (such as internet website or in public 
regulatory reports filed with bank supervisors), consistent with requirements of national 
supervisory authorities (paragraph 815). By linking the quality of disclosure to the 
regulatory capital requirements, pillar three attempts to give incentives to banks to 
improve the quality of the information regarding the bank's risk exposure and 
management practices. This can be achieved if banks improve their internal controls, 
systems operations, and overall risk-management practices.  
iii. Basel II.V and Basel III Accord 
The corporate governance practices of banks as discussed in the previous section, are 
addressed in Basel II accord. The Basel II.V package (BCSB 2009) and Basel III can be 
considered to be a response to the financial crisis with no direct implications for 
corporate governance, thus only the main points are going to be highlighted. 
Basel II.V charges banks more for keeping assets in the trading book, a portfolio which 
banks hold for daily trade usually on behalf of clients, instead of the banking book, a 
portfolio where usually banks keep the long term investments.  This set of rules entered 
in force on 31st December 2011 for Europe and most of the financial world jurisdictions, 
but Switzerland has started applying the requirements one year earlier than everybody 
else, while in the United States they will came to power in 2013. In United States, the 
Basel II.V starts one year later due to the noncompliance issues with the Frank-Dodd 
Act. The rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s which produce ratings 
that are used to calibrate capital charges by Basel II.V are held partially responsible for 
the crisis and the Frank-Dodd Act expressively forbids the use of such ratings. For this 
reason, American regulators have to come up with their own formula on capital charges 
for banks.  
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Turner (2009) identifies the regulatory capital requirements set by the Basel II accord as 
too low thus exacerbating the effect of the last financial crisis. Consequently, one of the 
recommendations of his report is the improvement of the quality and the quantity of 
the capital banks hold. Pepe (2013), following Turner 2009 finds that banks which 
tended to write the investment in the trading book before the Basel 2.5, now are writing 
more in the banking book. These findings are supported also by an article in The 
Economist38 stating that the financial three quarterly results of Credit Suisse in 2011 
show an increase on risk-weighted assets leading to higher capital costs for investment 
banking as a result of complying with Basel 2.5. 
Basel III is the new framework for capital adequacy of banks that has been endorsed by 
the G20 at the November 2010 Summit in Seoul. The lessons learned from the 2008-
2009 financial crisis taught the relevant stakeholders such as lawmakers and regulators 
that financial institutions previously considered ‘too big to fail’ can get into difficulties 
via companies operating in less regulated industries. This is why these institutions, 
referred to as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are at the focus of the 
Basel III framework. 
The implementation period for Basel III is 2013-2019, and there are a number of issues 
that need to be clarified and specified in the meantime, but many countries have 
already embarked in complying with these requirements rather than awaiting the final 
version of the rules. Previous experience with Basel II has taught countries as well as 
companies that strategic planning and adequate evaluations are crucial to successful 
implementation. 
The major Basel III recommendations are designed to address the following areas: 1. 
Increased quality of capital; 2. Increased quantity of capital; 3. Reduced leverage; 4. 
Increased short term liquidity coverage; 5. Increased stable long term balance sheet 
funding; and 6. Strengthened risk capture. 
Increase of the quality of capital should be achieved by using retained earnings and 
common equity as the main components of Tier 1 capital, and not financial instruments 
                                                          
38 Half cooked Basel, published on 7th of January 2012 edition of The Economist, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542463  
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based in debt which according to the current rules can be more than half of Tier 1. Other 
means, such as simplified requirements for Tier 2 capital and less complicated financial 
derivatives to be used for Tier 1 capital are part of measures to increase the quality of 
capital. 
The increase of quantity of capital is aimed to be achieved by increasing the minimum 
Tier 1 common equity from 2 per cent to 4.5 per cent, introducing a 2.5 per cent capital 
conservation buffer bringing the total common equity requirements to 7 per cent. The 
minimum total capital is increased from 8 per cent to 10.5 per cent as a consequence of 
the capital conservation buffer. 
Reducing the leverage of banks will be achieved by setting the leverage limit as 3 per 
cent which in accounting terms means that total bank’s assets cannot be more than 33 
times bank capital. This ratio is meant to supplement the risk based measures of 
regulatory capital and is to be applied to gross and un-weighted capital basis (risks 
related to assets are not included in the leverage calculation). 
The increased short term liquidity coverage introduced in the form of Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) aims to make sure that global banks have high quality liquid assets that can 
withstand a 30 day stressed funding scenario. The liquidity of assets is weighted on the 
basis that government bonds receive 100 per cent weight while corporate bonds can 
vary anywhere from 0 to 50 per cent. 
The regulatory objective 5 presents the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which is 
expected to incentivize and encourage banks to use stable funding sources for their 
activities rather than relying on short term wholesale funding. The logic behind this ratio 
is in comparing the required to available funding, ratios which are determined using 
weighting factors for assets such as government bonds weighted from 0 to 5 per cent, 
65 per cent for mortgages, 85 per cent for retail loans and 100 per cent for all other 
assets. The weighting factors for liabilities vary from 0 per cent for European Central 
Bank (ECB) funding, 50 per cent for unsecured wholesale funding, 90 per cent for core 
retail deposits and 100 per cent for Tier 1 capital. 
The 6th objective is about the strengthening risk capture with focus on counterparty risk. 
Through this set of rules, the BCBS aims to motivate a full coverage of risks in Pillar 1 
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framework, which were not captured by Basel II framework due to low capital 
requirements. Most of the objective 6 is covered by Basel II.V with respect to trading 
book and securitisation positions, but Basel III proposals take this a step further by 
modifying primarily the exposures to financial institutions and the counterparty risk on 
derivative exposures.   
iv. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
This document was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in September 
1997 and is comprised of twenty-five basic principles that need to be in place and 
enable an effective supervisory system. Core principles for effective banking supervision 
refer to a management structure composed of a board of directors and senior 
management. One of the fundamental guidelines is the encouragement of market 
discipline through good corporate governance. Supervisors should encourage 
appropriate structure and set of responsibilities for board of directors and senior 
management alongside with enhanced market transparency as means to improved 
banking.39  
In 2006, this document was revised with four more basic principles which had been 
identified as apparent gaps during the implementation of the first version of Core 
Principles. The Core Principles have served countries as a benchmark for assessing the 
quality of their supervisory systems. This led to identifying supervisory and regulatory 
needs to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices.40 
By the end of 2011 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision completed its review of 
the October 2006 Core principles for effective banking supervision and the associated 
Core principles methodology and The revised Core Principles were endorsed by banking 
supervisors at the 17th International Conference of Banking Supervisors held in Istanbul, 
Turkey, on 13-14 September 2012.41 
The revised set of twenty-nine core principles has been reorganized to follow a more 
logical flow of implementation and to provide a clearer division between what 
                                                          
39 For further discussion please see Appendix 1. 
40 Available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.htm  
41 Further details available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm  
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supervisors should do and what banks are expected to do from the supervisory 
perspective. In this light, principles 1 through 13 reflect the supervisory powers and 
obligations and principles 14 through 29 cover supervisory compliance of banks, 
focusing on corporate governance practices and risk assessment policies. 
The latest financial crisis has brought to light many corporate governance failures in 
banking practices thus, Principle 14 – Corporate Governance, postulates that supervisor 
determines that banks and banking groups have robust corporate governance policies 
and processes covering, for example, strategic direction, group and organisational 
structure, control environment, responsibilities of the banks’ Boards and senior 
management, and compensation. These policies and processes are commensurate with 
the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank. Principle 15 – Risk Management 
Process, requires from banks to have comprehensive risk management processes which 
include board and senior management insight. This principle then obliges the bank to 
behave accordingly for principles 16 through 19 which deal with: capital adequacy; 
credit risk; problem assets, provisions and reserves; and concentration risk and large 
exposure limits, respectively. Principle 20 addresses transactions with related parties, 
principles 21 through 25 deal with country and transfer risks; market risks; interest rate 
risk in the banking book; liquidity risk; and operational risk, respectively. The remaining 
principles 26 through 29 address audit and transparency issues such as: internal control 
and audit; financial reporting and external audit; disclosure and transparency; and abuse 
of financial services.     
2.5 Conclusions 
The chapter started with the discussion of the role of banks and other financial 
institutions as integral part of the economy and the potential spill over effects of bank 
(and other financial institutions) corporate governance onto the enterprises they lend 
to. Then the issue of whether corporate governance for financial and non-financial 
institutions is the same was examined. The current literature mainly supports the view 
that corporate governance for financial institutions is different from that of non-
financial ones mainly due to the fact that the principal-agent problem is more complex 
for banks and other financial institutions than it is for non-financial ones. There are 
some who support the view that there are enough features to distinguish corporate 
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governance of banks and other financial institutions. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are those who consider that corporate governance should not be different for 
financial and non-financial companies. The main studies in the field mention more or 
less the same basic elements distinguishing financial from non-financial firms and those 
are: opaqueness of bank operations, heavy regulation, and higher moral hazard 
opportunities by managers. This leads to a consensus that financial institutions are 
different from non-financial ones, thus the corporate governance should be adapted 
accordingly. 
Further in this chapter, the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of financial institutions is examined. The literature review showed a lack of 
consensus among the academia on which performance indicators and which corporate 
governance indicators are the most adequate ones for testing this relationship. Some 
studies showed that a higher frequency of board meetings combined with higher 
director fees and ownership stake and better attendance rates translates to higher 
profit efficiency of banks. Then there are studies that find that the lower the proportion 
of internal directors and an external chairperson will produce higher return on assets 
and return on equity for the bank. In addition, there are some studies that find that the 
board size and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q are positively related. 
Consequently, the review of literature showed that a relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance discovered in one study, is not supported by another 
study thus empirically supporting the prevailing lack of consensus in the academia about 
which indicators to use for estimating the relationship. 
The next section discussed the regulation and it showed that the banking industry is 
heavily regulated. The financial sector in United States alone has seen thirteen very 
relevant pieces of legislation spanning from 1913 to 2010 which have shaped the 
behaviour of financial firms. The regulation was intensified after the financial crisis 
which was blamed on failures of corporate governance practices of banks and other 
financial institutions. The regulation addressing corporate governance practices such as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Basel II, and Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
are discussed in detail. The common aspect of all these bits of legislation is the increase 
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of disclosure and transparency practices of financial institutions as one of the key 
aspects of improving corporate governance.  
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 4.1 Introduction 
It is generally agreed that good corporate governance is important for the operation of 
modern economies. However, there is no general agreement as how to establish that 
good corporate governance leads to better performance of firms. Arguably, this stems 
from the lack of a unified method of measuring the quality of corporate governance. 
This lack of consensus among academics and professionals of the field has produced 
divergences in terms of substance, methodology, techniques and other details used as 
to establish the direction and nature of the relationship.  
The study conducted by Gompers et al. (2003), hereinafter GIM, is among the first to 
attempt to quantify the corporate governance practices of companies and evaluate its 
impact on equity prices. There have been many studies of the subject since this paper, 
some agreeing with this approach while others do not. Bebchuk et al. (2005), e.g., 
consider that GIM method uses too many factors and dropping most of them will 
produce a better measure of corporate governance quality. Brown and Caylor (2004) use 
similar methods to the studies mentioned above but a different dataset, using another 
measure for the quality of corporate governance. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) use a 
different approach and use a system of simultaneous equations involving performance, 
governance, ownership and capital structure to estimate the relationship between 
performance and corporate governance.   
One of the important issues facing researchers studying corporate governance is to 
provide empirical evidence for the intuitive correlation between corporate governance 
and firm performance. However, finding a consistent relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance has been a serious challenge for researchers. The 
literature, as seen in previous chapters, shows that a corporate governance feature 
emerging as relevant in one study disappears in another. The situation is worse for 
financial institutions, as there are hardly any studies that explore this relationship for 
banks (or/and other financial institutions). Another issue facing researchers is the 
methods of investigation utilised in empirical research – most researchers use cross 
section analysis due to the nature of data availability. Econometric problems such as the 
treatment of endogeneity, which is one of the fundamental problems of this type of 
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investigation, have generally been ignored in the studies discussed earlier (and those 
that will be considered in this chapter). 
This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 4.2 will look at the most relevant 
research which is used to build the theoretical framework of this study. Section 4.3 will 
analyse the studies that are concerned with the measurement of the quality of 
corporate governance, looking at some of the widely used indices. Next the focus will 
turn to the relationship between corporate governance and bank valuation in section 
4.4, section 4.5 will embark on the empiric analysis by discussing the model, section 4.7 
will explain the methodology used, section 4.8 will present the empirical findings and 
section 4.9 will summarize the points made by this chapter and conclude. 
4.2  Theoretical Framework 
As seen in chapter one corporate governance issues stem from the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932) and the prevalence of agency problem 
(Fama, 1980). In practice this means that owners of capital have to part with their 
money and trust that managers will act in their best interests. This trust is weakened by 
the asymmetry of information between managers and owners, together with the 
uncertainty of the firm’s operations and the incompleteness of contracts which result in 
agency problems. The inability to address the agency problem through contracts due to 
high transaction costs will impact the corporate governance (Hart, 1995b).  
The agency problem illustrates how and why one of the main corporate governance 
problems is that between owners of capital and managers (Berglof and Von Thadden, 
1999) although there are other ways in which the corporate governance problem is 
manifested – for example the collusion of large shareholders and managers to 
expropriate small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 1999).  
Finding ways for suppliers of capital to get a return on their investment seems to be one 
of the main concerns of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For this 
reason the collapse of large corporations like Enron and WorldCom in late 1990s and 
early 2000s has had a negative effect on public trust and investor confidence (Rezaee, 
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2009).1 Getting the confidence back to investors required significant improvements in 
financial reporting, transparency and other aspects of corporate governance. The New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), among others, requires a majority of board members to be 
independent for a company to be listed.2 
Shareholders elect the board of directors so that it can oversee the management. As 
such, the board of directors’ function is to resolve or ameliorate the agency problem 
arising from the separation of ownership and management (Rezaee, 2009). In practice 
though, things are not that straight forward due to the opportunity that members of 
both, board of directors as well as management, pursue their individual interests instead 
of those of the company. Managers, as the agency theory suggests, might choose to 
maximise their own utility in contrast to maximising shareholder value (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, p.2; Fama, 1980).3 Similarly, board members can put provisions in place 
which might protect them from being removed (or replaced) easily by the board and 
entrench their position or seat on the board. This kind of behaviour by managers and 
board members can exacerbate the agency and the corporate governance problems. 
Considering that the board of directors is the medium where the interests of 
shareholders and the management of the company interact with each other, it is very 
important that the role and the functioning of the board of directors are not 
compromised. Although the decision making process (at the micro level) is delegated to 
the management, the board is responsible for running the company. The board 
represents the interest of all shareholders and its decisions should reflect the intention 
to increase shareholder value. Due to its importance, the board of directors is 
                                                          
1 The Enron, WorldCom and other corporate scandals have prompted corporate governance 
reforms in United States such as SOX, listing standards etc, in order to restore investor 
confidence (Rezaee 2009). 
2 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.01 Independent Directors: Listed companies must 
have a majority of independent directors.  
Commentary: Effective boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their 
responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality of board 
oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest. Amended: November 25, 
2009 (NYSE-2009-89). Available at: 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_
4_3_1&CiRestriction=303A&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F 
Accessed in June 2010 
3 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that an manager of mixed financial structure (debt and equity 
claims) firm would choose a set of activities for the firm which would result in lesser total value of 
the firm than it would be worth if the manager was the only owner. 
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considered “the cornerstone of the company’s corporate governance structure with the 
primary role of safeguarding interests of shareholders and other stakeholders” (Rezaee, 
2009, p.91). Having this in mind, one can suggest that a company’s corporate 
governance is only as good as the quality of its board members. 
As seen in chapter two there is a growing body of literature exploring the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance of firms. This chapter will broaden the 
discussion by analysing the studies mentioned in chapter two and augment it with other 
relevant developments in the field.  
Erkens et al. (2012) survey corporate governance of financial institutions worldwide 
during the period 2007-2008. They provide empirical evidence of the influence of 
corporate governance on the performance of these institutions during the crisis period. 
Their dataset consists of 296 of the world’s largest financial institutions spread across 30 
countries. These institutions have suffered the largest impact of the crisis according to 
the authors. Their model estimates stock returns during the crisis period January 2007 
to September 2008 and the corporate governance indicators such as i) board 
independence; ii) institutional ownership; and iii) the presence of large shareholders. 
They find that board independence is negatively related to performance due to the 
requirement of capitalisation at the time of depressed stock prices which in turn caused 
the wealth transfer from shareholders to debt holders. Also, greater institutional 
ownership is negatively related to performance as a result of institutional shareholders 
encouraging the management to take higher risks during the period leading to crisis (i.e. 
2000-2006).  
Some researchers suggest that improved governance reduces agency costs (Derwall and 
Verwijmeren, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004). The argument behind these studies is 
that firms featuring better corporate governance practices are expected to face lower 
costs of capital. Using the Governance Metrics International (GMI*) ratings for 2519 US 
firms, with diverse ratings, over the period 2003-2005, Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007) 
investigate the association between corporate governance and the cost of capital. They 
obtain the data on the cost of equity (the expected return) from Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (IBES) and dividend and price information from Compustat. Regressed 
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on the implied cost of equity as the dependent variable, their variable GOVSCORE is 
reported to be statistically significant at 10%.4 
Along the same line, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2004) look at the impact on firms’ cost of 
equity capital of governance attributes that aim to mitigate agency risk. They examine 
governance attributes relating to the quality of financial information, shareholder rights, 
and board structure by using a sample of 5306 firms compiled from a broad range of 
data sources.5 Abnormal accruals (an accounting based measure of the quality of 
financial information), earnings transparency (a market based measure of quality), the 
quality of audit committee (represented as the percentage of independent committee 
members), and the board structure (the proportion of independent board members) are 
all statistically significant at 5% or better and have the expected signs. These results 
allow the authors to suggest that firms with better corporate governance practices face 
lower cost of equity capital. They argue that this, as in the case of Derwall and 
Verwijmeren (2007), is due to the amelioration of the agency problem. 
Agency costs can be affected in many ways, one of which is the existence, or absence, of 
country (or in the case of US, state) laws regulating rights and obligations of 
management and/or shareholders. Daines (2001) finds that companies incorporated in 
the state of Delaware have higher share value than similar companies incorporated 
elsewhere in United States. By being agile in changing their laws so that they better suit 
the needs of firms and appointing a specialized corporate court, Delaware provides an 
option for parties to use contractual substitutes which may limit the agency costs.  
Owners and managers of firms going public6 have strong incentives to display value 
maximising behaviour. Since the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) are usually conducted 
during the stage of concentrated ownership and low agency costs, it is expected that a 
legal framework which provides lower agency costs and limits managerial behaviour is 
beneficial. The state of Delaware has the largest number of firms incorporated in the 
                                                          
4 The model also comprises of other control variables such as: firm size, firm’s beta (daily stock 
returns over the previous year), book debt to assets ratio, and the price to book ratio. 
5 They use: Investor Responsibility Research Center and the Corporate Library for board and 
committee composition and management entrenchment ces; Compact Disclosure for ownership 
data; CDA/Spectrum for Institutional holdings; Compustat for accounting variables; CRSP for 
stock return data; and Value Line for expected returns.  
6 Firms that are publicly traded. 
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United States, more than half of all public firms, generating around 20 per cent of state 
revenues.7 The Delaware law, according to Daines facilitates the easier acquisition of 
firms. Approximately 20% of firms incorporated in Delaware, in contrast to 14% of firms 
incorporated elsewhere in the United States, received at least one takeover bid during 
1995, resulting in completed sale of 12% of Delaware firms in contrast to 8% of other 
firms. The empirical evidence supporting this comes from a sample of 4481 United 
States exchange–traded firms over the period of 1981 to 1996. Using Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable, which stands for an approximation of firm value, Daines (2001) 
finds that the variable ‘Delaware incorporation’ is positive and significant at 1%.  
Daines argues that these findings provide strong evidence against voices that Delaware 
Law creates conditions for managerial rent seeking instead of an increase in shareholder 
value. Since Delaware has managed to create a legal structure such that it can reduce 
agency costs and private benefits for managers, investors are willing to pay the 
“Delaware Premium” for companies.  
Quantifying whether any given company has good or bad corporate governance 
practices has been a challenge for academics. This is mainly due to the complexity and 
multidimensionality of factors impacting corporate governance – and these have also 
contributed to the lack of consensus about a set of variables used to measure corporate 
governance practices. However, there have been several attempts by various 
researchers to quantify the corporate governance practices of companies for the 
purpose of empirical work. The following section will look into these studies.  
4.3 Measures of the Quality of Corporate Governance and their 
relationship with performance 
Academics and practitioners studying corporate governance are well acquainted with 
the most important developments in the area of measuring the quality of corporate 
governance. There are two approaches to measuring this quality that can be classified 
broadly into academic and commercial. The academic approach was pioneered by a 
widely cited work produced by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) which was followed by 
                                                          
7 In contrast to second largest market share, the state of New York which accounts for five per 
cent of public firms incorporated. 
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Bebchuk et al. (2004). Brown and Caylor (2004) also use a similar method but with a 
different database to quantify the quality of corporate governance of companies.  
On the commercial side, there are agencies such as Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), Governance Metrics International (GMI*), and The Corporate Library (TCL), 
specialising in rating corporate governance practices of companies. Also some stock 
exchanges have their own models for measuring and ranking the quality of corporate 
governance of listed companies, such as the Warsaw Stock Exchange. However, the 
commercial approach is beyond the scope of this chapter since chapter two has a 
section about their function, hence, the academic approach will be considered next. 
4.3.1 “The Governance Index” 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have produced one of the most cited works in respect 
of the relationship between corporate governance and performance. Their paper on 
corporate governance and equity prices has become a benchmark against which most of 
other works in this field are compared. They use the data published by Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) to construct what they call a “Governance Index”. 
The aim of the index is to evaluate the governance practices of companies using the 
level of shareholders’ rights within firms as a proxy. The logic behind the calculation of 
the index is quite simple; the presence of any provision in the company bylaws or state 
laws restricting shareholder rights would add one point to the index.8  
GIM focus on the two extremes of the spread of the Governance Index; firms scoring the 
index value ≥ 14, are put in the “Dictatorship Portfolio” and firms with the index ≤ 5 are 
sorted into the “Democracy Portfolio”.9 They find that $1 investment in a “Dictatorship 
portfolio” firm in 1990 would have grown to $3.39 in 1999, while the same investment 
in a “Democracy portfolio” firm would have grown to $7.07 for the same period. This 
                                                          
8 Also, the absence of one or both of specific provisions (which is considered to improve the 
position of shareholders), Secret Ballot and Cumulative Voting, would add one (or two) points to 
the Governance Index. Hence, the Governance Index represents the sum of ones which derive 
from the presence or absence of the respective provisions. The data is used to construct five sub-
indices such as: Delay, Protection, Voting, Other and State. Appendix 4-1 shows 28 provisions out 
of which the Governance Index is calculated. 
9 The former group consists of the firms where the managers have superior power while the 
latter group has firms in which shareholders are in a better position. 
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translates to returns of 14 per cent annually for the former firm and 23 per cent for the 
latter. The argument behind this approach is the following. If corporate governance is 
important for firm performance, and this relationship is incorporated by the market, this 
would be reflected in stock price which would adjust to relevant changes in corporate 
governance practices of the firm. However, if corporate governance matters but this 
information is not recognised (or ignored) by the market and therefore stock prices do 
not reflect the changes in governance, then the realized returns on the stock would 
systematically differ from equivalent securities (Gompers et al. 2003, p.13). To explain 
this disparity between the returns of firms belonging to each portfolio, they look at the 
“style” or riskiness of the portfolios by estimating the four factor model developed by 
Carhart (1997): 
 tttttt MomentumHMLSMBRMRFR   **** 4321  
where Rt is the return difference between Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios in 
month t, RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate, 
and the terms SMBt (small minus big), HMLt (high minus low), and Momentumt are the 
month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture 
size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. The estimated intercept, 
“alpha”, which is interpreted as the abnormal return, was both significant at 5 per cent 
and positively correlated with the governance index for the democracy portfolio and 
also significant at 5 per cent but negatively correlated for the dictatorship portfolio, thus 
the study suggests that the disparity in returns is due to the underperformance of the 
dictatorship portfolio and the overperformance of the democracy portfolio. 
GIM take their investigation further by investigating the relationship between 
governance and the firm value. Using Tobin’s Q as a measure for firm value, they 
construct the following model: 
 itittitttit eWcXbaQ '  
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With Q’it is the industry adjusted Q value,10 Xit represents a vector of governance 
variables and Wit a vector of firm characteristics11. Their results suggest a positive and 
economically large relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Their 
point estimate for 1999, as an example, can be interpreted as follows. In 1999, all else 
equal, a one-point increase in the governance index (taking the firm toward the 
dictatorship portfolio) is associated with 11.4 percentage points lower firm value. 
The Governance Index developed by GIM has been used as a measure of the quality of 
firms’ governance by a significant number of studies such as: Hafod, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008); Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005); Amit and Villalonga (2006); and others.  
There is no rationale to assume that all 24 provisions of the IRRC data contribute to the 
same extent12 to the firm’s valuation. Most provisions elaborated by the GIM study are 
negatively correlated but there are some that are positively correlated with firm value 
and even among the same group of criteria, one can expect that the weighting of 
provisions would be different. This has led a number of researchers to look in more 
detail inside the IRRC provisions. Chapter 6 of this thesis empirically investigates the 
relationship between performance and corporate governance of banks and insurance 
companies in SEE countries, and it is shown that using a sub-index (measuring some 
aspect of corporate governance) may be more useful than using an overall index.   
4.3.2 “The Entrenchment Index” 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) study was among the first to raise the potential problem of too 
many provisions. They suggested that only few of the provisions are correlated with the 
firm’s valuation while the rest are merely a measurement noise. Their hypothesis is that 
the IRRC provisions that matter are the ones that provide protection to incumbent 
managers against removal or the consequences of removal. They refer to this protection 
as “entrenchment”. The entrenchment index is compiled from six provisions grouped in 
‘constitutional limitations to shareholder rights’ and ‘takeover readiness’ provisions. The 
first group has four provisions: staggered boards, limits to amend bylaws, limits to 
                                                          
10 Firm Q minus industry mean Q. 
11 Firm characteristics used are book value of assets, firm’s age, whether the firm is incorporated 
in the state of Delaware and whether the firm is listed in S&P500 or not. 
12 Or contribute at all, which might be the case for any given provision. 
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amend charter; and supermajority. The second group is consisted of: golden parachutes 
and poison pill provisions.13  
One of the main contributions of this paper is the identification of the provisions which 
are negatively correlated to the firm’s valuation. Although the evidence presented by 
them is not sufficient to establish causality, it is consistent in suggesting that 
entrenching provisions contribute to bringing or maintaining a lower firm valuation. 
4.3.3 ”The Gov-Score Index” 
Brown and Caylor (2004) question whether the GIM index can be used to denote 
broader governance. Since most of the 24 provisions used by GIM are anti-takeover 
measures, Brown and Caylor argue that the GIM index is an anti-takeover protection 
index. They make the point that this index is designed to be negatively related to firm’s 
good corporate governance practices or lack of shareholder rights, while Gov-Score is 
constructed to be positively related to the strength of firm’s governance practices. 
Hence, ‘Gov-Score’ is a more adequate measure of corporate governance and it shows 
that better-governed firms are more profitable, pay out larger dividends and are valued 
higher by investors.   
Gov-Score is based on the ISS data which consists of 51 factors covering eight areas of 
corporate governance: board of directors, executive and director compensation, 
director education, audit, progressive practices, charter/bylaws, ownership, and state of 
incorporation. Gov-Score is computed by assigning each of the 51 factors the value of 1 
or 0 depending on whether the firm has (or has not) minimally acceptable governance 
practice.14 The value of Gov-Score is obtained by adding all the assigned values (ones 
and zeros), which means that in theory a firm can have a Gov-Score from 0 (worst) to 51 
(best). Brown and Caylor compute their index for 2327 firms using the ISS data on 1st 
                                                          
13 The rationale presented by the authors for not including the remaining 18 IRRC provisions in 
the index is that none of the 18 provisions has been subject to precatory shareholder resolution. 
14 Brown and Caylor (2004, p.11) “Example of a factor with minimally acceptable governance: 
1. Audit: Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors. 
2. Board of directors: Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 
3. Charter/Bylaws: Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder 
approved.” 
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February 2003. Performance variables are extracted from Compustat for the 2002 fiscal 
year end. 
Correlating Gov-Score using Pearson and Spearman correlations with industry-adjusted 
variables for performance, Brown and Caylor find that all but one of performance 
measures,15 including return on equity (ROE), net profit margin, Tobin’s Q, dividend yield 
and stock repurchases are statistically significant16 and of expected sign. This study 
reports that firms with higher Gov-Score, in other words with better governance 
practices, display ROE which is 9.244% above the industry average (compared to -
6.806% for low Gov-Score firms), net profit margin of 45.997% above the industry 
average (compared to -19.518%) and so on. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) also report the association between the six performance 
measures and the eight governance categories and find that ROE is positively and 
statistically significantly related to five categories.17 Net profit margin is positively and 
statistically significantly correlated to four categories, Tobin’s Q is positively and 
statistically correlated to two categories, dividend yield is correlated to five categories 
and all the correlations are positive and statistically significant. 
4.3.4 Other Contributions 
Baghat and Bolton (2008) raise some doubts regarding the governance measure 
developed by GIM and say that there are at least three alternative ways of interpreting 
the abnormal returns for the firms in the democracy portfolio. One, the results can be 
specific to the period and sample used. Two, there might have been some unobservable 
risk-factor correlated to the governance measure, i.e. the risk-adjustment could have 
been flawed. Three, considering the possibility of an endogenous relationship between 
performance and corporate governance, one can assume that the causality explanations 
provided by GIM will be distorted. 
                                                          
15 The exception is Sales Growth. 
16 Stock Repurchases is not statistically significant for Pearson correlation but it is positive and it 
is positive and significant at 1% for Spearman correlation. 
17 It is also correlated to ‘the state of incorporation’ category but it is statistically insignificant. 
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Baghat and Bolton (2008) find that board independence (measured by the proportion of 
independent members on the board) is negatively correlated with current and future 
operating performance, but confirm that better governance as measured by GIM and 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) indices, stock ownership of board members, and the separation of 
the CEO-Chairperson roles is positively correlated with the operating performance 
measure used above. Baghat and Bolton suggest that in order to study, from the 
econometric point of view, the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance, a system of simultaneous equations specifying the relationships between 
performance, corporate governance, ownership structures and capital structures should 
be designed, thus they estimate the following: 
Performance = f1(Governance, Ownership, Capital Structure, Z1, ε1) 
Governance = f2(Performance, Ownership, Capital Structure, Z2, ε2) 
Ownership = f3(Governance, Performance, Capital Structure, Z3, ε3) 
Capital Structure = f4(Governance, Ownership, Performance, Z4, ε4) 
Where Zi are vectors of control variables and εi are the error terms. They use the data of 
the following sources: IRRC and The Corporate Library (TLC) for the board variables; 
Compustat and Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for performance variables. 
Using Return on Assets (ROA), ROA for the next year and ROA for next two years,18 
Baghat and Bolton find their results consistent with GIM results for relationship between 
good governance and performance for the period 1990-1999 which extends for the 
period 2000-2004 too.19 They also suggest that stock ownership by board members will 
serve as incentive for better monitoring and more involvement in the strategic decision 
making processes, hence, a reliable proxy for good corporate governance can be the 
board members’ share ownership. 
                                                          
18 Under the assumption that performance is affected by governance, then operating 
performance can be expected to be impacted for several coming years (Baghat and Bolton, 
2008). 
19 Baghat and Bolton study was conducted in 2008 hence the data for the period up to year 2004 
was available. 
  
Theoretical Framework and Cross Section Analysis 
114 
There are, however, researchers who ask the question ‘does better corporate 
governance cause better firm performance?’20 with a touch of scepticism. Chidambaran 
et al. (2008) find that there is no clear correlation between good governance and good 
performance if governance measures are considered, as they should, to be 
endogenous.21 To investigate this issue, they design three samples for the period 1992-
2002, constituting firms that have experienced large changes in governance but not 
extremely good/bad changes in performance (Moderate Performance Sample), large 
performance declines (Abnormally Bad Performance Sample), and large performance 
improvements (Abnormally Good Performance Sample).  
Using CRSP and Compustat databases to construct industry adjusted ROA and stock 
returns they classify firms into the ‘Abnormally Bad Performance’ sample if their 
industry-adjusted stock return is in the lowest quartile in the identification year and in 
the top quartile the previous two. Firms that inversely meet this criteria, i.e. they are in 
the top quartile in the identification year and in the bottom quartile the previous two 
years, are sorted into the ‘Abnormally Good Performance’ sample. The firms whose 
governance changes are large, but whose performance changes are not sorted into any 
of the two previous samples, are put into the ‘Moderate Performance’ sample. 
To classify the governance changes for firms, Chidambaran et al. (2008) use 13 criteria in 
five governance categories: ‘board monitoring’, ‘pay-performance sensitivity’, 
‘shareholder rights’ and other ‘governance measures’. The composition of the criteria 
belonging to each category is presented in Appendix 4-2 where each governance 
measure (mechanism) is represented with its ex-ante value for good governance 
changes.  
The study fails to find a direct correlation between good performance and good 
governance except in isolated cases. In more than 50% of cases firms with good 
governance changes suffer negative changes in industry-adjusted performance. The 
                                                          
20 This was the working title of the paper by Chidambaran et al. (2006) which was published by 
the title ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Large Governance 
Changes’ in 2008. 
21 Authors argue that governance measures (or mechanisms) to ameliorate the agency problem, 
such as: size of the board, independence of the board, frequency of board meetings are not 
necessarily exogenous. 
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authors often find that firms make at the same time good and bad governance changes. 
They also find that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ changes in governance affect performance; 
however, direct or inverse causality cannot be confirmed. These findings are in line with 
Core et al. (2006) who find that abnormal stock returns for firms with weak shareholder 
rights are somewhat greater than the abnormal returns for firms with strong 
governance practices. 
These findings show that a robust relationship between good governance practices and 
good firm performance remains unresolved. However, the authors themselves report 
that changes in governance practices, whether good or bad, affect firms’ performance. 
Hence, one can argue that the fact that these studies fail to find the ‘good governance – 
good performance’ relationship may be due to misspecification of models 
(misspecification stemming from failure to properly address endogeneity and dynamic 
issues). This could arguably represent a situation where some unobserved firm 
characteristic(s) is/are driving the results. Also, the biased way samples were created in 
the Chidambaran et al. (2008) study may suggest that there might not have been 
enough time lags taken into consideration to allow for governance changes to start 
showing their impact on firms’ performance. 
4.4 The Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation – The Cross Section Investigation 
The previous sections of this chapter gave a more elaborate insight into the prevailing 
approaches for exploration of the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of firms. The (large) number of corporate governance and performance 
measures used in these studies is an indicator of the lack of a unified theory and 
consensus on what is the most appropriate relationship and which factors are 
important.  
One possible explanation for such diversity of approaches can be the fact that corporate 
governance as a scientific field has started to receive the deserved attention fairly 
recently, after the failures of Enron, World Com and the like. Considering that this is all 
happening in the last decade and a half, arguing that the field is still ‘relatively new’ is a 
plausible explanation. 
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The shifting of focus to corporate governance meant, however, that any hypothesized 
relationship has to be tested and supported by data. This pointed out the obvious 
problem of lack of data from the corporate governance perspective which in turn gave 
way to the emerging of a number of agencies specialized in corporate governance. As 
described in chapter 2, these agencies gather relevant corporate governance data and 
rate corporate governance practices of companies.  
This situation entailing a number of agencies providing more or less different versions of 
the same thing in respect of corporate governance practices and lack of consensus on 
the theoretical model although not a receipt for a unified approach, at least provides 
scope for experimentation with different combinations of corporate governance – 
performance/valuation relationship. 
4.5 Determinants of Good Corporate Governance – Discussion 
of the Model 
Throughout this thesis the few most important studies, such as Gompers et al. (2003), 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) and Brown and Caylor (2004), have been explained from different 
aspects. Here they will be subject to detailed investigation of the corporate governance 
component of the model these studies use and how these relate to the performance or 
valuation of the firms. Attention has to be drawn to the fact that all these studies are 
based on decomposed22 governance information which is crucial to the testing of 
specific aspects of corporate governance. This study does not possess such detailed 
data, thus the investigation is limited in this respect. 
Gompers et al. (2003) as mentioned earlier, use the IRRC database to design their 
corporate governance index consisted of 24 provisions (see Appendix 4-1). The index 
which can have maximum value of 24 (representing the weakest shareholder rights) is 
negatively correlated to the firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. The main finding of 
Gompers et al. (2003) is that firms with strongest shareholder rights (low value of the 
index) have higher firm value, profits, sales growth etc.  
                                                          
22 Disaggregated firm-level information.  
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Bebchuk et al. (2004) in their study present a more parsimonious index compared to the 
one of Gompers et al. (2003) and suggest that 18 out of 24 provisions used in the 
Gompers et al. study bring only ‘noise’ to the index, hence, have no correlation with firm 
valuation. The provisions singled out by this study, consequently comprising the  
Entrenchment index are: Staggered Board (boards with directors divided into different 
classes and separate election terms for each class); Limitation on Amending Bylaws; 
Limitation on Amending the Charter  (provisions which limit shareholders’ ability 
through majority vote to amend the corporate bylaws and corporate charter 
respectively); Supermajority to Approve a Merger (a requirement of more than a 
majority of shareholders to approve a merger); Golden Parachute (a severance 
agreement to protect the management or/and board members following a change in 
control); and Poison Pill (a shareholder right that can be used in the event of an 
undesired change in control). 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) recognize that there might be aspects in which the power of the 
entrenchment index can be improved. For one, the index is constructed by assigning 
equal weights to each provision, which means that potential effects that several 
provisions might have jointly, is neglected. Nevertheless, their results suggest that six 
provisions in the Entrenchment Index are sufficient to explain the relationship between 
a low firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q for the period 1990-2003 and 
shareholder rights.23  
Brown and Caylor (2004) find a positive relationship between a Gov-Score constructed 
from 51 factors provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Tobin’s Q. In 
this study other measures of performance and valuation such as Return on Equity, Net 
Profit Margin, Sales Growth, Dividend Yield and Stock Repurchases, are also used. The 
correlation between these measures and Gov-Score was found using the ISS data from 
2003. However, in 2006 these authors publish another version of their paper where the 
main differences from the previous 2004 paper is that they use only Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of firm value and they construct a more parsimonious index called Gov-7. They 
use a three step procedure in order to identify which are the most important factors 
                                                          
23 Bebchuk et al. (2004) use the same data source (IRRC) to construct their index hence their 
findings are comparable to Gompers et al. (2003). 
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driving the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. The first step 
(referred to as ALL approach) is a process of regressing Tobin’s Q on all 51 factors and 
control variables log (Assets), log (Firm Age) and Delaware (dummy) and this produces 
six factors as statistically significant. The second step the technique used by Bebchuk et 
al. (2004) to derive the entrenchment index, with the difference that the regressions on 
Tobin’s Q are run for each ISS factor individually (excepting the six identified in the first 
step) and 50 remaining grouped together. This step generated three more statistically 
significant factors. The third step (referred to as Step approach) employs a stepwise 
regression and as a result six factors are singled out, four of which have been already 
identified by the previous two steps. After some simple tabulations of the results from 
the three steps described above, Gov-7 was constructed from the following factors: (1) 
average options granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares 
outstanding did not exceed 3%; (2) board members are elected annually; (3) company 
either has no poison pill or a pill that is shareholder approved; (4) option re-pricing did 
not occur within the last three years; (5) directors are subject to stock ownership 
guidelines; (6) directors attended at least 75% of meetings or had a valid excuse for non-
attendance; and (7) board guidelines are in each proxy statement. When Tobin’s Q was 
regressed on Gov-7, Gov-Remaining44 and control variables, Gov-7 came out highly 
significant while Gov-Remaining44 turned to be statistically insignificant, thus indicating 
that the factors driving the relationship between corporate governance and firm value 
have been identified successfully. 
Bebchuk et al. (2004) and Brown and Caylor (2006) bring out an important aspect of 
corporate governance measures, which is aggregation of a large number of individual 
corporate governance aspects into a single index. Although this aggregation makes it 
easier to compare companies with regards to their corporate governance practices, it 
also contributes to the bluntness of the measure in modelling terms. This means that 
effects of individual corporate governance aspects are averaged in a single index. Yet 
Bebchuk et at. (2004) show that only a few of the 24 corporate governance provisions 
used in Gompers et al. (2003) drive the relationship and a similar finding is presented by 
Brown and Caylor (2006) in the paragraph above. 
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With all the evidence presented and discussed throughout this thesis regarding the 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm value/performance, this 
chapter sets out to test whether this is true for the banking sector. Before delving on 
explaining the approach in more detail, a few notes should be taken into consideration. 
First, corporate governance rating agencies are usually private enterprises and access to 
their data is restricted by fee payments which are not modest by any standards.24 
Second, the last global crisis hit the banking system the worst which indicates that there 
might be few relationships disturbed in the process, and third, as mentioned in chapter 
3 banks are considered to be opaque in comparison to most other industries hence 
evaluating their corporate governance practices might have been harder for the rating 
agencies.  
A model used by Brown and Caylor (2004) will serve as basis for the starting point of this 
analysis. There are two main reasons for this. First, the data for the corporate 
governance rating of banks used in this research (produced by ISS) is the same as that 
used by them and most of the variables can be replicated (or proxy-ed) easily.25 Second, 
this would potentially give some comparability to the model as results can be compared 
to Brown and Caylor (2004) findings. Having said that, the variable for corporate 
governance in the model is expected to suffer from the same bluntness as explained 
above. 
4.6  The data 
The dataset which will be used for the empirical analysis in this chapter is compiled from 
two separate databases, ISS CGQ Profiles (Institutional Shareholder Services Corporate 
Governance Quotient) and Bankskope. This was necessary as all the data (variables) 
needed for the econometric modelling were not available in one place. Although this 
allows for a larger variety of variables, the downside of combining a dataset from two or 
more databases is that a significant number of observations are lost due to the 
mismatch of information on any one entity. The following short presentations of 
                                                          
24 The lowest quote offered by one of these agencies for a one year single user account was USD 
15,000.00. 
25 Brown and Caylor (2004) use the Gov-Score (all 51 factors) instead of Gov-7, which is 
convenient as the dataset used for this chapter does not have the disaggregated corporate 
governance index. 
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databases will give an idea of how the data is collected and presented and in the next 
heading the effects of mismatched information will be explained in more detail. 
4.6.1 ISS CGQ 
ISS collects data from public disclosures, press releases and websites on 7500  
companies worldwide. According to the RiskMetrics Group, who acquired ISS in 2007  
and consequently have the rights to the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ®), the 
selection of companies in their database is done irrespective of whether they ask to be 
rated or not.  The rankings are derived based on a model which looks at over 60 data 
points relevant to corporate governance practices of the company and then categorizes 
this information into eight areas: 1) board of directors, 2) audit, 3) charter and bylaw 
provisions, 4) anti-takeover provisions, 5) executive and director compensation, 6) 
progressive practices, 7) ownership, 8) director education. The model then produces 
two ratings, which are on percentile basis, for each company:  CGQ Index – comparing 
corporate governance scores of companies listed in the same market index; and, CGQ 
Industry – comparing governance scores in the same industry (i.e. with all other US 
banks). For the purpose of this analysis, CGQ Industry will be used as the way it is 
constructed allows for comparison of corporate governance scores of all banks in the 
sample, and also dummy variables to control for each listing index are going to be 
included in the model. Hence, in future, reference made to CGQ scores shall mean CGQ 
Industry unless explicitly stated otherwise. According to Stybel (2009, p.7) “CGQ index 
score provided by ISS compare to Relevant Market Index including: S&P 500, Mid-Cap 
S&P 400, Small-Cap S&P 600, Russell 3000, and CGQ Universe (remaining companies 
covered by CGQ but outside the Russell 3000)”. Note that when CGQ refers to a "Russell 
3000" CGQ score, it is referring to Russell 3000 companies MINUS the three S&P 
Indices). A sample of the questionnaire used to calculate the rating is attached as 
Appendix 4-3 to this chapter. 
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4.6.2 Bankscope 
Bankscope is a database produced by BUREAU VAN DIJK and publishes data on 
approximately 30000 banks all over the world.26 The large number of banks included in 
each region is a good argument against any selection criteria bias. The information 
presented in the database is compiled from a number of sources. Financial data supplied 
by Fitch Ratings consists mainly of information available on balance sheet and income 
statements as well as audited reports. Ratings and rating reports are gathered from four 
different agencies: Fitch, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Capital Intelligence. The 
security and price information is provided by Fininfo and ownership information is 
drawn from BvDEP resources.27 
To summarize the dataset, it is clear that there is an ample number of banks in each 
database, especially in Bankscope and for the developed economies. However, when 
combined to generate the dataset for this chapter, the number of common observations 
is greatly reduced, leaving us with a dataset of 276 observations.  
4.6.3 The Process of Generating the Dataset 
The logical consequence of trying to match observations from two databases is that the 
constraint on the number of observations is imposed by the database with the smaller 
number of banks. For this reason, the first search was conducted on the ISS CGQ 
database. By using a single search criteria “Bank” which selects all the registered 
companies within the banking industry (and obviously having the word ‘Bank’ in their 
name), out of 7500 entries, a list of 613 banks is generated.28 The report contains 
several important fields such as the report date, company identifiers, industry, securities 
                                                          
26 Bankscope has up to 16 years of financial information for public and private banks with a 
geographical span as below: The top 7,000 European banks; The top 12,000 North American 
banks; 800 Japanese banks; 1,000 Russian banks; Over 3,000 other major banks; The leading 32 
supranational banking and financial organisations. However, it contains limited information only 
on few SEE banks. 
Available at: http://www.bvdinfo.com/getattachment/c6ce49f6-ac7f-4782-a2fa-
0637cce8992a/Bankscope.aspx accessed in September 2010. 
27 Available at: http://www.bvdinfo.com/getattachment/c6ce49f6-ac7f-4782-a2fa-
0637cce8992a/Bankscope.aspx accessed in September 2010. 
28 When a similar search was conducted at the beginning of March 2010, a report of only 113 
banks was generated. 
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information and Corporate Governance Quotient (index and industry score), the latter 
also being broken down into sub-scores for board, compensation, takeover and audit 
(please see Appendix 4-4). In contrast to the Corporate Governance Quotient which is 
expressed on per centile basis, the sub-score ratings take the values from 1 to 5 (bottom 
quintile and top quintile respectively). 
Once the information from ISS database is organised the next step is to find the 
information in BankScope for the banks in the ISS list. This means searching for the 
banks from the ISS list one by one in BankScope. The outcome was classified into three 
categories: (1) not in BankScope; (2) in BankScope, but only minimal information is 
available; and (3) in BankScope and there is full information on it in the database. The 
explanation of categories is intuitive as for category (1) BankScope search would return 
a “No match found” - answer. There are 123 banks that fall under this category. For the 
198 banks in category (2) the search would result in bringing up a file on the bank 
containing some narrative information but no financial data whatsoever. The category 
which contains 292 banks, category (3), has all the information on banks, narrative and 
financial, which spans from financial reports of 2009 to, in some cases, as early as 1994. 
However, for some banks financial reporting dates would fall short of 2009. In order to 
complete these observations for the missing years, each of the banks’ websites was 
visited and in most cases there was valid information such as annual or other useful 
reports. Another very useful resource is the Securities and Exchange Commission 
website where publicly listed US companies have to submit their information (such as 
10K form). However, in some cases these banks had undergone acquisition processes or 
had filed for bankruptcy, hence there is no information available beyond the years on 
the BankScope file.  
4.7 Methodology 
The components of the econometric model can be loosely sorted in three groups, 
corporate governance, valuation, and control variables. The model to be estimated a 
variation of the Brown and Caylor (2004) model with the following distinctions: the 
inclusion of other listing indexes such as S&P 400, S&P 600, Russell 3000, and CGQ 
Universe in addition to the S&P 500 used by Brown and Caylor (the dummy variable for 
companies incorporated in the state of Delaware used by Brown and Caylor is not 
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available to this model); and finally, the inclusion of the dummy variable ‘dce’ which 
should act as an alert of something not being right with the financial indicators, in this 
case change in Market Book Value and change in total assets. Hence the model to be 
estimated in this chapter is the following: 




6004005003000
ln2009_ln_ln2009_ln
8765
43210
DspDspDspDrussell
DceAgetaincgqaq
  
Where aq represents the Approximate Q ta is total assets, age is the age of the firm’, 
indicator is crisis effect and takes 0 or 1 values depending on the criteria explained later, 
Drussell3000 controls whether a bank is listed in the Russell 3000 listing index, and Dsp 
dummies provide information whether a bank is listed in one of the ‘S&P 400; S&P 500; 
and S&P 600 indices.   
The variables included in the model and the reasons why they are important for this 
estimation are discussed below. 
CGQ index score. There are two composite indices generated for each company: CGQ 
Index – comparing corporate governance scores of companies listed in the same stock 
market index and, CGQ Industry – comparing governance scores in the same industry. 
For the purpose of this analysis, CGQ Industry will be used as the way it is constructed 
allows for comparison of corporate governance scores of all banks in the sample. It is of 
course also important to know on which stock market index a particular share is 
included and, therefore, we have included dummy variables to control for each listing 
index (Russell3000, S&P400, 500 and 600) (more on these listing indices later).  
Approximate Q. Tobin’s Q is a measure of firm value, widely used by academics and 
practitioners of finance as seen throughout the literature review in previous chapters 
(Gompers et al. 2003, Brown and Caylor 2004 (and 2006), Villalonga 2004, Cremers and 
Nair 2005, Villalonga and Amit 2006, Baghat and Bolton 2008). The idea behind Tobin’s 
Q is to compare the stock market value of the company and the cost of replacing the 
assets of the company.29 The Q ratio became very popular following the paper by 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) but their formula for calculating this ratio (shown below) is 
                                                          
29 The hypothetical value of this index is 1 (or approximately 1) indicating that the assets of the 
company are valued ‘correctly’ by the markets. 
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very demanding in terms of both, information requirements and computation 
capacities.  
NETCAPBKCAPTOTASST
ADJSTDEBTLTDEBTVCOMSPREFST
RL q



  
where L-Rq is Lindenberg and Ross’s Q; PREFST represents the liquidation value of a 
firm’s preferred stock, VCOMS the product of firm’s common stock price and number of 
shares outstanding at the close of the year; LTDEBT the value of the long-term debt 
adjusted for its age structure; STDEBT the book value of current liabilities; ADJ the value 
of net short-term assets; TOTASST the book value of total assets; BKCAP the book value 
of net capital stock; and NETCAP inflation-adjusted net capital stock. Obviously the use 
of the formula described above is preferable, but due to limited information available, it 
is also very hard to realize. However, an alternative method of calculating the 
approximate value of Tobin’s Q is presented by Chung and Pruitt (1994). This method 
allows the calculation of an Approximate Q value using the data available in financial 
statements and explains at least 96.6% of variability of Tobin’s Q values obtained by the 
theoretically more appropriate L-Rq formula. The formula Chung and Pruitt suggest is:  
TA
DEBTPSMVE
QeApproximat


 
Where MVE is the product of share price and common shares outstanding; PS 
represents the liquidation value of a firm’s outstanding preferred stock; DEBT is the 
value of short-term liabilities net of short-term assets plus the book value of the long-
term debt; TA stands for the book value of total assets of the firm. 
Given that the information required for the calculation are obtainable from financial 
statements, the dependent variable used in this study is Approximate Q.30  
Total Assets. Total assets represents the value of assets in millions of dollars at the end 
of the financial year. This variable was used as a control by Brown and Caylor (2004) and 
(2006). It appears in the natural logarithm form in the models to be estimated later in 
this chapter. 
                                                          
30 None of the banks in my data sample has reported preferred stock. 
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 (Bank) Age. Brown and Caylor in both of their publications in 2004 and 2006 use firm 
age as a control variable and, we too, use this variable in the regressions of this chapter. 
Following Brown and Caylor (2004 and 2006) and Fahlendbrach (2008) age enters the 
regressions in its natural logarithm form. 
S&P 500. S&P 500 was set up in 1957 and covers 500 largest US firms with market 
capitalisation in excess of US$ 4 billion and captures around 75% of US equities.31 Listing 
in this market index is used in a number of studies (Gompers et al. 2003, Brown and 
Caylor 2004). A dummy variable identifies the banks in this index (taking the value of 1 
when the bank is listed in this index and 0 otherwise). 
S&P 400. S&P 400 captures around 7% of US equities and consists of mid-cap companies 
with market capitalization between US$ 850 million and US$ 3.8 billion. Other criteria 
for inclusion are geographical location, public float of at least 50% etc.32 The inclusion of 
other listing indices than S&P 500 is important to the model as previous studies (e.g. 
Brown and Caylor, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003) covered more industries; hence, S&P 500 
provided enough variation and positive selection of largest companies in respective 
industries. The model used in this chapter, however, looks only at the banking sector 
with a sample comprised entirely of US banks. Hence, listing of banks on these 
respective indices carries more explanatory power. A dummy variable identifies the 
banks in this index (taking the value of 1 when the bank is listed in this index and 0 
otherwise). 
S&P 600. S&P 600 index covers approximately 3% of the US equities market. Measuring 
the small cap segment, with companies with market capitalization between US$ 250 
million and US$ 1.2 billion, this index serves as an efficient portfolio of companies that 
meet specific inclusion criteria and enables these companies to be investable and 
                                                          
31 For more information, follow the link: http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-
500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l--  
32 For more information, follow the link: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobheadername3=MDT-
Type&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobheadervalue2=inline%3B+filename%3DFact
sheet_SP_MidCap_400.pdf&blobheadername2=Content-
Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobheadername1=content-
type&blobwhere=1243765720041&blobheadervalue3=UTF-8  
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financially viable.33 A dummy variable identifies the banks in this index (taking the value 
of 1 when the bank is listed in this index and 0 otherwise). 
Russell 3000. Russell 3000 is an index comprised of the 3000 largest US companies. This 
index is reputed to serve as a broad barometer for the market and is reconstituted on 
annual basis to reflect any changes in the list of largest companies.34 A dummy variable 
identifies the banks in this index (taking the value of 1 when the bank is listed in this 
index and 0 otherwise). 
CGQ Universe. Companies that have had their corporate governance score calculated by 
ISS and are not included in the Russell 3000 are put together in what Risk Metrics 
International35 calls the CGQ Universe.36 A dummy variable identifies the banks in this 
index (taking the value of 1 when the bank is in this group and 0 otherwise). 
Each of the companies in the sample belong to only one index. ISS explain that the 
situations in which the same company would qualify to be listed in both the Russell3000  
(3000 top companies in US) and S&P500 (500 top companies), for example, have been 
sorted out and each company is associated with only one listing index.  
Book Value and Market Value. The book value of a bank is calculated by deducting 
“Deposits & Short term funding” from “Total Assets”, both pieces of information 
available on the financial reports provided by BankScope.  
The market value of the bank is calculated by multiplying “Shares outstanding“ and 
“Market price - year end” also available from financial reports provided by BankScope. 
Both of these variables are calculated for at least five years (or more) subject to data 
                                                          
33 For more on this index, follow the link: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobheadername3=MDT-
Type&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobheadervalue2=inline%3B+filename%3DFact
sheet_SP_SmallCap_600.pdf&blobheadername2=Content-
Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobheadername1=content-
type&blobwhere=1243765720053&blobheadervalue3=UTF-8  
34 For more on this index, follow the link: 
http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact_sheets/us/Russell_3000_Index.asp  
35 Risk Metrics International has concluded the acquisition of ISS on 11th January 2007. For more 
information please see the press release at the following link: 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/riskmetrics_acquires_iss  
36 For more information on the index follow: 
https://frontoffice.riskmetrics.com/wiki/index.php/Index_CGQ 
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availability for the respective banks. Although these variables do not enter the model 
directly, they are needed for calculation of the ratio Market to Book Value (MBV). 
Indicator. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the period studied, banks suffered one 
of the most severe financial crisis and this variable is an intuitive measure to ‘alert’ if 
there is something counterintuitive happening with the information reported. For 
instance, the market book value (MBV) of the company in the current year is higher 
compared to the MBV of the previous year, while total assets in current year are lower 
compared to the previous year. This variable enters the model as dummy which takes 
the value of 1 in case that the following condition is met: 
MBVt > MBVt-1 and Total Assetst < Total Assetst-1 
Otherwise it is 0. There are a number of hypothetical situations even during the normal 
economic cycle when that situation can occur such as the case when the assets of a bank 
decline and market value remains the same, or, both MBV and Total Assets decline but 
the latter suffer a larger decline than the former. However, especially during the crisis, 
one would expect that markets are more alert to the changes in balance sheets and this 
should be reflected on the stock price of the respective banks. 
Distance to Default (d2d). This variable is included in the model following Spong and 
Sullivan (2007) as a comprehensive measure of bank risk. According to their definition 
(p.16) “It is based on the probability distribution of the income earned by the bank and 
is derived by asking the question: How far would income have to fall before the bank 
would be forced to default on its debt?” and the formula they use is: 
assetsonreturnofdeviationstndard
assetsonreturnofvalueaverageratioassettoCapital
DefaulttoDist


 
And the information to calculate this variable is reported by BankScope for most of the 
banks, hence it is available from the balance sheets. 
Tier 1 Ratio (t1r). This regulatory measure was introduced by FDICA and requires from 
banks to set aside a proportion of their capital to provision for risk weighted assets. The 
benchmark for well capitalised banks according to this ratio is at 6% or more. A detailed 
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discussion of tier 1 ratio follows in section 5.4 and Table 5-3 displays the levels of 
capitalisation of American banks.  
Market Capitalisation (MC). MC is a simpler measure of bank value determined mainly 
by the stock markets as it represents the product of the number of shares outstanding 
and stock price at the end of the year. Table 4-1 presents the variables of the model 
with statistical information. 
Table 4-1 - Summary statistics on the main variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnaq_2009 223 1.69 0.51 0.82 6.41 
lncgq_in         290 3.69 0.96 -1.20 4.61 
lnta_2009         277 7.81 1.58 4.84 14.61 
lnAge        290 2.35 0.42 1.10 2.77 
dce      223 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Dsp500        290 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Drussell30000 290 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Dsp400        290 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Dsp600        290 0.09 0.29 0 1 
lnmc_2009 257 5.14 2.53 0.69 15.71 
cgq_in 290 53.60 29.95 0.30 100.00 
d2d_2009 257 12.17 5.87 -2.66 39.51 
t1r_2009 211 11.82 3.62 0.20 29.90 
roe_2009  275 -0.73 2.43 -11.35 3.69 
CGQ Universe 121 8621.77 57685.50 2 515053 
S&P 500 13 721242.40 1909842.00 1390 6652934 
S&P 400 23 1623.26 871.53 376 4689 
S&P 600 26 612.26 331.93 137 1680 
Russell 3000 74 16112.05 67653.52 26 390352 
The method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is found to be the best approach for the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation given the nature of the 
data at our disposal. As Wooldridge (2005) points out the OLS method gives unbiased 
estimators if the following five assumptions from Gauss-Markov theorem hold: 
Assumption 1: Relationship is linear in parameters; Assumption 2: Random Sampling; 
Assumption 3: Sample variation in explanatory variable, i.e. explanatory variables are 
not all the same value; Assumption 4: Zero conditional mean, i.e. the sum of residuals in 
any explanatory variable is expected to be zero; and, Assumption 5: Homoscedasticity, 
i.e. the error term has the same variance for any given value of the explanatory variable. 
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The compliance with these assumptions will result in OLS estimators being Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) of estimated coefficients. Gujarati (2003, p.79) explains that 
for the OLS estimators to be BLUE, the following criteria will have to hold: “1. It is linear, 
that is a linear function of a random variable, such as the dependent variable Y in the 
regression model; 2. It is unbiased, that is, its average or expected value, )( 2
^
E , is 
equal to the true value of β2; 3. It has minimum variance in the class of all such linear 
unbiased estimator; an unbiased estimator with the least variance is known as an 
efficient estimator”. 
It has to be mentioned here that neither OLS estimation nor the data available for this 
chapter allow the addressing of either potential endogeneity (for which 2SLS, had the 
instrumental variables been available, would be a better technique) or dynamic issues 
(requiring data for several years on each observation). These issues will be addressed in 
Chapter 5, while the findings of this chapter will serve to introduce the relationships of 
new variables not used in previous research thus developing the basis for the preferred 
models to be used in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. With these caveats at mind, OLS 
regression will be used for estimating the relationships for the sample used in this 
chapter.  
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4.8 Discussion of the Results 
Using the data as described above to estimate the model laid out in section 4.5 provides 
the initial results presented in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 - Lnaq Regression Results 
Dependent variable lnaq_2009.  
Dummy benchmark ‘DcgqUniv’ 
lncgq_in 0.01 
(0.04) 
lnta_2009 -0.01 
(0.03) 
lnAge 0.21** 
(0.08) 
dce -0.06 
(0.11) 
Dsp500 -0.52** 
(0.23) 
Drussell3000 -0.13 
(0.08) 
Dsp400 
-0.11 
(.15) 
Dsp600 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
Cons 
1.32*** 
(0.31) 
Note: ***, **, and* denote level of significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. SE value in parenthesis.  
The results do not support the correlation between corporate governance and bank 
valuation. Although the sign of the main variable of interest is positive, the estimated 
coefficient on the variable is not significant meaning that statistically it is not different 
from 0. The log-log specification of the model shows satisfactory diagnostics tests (see 
the Stata outputs in Appendix 4-5). 
The interesting finding about this model is that the dummy variable for whether the 
bank is listed in the S&P 500 index is one of the only two significant variables and at the 
5% level. The interpretation of this variable would be as follows. Banks that are listed 
under the S&P 500 index, ceteris paribus, stand to have a 0.4 per cent lower 
approximate Tobin’s Q in comparison to banks grouped under the CGQ Universe (banks 
that are excluded from the Russell 3000, hence also from the other three listing indices). 
Conversely, as the effects associated with the largest banks listed in the S&P 500 are 
diluted in successively broader indices containing larger numbers of smaller banks, so 
this negative effect is attenuated in Russell 3000, -0.13; S&P 400, -0.11; and S&P 600, -
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0.06. Although the coefficients on broader categories are not estimated with statistical 
significance, the results suggest that the larger the bank, ceteris paribus, the lower the 
Approximate Q.  
This finding is quite counterintuitive and requires further attention. In order to test 
whether these results are peculiar to 2009 or stretch over a longer period of time this 
chapter averages the data over the period 2005 to 2009. Statistically insignificant results 
on all variables excepting age, and contradictory result on heteroscedasticity tests by 
STATA indicate that there might be some unaccounted factor which is influencing the 
model. For the period of time covered by this model it can be argued that the financial 
crisis which hit the financial sector, especially in the United States where the sample 
data used for this chapter is from, then it is arbitrarily decided to divide the sample by 
averaging the data for years 2008-2009 and 2005-2007. The results for the three 
regressions are reported in the following Table 4-3.  
 
 
Table 4-3 – Average Approximate Q Regression Results 
Dependent variable Average Approximate Q for the period: 
Dummy benchmark ‘DcgqUniv’ 
Period 2005-2009 2005-2007 2008-2009 
lncgq_in 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
lnAvta -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.060* 
(0.030) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
lnAge 0.23** 
(0.09) 
0.31** 
(0.09) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
Dsp500 -0.36 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.49** 
(0.22) 
Drussell3000 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.24 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
Dsp400 0.02 
(0.15) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
Dsp600 
0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Cons 
1.17*** 
(0.32) 
1.16*** 
(0.31) 
1.24*** 
(0.29) 
Note: ***, **, and* denote level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. SE 
value in parenthesis.  
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Results presented in Table 4-3 support the suspicion of the impact of the financial crisis 
on the valuation of banks as measured by Approximate Q. The estimated coefficients of 
variables, excepting bank age which is statistically significant across all model 
specifications, suggest that the models specified by averaging the data between 2005-
2007 and 2008-2009 make more sense than the joint specification over 2005-2009.  
Firstly, for the period 2005-2007 the main variable of interest, CGQ industry, although 
not statistically significant at conventional levels, is significant at 14% and has the right 
sign. This result supports the finding by Bebchuk et al. (2010) that in 2000s the 
association between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q still exists.37 The statistically 
significant variable Total Assets has a negative sign and there is no economically intuitive 
explanation for such relationship. The statistically significant estimation on the dummy 
for whether the company is listed in the S&P 400 (mid-cap companies) suggests that 
banks in this category have been valued slightly higher than similar banks listed in CGQ 
Universe index.38 
On the other hand, the results of the model averaging the data over the period 2008-
2009 exhibit similar properties to the first model as presented in table 2. Again the only 
statistically significant relationships are the positive correlation with bank age and 
negative correlation with banks listed in S&P 500. Considering that S&P 500 index is 
regarded as a respectable gauge for large-cap US equity market, the intuitive 
(anticipated) correlation between banks listed in this index and their valuation, is not a 
negative one (for Stata printouts see Appendix 4-6).  
By deepening the research, this chapter comes to a revelation that the results actually 
support an emerging strand of studies that are concerned with the use of accounting 
regulations by banks in light of the recent financial crisis. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) 
report that banks in US had managed to successfully lobby against the use of ‘fair value 
                                                          
37 Bebchuk et al. (2010) argue that in 2000s the association between abnormal returns and their 
measure for governance (G- and E-indices) due to learning of market participants to appreciate 
the difference between firms scoring poorly and well on governance indices. However, their 
research shows that the negative association (due to the construction of G- and E- indices) with 
Tobin’s Q still remains. 
38 Since the data is averaged over a period of time, resorting to more detailed interpretation of 
these results might stress the economical meaning of the relationship. 
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accounting’ regulation as the impact of crisis started to show.39 By claiming that their 
assets are mostly not impaired currently and that they intend to hold on to them till 
maturity since “the market prices reflect distress sales into an illiquid market” (Huizinga 
and Leaven, 2009, p.3) banks have manoeuvred their way into downplaying the extent 
of their losses by overstating the book value of their assets (or understating the value of 
the loss).  
Normally, accounting techniques should not generate significant differences between 
the market and book value of assets. However, during the crisis, large gaps emerge 
between these two values, especially when assets reflect values based on historical cost 
(Huizinga and Laeven, 2009).40 This, according to the authors, raised doubts about the 
reliability and the relevance of bank’s accounting information. In their paper, they prove 
that banks have systematically understated the impairment of their assets related to 
real estate, in an attempt to keep book capital. Firstly, large discounts to mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) are proven even in the situations when they were carried at fair 
value (they appeared to be overvalued on bank’s balance sheets). Secondly, banks with 
high exposure to MBS experienced large excess returns when fair value accounting rules 
were relaxed.41 Thirdly, banks with large MBS portfolios tend to report low rates of loan 
charge-offs and loan-loss provisioning. 
This is also supported by the model as it can be seen in Table 4-4 as the dummy for S&P 
500 keeps its sign and statistical significance in 2009 and 2008 while in 2007 it becomes 
insignificant (see Appendix 4-7 for stata outputs).42 
                                                          
39 As it is stipulated by the accounting standards, the quoted market price should be used as basis 
for the estimation of the asset’s fair value. However, if such information is not obtainable, then 
fair values of such assets should be calculated based on the information available. Huizinga and 
Laeven (2009). 
40 Huizinga and Laeven (2009) state that by the end of 2008, market-to-book value of more than 
60% of bank holding companies (compared to 8% in 2001) in US was below 1. Also the average 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to bank assets was relatively stable at 11% during this time (2008). This has 
created the situation where market value of bank equity drops although the book capital 
remained virtually constant. 
41 In October 2008 the allowable use of non-market information for determination of fair value 
was clarified by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and in April 2009 the same body 
released a decision to provide banks with greater discretion for the use of non-market based 
information for the evaluation of hard-to-value assets. (Huizinga and Laeven 2009). 
42 As a robustness check for this relationship, the dependent variable is replaced with MBV and 
the regression is run on the data for 2009. Although none of the coefficients are statistically 
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Table 4-4 - Comparative Regression Results 
Dependent variable, lnaq 
dummy benchmark ‘DcgqUniv’ 
 2009 2008 2007 
lncgq_in 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01    
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Lnta_ -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
lnAge 0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.28** 
(0.08) 
dce 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
N.A. N.A. 
Dsp500 -0.52** 
(0.23) 
-0.38*  
(0.20) 
-0.1 
(0.23) 
Drussell3000 -0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.01    
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Dsp400 -0.11 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
Dsp600 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
0.14  
(0.11) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
Cons 
0.01 
(0.04) 
1.24***  
(0.27) 
1.19*** 
(0.29) 
Note: ***, **, and* denote level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. SE 
value in parenthesis.  
With the results supporting Huizinga and Laeven (2009), indicating that banks might be 
involved in ‘creative accounting’, the lack of statistically significant correlation between 
corporate governance and bank value perhaps can be attributed to the irregularities in 
balance sheets. For this reason, this chapter will turn to an alternative measure of bank 
value, Market Capitalisation. Although it is not sophisticated as Tobin’s Q (or 
approximate Tobin’s Q in this case), the advantage of the market capitalisation measure 
is that it is exclusively market based.  
The focus, then, is on the relationship between market capitalisation and corporate 
governance index. For this purpose, the following model is estimated: 




6004005003000
2009_2009_12009_2_2009_ln
8765
43210
DspDspDspDrussell
roertDDincgqmc
 
On the left-hand side is market capitalisation in its natural logarithmic form for the year 
2009. The right-hand side is comprised of control variables such as: distance to default, 
Tier 1 capital ratio, return on assets and listing index dummies.  
                                                                                                                                                               
significant, the signs on the coefficients are not contradicting the results of previous models (see 
appendix 7 for STATA results). 
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Some statistical properties of the variables which will be used have already been 
presented in Table 4-1.  
The results presented in Table 4-5 are quite intuitive and all the variables have the 
expected sign. 
Table 4-5 - Regression Results with MC 
Dependent variable lnmc_2009.  
Dummy benchmark ‘Dsp500’ 
cgq_in 0.01* 
(0.01) 
d2d_2009 0.03** 
(0.01) 
t1r_2009 -0.01 
(0.02) 
roe_2009 0.01*** 
(0.01) 
Drussell3000 -3.31*** 
(0.31) 
Dsp400 -1.43*** 
(0.34) 
Dsp600 -2.41*** 
(0.34) 
DcgqUniv -4.66*** 
 (0.32) 
cons 7.97***   
(0.51) 
Note: ***, **, and* denote level of 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. SE value in 
parenthesis.  
 
The diagnostics indicate that this is a well specified model and the suspicion of potential 
heteroscedasticity problem cast by Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is removed by 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test (see Appendix 4-9).  As seen in Table 4-5, 
the results support a positive relationship between corporate governance and market 
capitalisation. According to these results, market capitalisation of a bank, ceteris 
paribus, will increase by 0.05 percentage points if the corporate governance score of a 
bank increases by 1. This relationship is statistically significant at the level of 10%. 
However, it can be argued that the magnitude of the effect, i.e. a small estimated 
coefficient, is influenced by the existence of an additional group of stakeholders in the 
context of the banking industry (depositors), and also the heavy regulation in this 
industry. 
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Tier 1 ratio in this estimation losses statistical significance. With the mean value of tier 1 
ratio as reported in Table 4-1 at approximately 11%, this finding might indicate that 
banks are keeping the Tier 1 Ratio intentionally at high levels as this measure is easily 
observable by markets, with the hope of being rewarded if it is high. This particular bank 
behaviour is supported by results of Huizinga and Laeven (2009) as in their sample, same 
as here, tier 1 ratio was observed to remain at 11% although banks were suffering large 
losses which should be cushioned by this fund. 
The relationship between distance to default and market capitalisation, is statistically 
significant at 5 per cent and the interpretation is as follows. All else being equal, a 1 per 
cent43 increase in the capital provisions will increase the market capitalisation by 0.033 
percentage points. Arguably this can be attributed to the fact that distance to default is 
being observed by the markets hence a bank with proper capital ‘buffers’ against 
defaulting loans is rewarded with higher market capitalisation.  
Other relationships are statistically significant and display the expected signs. The 
relationship between return on equity (roe_2009)44 and market capitalisation is positive 
and statistically significant at a level of 1%.45 This model specification produces the 
intuitively expected relationships between market capitalisation and dummy variables 
for listing indices.46 Using the methodology suggested by Halvorsen and Palmquist 
(1980), Gujarati (2004), Wooldridge (2005), the dummy variable for CGQ Universe index 
should be interpreted as follows. The median Market capitalisation of banks listed under 
CGQ Universe index, ceteris paribus, is approximately 1.04 times lower than the median 
                                                          
43 Distance to default is a ratio, hence the interpretation 1% increase… 
44 The Return on Equity / Assets (ROE; ROA) are presented by Bankscope as averaged values to of 
the respective indices throughout a period of time (usually one year) thus in Bankscope datasets 
these indices would appear as ROAE and ROAA. However, to avoid causing confusion, this thesis 
resorts to shortening the abbreviations to the more conventional ROE and ROA respectively. 
45 There is nothing counterintuitive about this, and the regression results can be interpreted as 
follows: everything else equal, 1 percentage point increase in return on average equity will result 
at approximately 15 percentage points increase on the market capitalisation of the respective 
bank. Since the roe_2009 appears in its level functional form then the interpretation of this 
relationship is xy  )100(%   (Wooldridge, (2005) p. 50; Gujarati (2004) p. 179). However, 
due to problems pointed out earlier in this chapter regarding the reliability of financial 
statements of banks throughout this period, perhaps one should refrain from quantifying this 
relationship. 
46 The base category is CGQ Universe listing index. 
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market capitalisation of banks listed under S&P 500 index.47 Although this result might 
appear to be very large, the summary statistics (Table 4-1) support this interpretation, as 
the maximum value of market capitalisation of a bank listed in S&P 500 is on the order 
of six trillion US dollars. 
The findings discussed in the previous two paragraphs, together with the evidence 
presented in Table 4-1, indicate that there is an adverse selection of banks grouped 
under CGQ Universe listing index. This is supported by the fact that excepting banks 
listed under S&P 500, some of the largest banks as measured by market capitalisation 
are listed in the CGQ Universe index. As such, in a way these findings provide some 
support to the suspicions expressed at the beginning of this chapter after the estimation 
of the first model that there is something dubious about the information presented by 
banks listed under the CGQ Universe index. 
Having said that, the strategy of moving the investigation towards measures that are 
determined more by the markets proved to be a step in the right direction as it was 
possible to provide evidence of the positive and statistically significant relationship 
between corporate governance quality as measured by ISS CGQ score and the valuation 
of banks as measured by market capitalisation of banks. Although Tobin’s Q or some 
alternative more sophisticated measure of valuation or performance would be 
preferable, there is evidence that such measures might be compromised due to crisis 
and changes in accounting regulation, that have effected financial statements of US 
banks. Nonetheless, the existence of positive and statistically significant correlation 
between corporate governance and any measure of valuation should not be ignored.  
                                                          
47 The formula g= {exp(c) - 1} as suggested by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) where g is the 
relative effect and c is the estimated coefficient. Applying the formula to the coefficient the 
following is obtained: g = {exp(4.66)-1}={105.63-1}≈104.63 (104.63/100 = 1.0463). The dummy 
variable for banks listed under the S&P 400 following the same logic of interpretation can be 
explained as follows: The median market capitalisation of banks listed in S&P 400, ceteris paribus, 
is 0.03 times lower than median market capitalisation of banks listed under S&P 500. Banks listed 
in S&P 600, everything else equal, tend to have 0.1 times lower median market capitalisation 
than the omitted category and banks listed under Russell3000 index, ceteris paribus, have on 
average 0.2 times lower median market capitalisation than the reference S&P 500 index. 
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4.9 Conclusions 
The chapter started by explaining the lack of consensus in academia regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation indicators. The corporate 
governance problem stems from the separation of ownership and control according to 
Berle and Means (1932). This problem is exacerbated by the asymmetry of information 
and incompleteness of contracts which worsens the agency problem. Enron and 
WorldCom failures are among the largest ones to provide an exhibition of the 
devastating power of poor corporate governance in practice. Re-establishing investor 
trust and assuring the suppliers of capital that they will get a return on their investment 
triggered a number of acts. These acts range from passing of laws as seen in chapter 
three, to attempts of quantifying and measuring corporate governance practices. 
The ‘Governance Index’ by Gompers et al. (2003), ‘The Entrenchment Index’ by Bebchuk 
et al. (2004) and other indices investigate different aspects of corporate governance 
practices and most of them report positive correlation between good corporate 
governance and firm performance. However, the existing evidence in respect to this 
relationship is inconclusive. 
All the studies discussed in this chapter explore the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance for a broad range of firms. The evidence of such empirical 
research carried specifically for banks is very scarce or non-existent. Hence, this chapter 
has contributed to closing the gap by empirically exploring the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. 
The findings on this chapter are one more proof of the difficulties in finding a persistent 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. The indicators used in 
previous studies, due to the accounting issues explained in the previous section, could 
not be used for the estimation model of this chapter, thus warranting the search for a 
new measure, which in this case was market capitalisation. It can be argued that in case 
of this study, the estimation was exacerbated due to the crisis period being investigated 
and the lack of data for more than one year with regards to corporate governance score 
of banks.  
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The crisis period made it impossible to estimate similar models to the ones used in 
previous research due to the change of some accounting practices in the US during the 
investigated period. However, the findings in this chapter managed to identify a 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation irrespective of the crisis 
period. The empirical results support the positive relationship between corporate 
governance of banks and the market capitalisation leading to believe that corporate 
governance practices are observed by markets even during one of the largest financial 
crisis. Being aware of the shortcomings of the cross section OLS estimation of the 
corporate governance relationship, the main one being the inability to address potential 
endogeneity, the next chapter will investigate this relationship using a panel data set 
and more advanced statistical methods. 
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 5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed and tested a model of the relationship between 
corporate governance and market capitalisation of banks, using a cross section analysis 
due to data limitations. Despite the numerous flaws in this approach, exacerbated by 
the fact that the estimated model contains data from the financial crisis period (2005-
2009), the exercise did prove to be fruitful as it managed to identify relationships 
between corporate governance and bank valuation not highlighted in the literature 
previously, and provided a plausible explanation for why the models used in previous 
studies failed to produce meaningful and statistically significant results. As such, the 
contribution of chapter 4 should be considered more as a means to investigate new 
relationships untested before in the literature, and seen as a prelude to chapter 5 where 
the data allows for the application of more advanced empirical approaches, thus 
addressing the issues identified in previous chapters. 
The aim of this chapter then, is to test whether the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank valuation, as identified in chapter 4, holds over time or not. Such 
an inquiry requires panel data, i.e., information on the same unit of analysis over more 
than one period in time. The panel modelling became possible once we were able to 
obtain additional data for the years 2005-2008 from ISS, amend the dataset used in the 
previous chapter, and create a panel dataset for the years 2005-2009. 
The chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2 explains the data, section 3 explains the 
model, section 4 describes the empirical assessment strategy, section 5 interprets the 
results, section 6 carries out the robustness checks, and section 7 concludes. 
5.2 The Data 
The previous chapter explains the process of creating the cross section dataset by 
combining the information extracted from two sources, Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) database which provides governance scores and the Bankscope database 
which provides financial information for respective banks. The same approach is applied 
in this chapter except here the adjustments are made to accommodate the creation of a 
panel dataset.  
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ISS publishes a ‘corporate governance quotient’ for US and international companies on a 
regular basis. In their Best Practices and User Guide Glossary1, ISS explain that for 
generating the CGQ index for each company, publicly disclosed documents covering 
eight arrears which produce data on 61 different issues of corporate governance are 
analysed. These areas are: 1) board of directors; 2) audit procedures; 3) charter and 
bylaw provisions, 4) anti-takeover provisions, 5) remuneration of executives and 
directors; 6) progressive practices, 7) ownership, and 8) director education. Each 
variable is evaluated at on a standalone basis, however, some variables are also looked 
at in combination under the premise that corporate governance is improved by the 
presence of selected combinations of favourable governance provisions.  
Actually, ISS produces two corporate governance quotients (CGQ) for each company, 
CGQ industry and CGQ index. The CGQ industry measures the corporate governance 
practices of each company against that of companies in the same industry while the 
CGQ index measures the corporate governance practices of each company against that 
of companies listed in the same listing index. All companies are listed in one of 5 listing 
indices2, Russell 3000, S&P400, S&P500, S&P600 and CGQ Universe – the last group 
constitute companies that are rated for their corporate governance practices but are not 
listed in any of the previous four listing indices. The scoring is relative to other 
companies and can take the value 0 to 100.3 In addition to the two main quotients, ISS 
provides four more sub-scores for industry and index comparisons each. The sub-scores 
are related to board issues, takeover defences, compensation policies and audit. The 
sub-scores can take values from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that the company ranks in the 
bottom 20% of companies in terms of its performance in a particular area of corporate 
governance practice, and 5 meaning that the company is in the top 20% of best 
performing companies. 
In terms of creating the dataset for this chapter, the first step was to identify the banks 
in the ISS database and extract the information relevant to these banks. There were 613 
                                                          
1 Available from: www.alacra.com/alacra/help/iss_bestpractices.rtf 
2 ISS say that they make sure that there is no cross-listing of companies i.e. that each company is 
listed only in one listing index on their database. 
3 For example: Microsoft has CGQ industry score of 97 and CGQ index score of 75. This means 
that Microsoft outperforms 97% of companies in the software industry and 75% of companies in 
S&P500 listing index (where it is listed) in terms of corporate governance practices. 
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banks in the database, all being US banks. The next step was to extract the financial 
information from the Bankscope database for these 613 banks. Only 490 of these banks 
were found in the Bankscope database- they were searched one by one using their 
name or the Primary ‘Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures’ 
(CUSIP). However, for 200 out of the 490 banks, there is no other information besides 
the identification by which they were searched. Consequently, it was only possible to 
construct a panel dataset with information on 290 banks over a 5-year period resulting 
in 1450 observations.  
5.3 Methodology 
The availability of panel data provides an opportunity to extract and use more available 
information on the dependant and the independent variables provided by the dataset 
and utilise the advantages of the greater cross sectional and time variation for each 
observation. According to Greene (2002, p.282), the fundamental advantage of a panel 
data set over a cross section is the flexibility it allows the researcher to model 
differences in behaviour across individuals. In this study, the panel data enables control 
for unobserved bank specific characteristics that affect market capitalisation. The 
assumption here is that these unobserved factors are stable over the whole period of 
analysis - i.e. are time invariant or, at least, “slowly moving” (i.e. relatively little within-
group variation). This feature of the panel data modelling and the period of five years 
data create a clear advantage over the use of cross section and time series models. In 
addition, estimating a static model when there are dynamic relationships present can be 
construed as a specification error (Pugh, 2009). 
With panel data several options are available. The static Fixed Effects (FE) approach is 
usually the starting point. In Greene’s (2002) basic FE model, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖  is 
a group-specific constant term (or dummy variable) that captures the influence on the 
dependent variable of all time-invariant observable effects. Because the 𝛼𝑖 are in the 
estimated part of the model, it does not matter if they are correlated with one or more 
of the independent variables in the x vector (at worst, this gives rise to multicollinearity, 
which in a panel context is unlikely to be a significant threat to valid estimation). 
Furthermore, in a situation where the 𝛼𝑖 and one or more of the independent variables 
are jointly determined, the presence of the 𝛼𝑖 in the estimated part of the model means 
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that – by construction - the 𝛼𝑖 are not in the error term and a source of potential 
endogeneity is avoided. 
The random effects (RE) model also allows for group-specific fixed effects, but these are 
assumed to be randomly distributed and, hence, part of a composed error term: (𝑢𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡) , where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the usual idiosyncratic (observation-level) error. The drawback of RE 
estimation is that it is generally implausible to assume that that the 𝛼𝑖 are uncorrelated 
with one or more of the independent variables in the x vector. In this case, when the 𝛼𝑖 
are correlated with one or more of the independent variables, RE suffers from an 
inherent endogeneity problem. Moreover, whereas FE models are estimated by OLS, RE 
cannot be estimated by least squares either efficiently or consistently. To anticipate, the 
dynamic model favoured by this thesis is a species of RE modelling, because it includes a 
composed error term: (𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡). Nonetheless, the GMM estimation strategy allows an 
instrumental variables approach to addressing endogeneity as well as consistent 
estimation. 
Hitherto, where the potential endogeneity of corporate governance has been taken into 
account in the literature, this has been approached by static panel data techniques 
and/or by instrumental variables (IV) estimation.  According to Wooldridge (2002, p.83-
84), the IV method provides a solution to the problem of an endogenous explanatory 
variable. In order to apply this method in estimating a model where xk is endogenous, 
we need to find an observable variable zi that satisfies two conditions. First, zi is not 
correlated with the error term, and second, zi is (partially) correlated with xk. The 
dataset used for this chapter, provides at least one variable zi (share price) which meets 
the conditions described above. To anticipate, the objection raised by this thesis to 
conventional IV strategies is not the use of instrumental variables as such but to the use 
of instrumental variables in the context of either cross-section or static FE/RE models. 
Indeed, when conventional IV methods are applied to the data, the estimated results 
are hard to explain using economic theory (see Appendix 5-2).4  Yet the application of 
                                                          
4 The results show a negative sign on the corporate governance variable, which leads to the 
following interpretation of the relationship: everything else the same, the lower the corporate 
governance score (the worse the corporate governance practices) the higher the market 
capitalisation of the bank.  
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the GMM approach to instrumentation in the context of a dynamic model yields 
economically more plausible results.  
To summarize the estimation strategy so far, there are two serious problems in the data 
that need to be addressed: endogeneity and autocorrelation or serial correlation.5 Given 
that the former causes the OLS estimators to be biased and inconsistent and the latter 
renders the OLS estimators not BLUE, these problems cannot be ignored. In the 
following subsections, these problems are elaborated and the estimation techniques 
that would resolve these problems are identified. 
5.3.1 Endogeneity 
The nature of corporate governance and the interdependent, complicated relationships 
in the day to day running of any firm create the conditions for the phenomenon of 
endogeneity to arise. The dilemma at this point is: Are firms applying good corporate 
governance practices from the beginning of their operations, or, do firms concentrate 
on becoming successful first and then improve their corporate governance framework? 
It can be argued that compliance cost is the underlying mechanism driving this 
relationship. Considering that corporate governance has a compliance cost (be that time 
wise or foregone potential profits due to adherence to the related rules), then logically it 
can be deduced that companies that have higher market capitalisation can afford to 
invest more funds and time to improve their corporate governance, which in turn is 
expected to be rewarded by markets with higher share price thus higher market 
capitalisation. 
In technical language, a variable xj is considered to be endogenous if for any reason it is 
correlated with the error term u (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 95). The endogeneity in 
econometric sense can arise as a result of three situations: omitted variables, 
measurement error and simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 50 - 51). Greene (2002, pp. 
259-261) provides a slightly different categorisation to Wooldridge, adding a new group 
and slightly different description: Omitted variables, either observed or unobserved; 
Feedback effects; Dynamic effects; and Endogenous sample design.  
                                                          
5 Similar to Gujarati (2004) this thesis will resort to using the terms ‘autocorrelation’ and ‘serial 
correlation’ interchangeably and as synonyms of each other. 
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For the purposes of this chapter, since there are no grounds to believe that there are 
omitted variables or measurement error during the collection of data, the endogeneity 
of the variable/s of interest will be regarded as being caused by the ‘simultaneity’ 
(Wooldridge). This is consistent with theory as explained in section 4.3.4 of this thesis. 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 51) provides the following definition: “Simultaneity arises when at 
least one of the explanatory variables is determined simultaneously along with y. If, say, 
Xk is determined partly as a function of y, then xk and u are generally correlated.”  
The reason why endogeneity is such a problem is that it violates one of the assumptions 
of the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR), the ‘Zero Conditional Mean’, otherwise known 
as MLR.4, which requires that the mean of the error term u given a specific value of the 
independent variable xi (i=1, 2,.., k) is zero, or: E(u |x1, x2,…, xk) = 0. If this expression is 
different from zero, the implications are that at least one of the independent variables is 
correlated with the disturbance term, which means that all the parameters estimated by 
OLS are biased  (Wooldridge, 2005). This imposes the necessity to search for a more 
appropriate estimation method. There are such methods available, and these will be 
discussed in other sections of this chapter. 
Several studies such as Black et al. (2003) and Drobetz et al. (2004) note the problem of 
endogeneity but their proposed solutions cannot be replicated easily. Black et al. (2003) 
use instrumental variables available for South Korean firms, while Drobetz et al. (2004) 
are aware of potential problems caused by endogeneity but their data offers limited 
potential to address it. They too, similar to Black et al (2003), use characteristics specific 
to German firms, i.e. German listing indices, to instrument for the endogenous variable 
in their model. Morey et al. (2009) acknowledge the possibility of endogeneity in their 
data but they do not report any steps to try and address it. Later studies carried by 
Dunev and Kim (2005) and Black et al. (2006a) also use instrumental variables to address 
the endogeneity issues.  
5.3.2 Autocorrelation or Serial Correlation 
Autocorrelation or serial correlation arises when error terms are correlated across time. 
“One interpretation of serial correlation in the errors of a panel data model is that the 
error in each time period contains a time-constant omitted factor” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 
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176). While serial correlation is not a problem for cross section data due to the random 
sampling assumption, it is a problem for time series and panel data analysis (Wooldridge 
2005, p. 357). “The problems for estimation and inference caused by autocorrelation are 
similar to (although, unfortunately, more involved than) those caused by 
heteroscedasticity. As before, least squares is inefficient, and inference based on the 
least squares estimates is adversely affected.” (Greene, 2012, p. 946).  
The Gauss-Markov theorem suggests that time series (TS) assumptions TS.1 – TS.5,6 will 
also make OLS the best linear unbiased estimator (Wooldridge 2005, p. 358). However, 
serial correlation violates TS.5 which makes OLS no longer BLUE. This in addition renders 
the standard errors and statistics estimated by OLS, invalid. (Wooldridge, 2005; Gujarati, 
2004). 
Using enough lags of dependent variable y as explanatory variables, to the point that the 
inclusion of more lags of y and explanatory variables does not matter for the explanation 
of yt, leads to a dynamic model (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 406). Such point is supported by 
Arellano and Bond (1991, p.278) who state that an estimation that uses lags as 
instruments would lose its consistency if in fact the errors were serially correlated. 
“Some think that all models should be dynamically complete and that serial correlation 
in the errors of a model is a sign of misspecification” (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 407), and, 
unsatisfactory results of tests for serial correlation may point out dynamic 
misspecification of the model (Wooldridge, 2005). 
The arguments presented above support the need to introduce dynamics to the 
estimated model in this chapter. In the literature on corporate governance to date, a 
‘common’ modelling fault shared by most can be identified. While a few studies, as 
mentioned previously, at least acknowledged the problem of endogeneity and even 
fewer attempted to address it, the use of dynamic specification in modelling corporate 
governance has been virtually non-existent.7 As this chapter will show, omitting 
dynamics from modelling will generate misleading results. 
                                                          
6 TS.1 – estimation follows a model which is linear in parameters; TS.2 – No perfect collinearity; 
TS.3 – Zero conditional mean; TS.4 – Homoscedasticity; and TS.5 – No Serial correlation; 
7 Some exceptions are: Rafferty and O’Connor 2011 (available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773020), e.g. use dynamic modelling 
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Returning to the estimation strategy of the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance/valuation in the light of the problems and issues discussed 
above, it can be said that there are a number of techniques that can be used to address 
those problems individually, such as use of instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity and use of a number of lags to control for serial correlation. However, 
addressing one problem at a time is not the solution8, and an alternative technique 
which addresses both problems at the same time should be tried. The Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) enables both instrumented variables and lagged 
dependent variables, into the same estimation model.   
5.3.3 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
The Method of Moments, according to Greene (2002, p. 526), rests on the benign 
assumption that, with random sampling, a sample statistic will converge in probability to 
some constant. This constant will be a function of unknown parameters of the 
distribution, which can be used to compute moments whose probability limits are 
known. The least squares estimator for the classical model of the form yi = xi’β + εi would 
be an inefficient estimator in the situation where some of the xi variables (k variables) 
are correlated to the error term εi. If one supposes that there are L variables zi, where L 
≥K, in such way that zi is correlated to xi but not with εi, then, a consistent estimator β 
can be constructed taking into consideration the relationships between zi, xi and εi  for E 
[εi |zi] = 0. The assumption E [εi |zi] = 0 implies the orthogonality condition9 which can 
be written as Cov [zi, εi,] = 0 or E [zi(yi - xi’β) ] = 0. This can be developed to find the 
population moment equation and subsequently the empirical moment equation. The 
                                                                                                                                                               
techniques but the endogeneity issues are immense and probably not addressed properly for the 
results to be considered as valid. And Barker (2010) uses a GMM approach in his book ‘Corporate 
Governance, Competition and Political Parties’ but the processes and detailed results and 
diagnostics are not presented. Also, in Barker (2010) Corporate Governance is the regressor.   
8 Appendix 2 exhibits a panel estimation using instrumental variables (stata command: ivreg2). 
While the diagnostics show that the model is well specified, and the tests for the validity of 
instruments pass the statistical significance of 1% and 5% for the instruments used (return on 
average assets and share price respectively), the relationship between the regressor and the 
main variable of interest emerges with an unexpected negative sign. This outcome can be the 
result of the static modelling of the  IV approach which does not include the lagged dependent 
variable in the model. As a consequence, the autocorrelation problem is not addressed and the 
results are considered biased. 
9 The orthogonality condition means that the disturbance and the regressors in the model are 
uncorrelated (Greene, 2002, p. 165). 
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empirical moment condition is L equations, in K unknowns with three potential 
possibilities where L < K, ‘underidentified’; L = K, ‘exactly identified’; and L > K, 
‘overidentified’ (Greene 2002, p. 75, pp.201-202). In most cases, there are far more 
orthogonality moments than parameters, leading to the model being overidentified 
(Greene 2002, p. 314). 
Using more moments than there are parameters enhances the estimation process as it 
maximises the information available for it, and this advantage becomes even more 
important when it is known and accounted for based on economic grounds and/or 
stems from the statistical character of the model (Pugh 2009, p.8). Wooldridge (2002, 
p.183) points out that the term generalized method of moments was coined by Hansen 
(1982) who also provides support to the consistency and asymptotic normality of GMM 
estimators under the orthogonallity conditions (Hansen, 1982, p. 1050). 
GMM is an approach to estimation (like OLS and MLE). It is suitable for application to 
dynamic panel models, because the lagged dependent variable in a panel model is, by 
construction (i.e. by the design of the model), endogenous (or, strictly speaking, 
predetermined). The GMM approach to defining internal instruments is ideal for 
addressing this endogeneity. Moreover, the same approach can be applied to other 
independent variables that are potentially endogenous. 
One of the main advantages of the dynamic panel modelling with GMM is that the 
procedure for addressing the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, may be 
applied to all suspected/potentially endogenous variables and predetermined variables 
in the model (Pugh, 2009 p.17). However, this might generate a large number of 
moments (potential instruments) which may be of the order of hundreds.10 As a 
consequence, the potential problem of too many instruments is the weakening of the 
Hansen version of Sargan test meaning that the test finds it increasingly hard to reject 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity (Pugh, 2009 p. 19). Researchers are warned 
against instrument proliferation in system GMM as this may generate results which are 
invalid but appear valid (Roodman, 2008). 
                                                          
10 Stata 9.1 software when executing the xtabond2 command would generate the following:  
“Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
  Suggested rule of thumb: keep number of instruments <= number of groups.” 
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Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) have 
developed GMM estimators which can be applied to: 1) “small T, large N” panels, 
meaning that only a few time periods and a large number of individuals are required;11 
2) panels where there is linear relationship; 3) the estimation where the dependent 
variable is dynamic, meaning that its current value is dependent on its values in previous 
time periods; 4) estimations where there are independent variables which are not 
strictly exogenous; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) data that displays 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them 
(Roodman, 2009). 
With all these warnings and caveats in mind, the unrestricted model is estimated using 
the STATA 11 software package and the user written and explained command 
‘xtabond2’ in Roodman (2009). The GMM approach as explained in Arellano-Bover 
(1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) is implemented by default in ‘xtabond2’. In essence, 
system GMM estimation is a weighted average of two estimated models (hence 
“system” GMM): one in which the levels of predetermined and potentially endogenous 
variables are instrumented by lagged differences; and one in which the differences of 
predetermined and potentially endogenous variables are instrumented by lagged levels.  
  
5.4 The Estimated Model 
This chapter employs the model introduced in the previous chapter, with firm valuation 
as the dependent variable and the corporate governance score and a few control 
variables as independent variables. The control variables included in the model are: 
lagged dependent, assets, age, agesq, tier1, tier1sq, dist2def, and year. Listing index 
dummies are also included in the model. The measure for firm valuation is market 
capitalisation, which is selected to circumvent the problems arising from 
misrepresentation of actual facts in the accounts of banks discussed in more detail in the 
previous chapter. Due to the nature of banking, it can be argued that the values of most 
indicators of a bank’s performance in the current year are dependent on their values in 
                                                          
11 Large T tends to make insignificant the dynamic panel bias while the number of instruments 
‘explodes’. Small N may cause the cluster-robust standard errors and Arellano-Bond 
autocorrelation unreliable (Roodman 2009, p.128). 
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the previous year, and the availability of panel data in this chapter allows for the 
modelling of such dependencies across time. The model is estimated with the following 
additions as compared to the cross-section model in the previous chapter: (i) the 
inclusion of the lagged dependant variable, which changes the estimation from static to 
dynamic; (ii) the ability to address the endogeneity issue by exploiting time-series 
dependencies; and (iii) the ability to address omitted dynamics, which otherwise appear 
as serial correlation in the residuals (as shown in Appendix 5-1; the xtserial test following 
static fixed effects estimation confirms that the null of no serial correlation can be 
rejected; p=0.000).   
These features are important for improving the consistency and efficiency of the 
estimators. The consistency of an estimator implies that it does not have any inherent 
bias, thus does not underestimate or overestimate systematically and, as the sample 
increases indefinitely, has a value that converges to the true natural value in the 
population (Gujarati, p.110, 2004; Wooldridge, p. 182-183, 2005). Also, as defined in 
Gujarati 2004 (p.79) an efficient estimator is an unbiased estimator with the least 
variance.  
Allowing for dynamics in the model, even if the statistical significance and/or the sign of 
the  lagged dependent variable is not of direct interest, may prove crucial for obtaining 
consistent estimates of other parameters (Bond, 2002). In addition it can be argued that, 
in dynamic panel models, the lagged dependent variable gives an indication of the speed 
of adjustment of the regressand. We conclude that the correct specification of the 
model requires dynamics in the estimated part of the model (i.e. not in the residuals). In 
addition, the general method of movements approach to estimating dynamic models 
allows the endogeneity problems mentioned in the previous chapter to be addressed. 
Thus, the preferred model estimated is an augmented model, based on the relationships 
emerging from the previous chapter, in which the market capitalisation is regressed on 
its own lagged value, corporate governance index, and bank-specific indicators such as 
total assets and age, proxy measures intended to capture the ‘governance quality’ such 
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as “distance to default” and “tier one ratio” as well as dummies for years and listing 
indices.12 
The preferred model to be estimated is as follows: 
ti
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Where β0 represents the intercept term; lnmc, the natural log of Market Capitalisation 
(measured in millions of dollars); cgq, the Industry Corporate Governance Quotient; age 
- Number of years since the establishment of the bank; agesq –the squared value of 
number of years since the establishment of the bank squared; assets - Total Assets in 
million dollars; dist2def – Distance to Default; tier1 – Tier 1 (risk weighted) Ratio; tier1sq 
– ‘Tier 1 (risk weighted) Ratio’ squared; yj - Year dummies (j =2005 to 2009); dj - 
Dummies for listing indices (j = SP400-600, Russell3000, CGQUniverse); ε - The error 
term; i,t - bank and time specific subscripts; β j - Parameters to be estimated (j = 1 – 16) 
The economic reasoning for including these variables in the model as well as the 
expected signs are discussed below. Also, whether the variables entering the model are 
considered endogenous or exogenous is explained. But first some descriptive statistics 
of the data are presented in  
 
 
 
Table 5-1 below. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 ‘Governance Quality’ loosely defined in this context is the attitude of management towards risk 
or efficiency and the ability of the board of directors to notice and address that.  
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Table 5-1 - Descriptive Statistics 
# Variable # of Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Expected 
sign 
1 lnmc 1211 5.5 2.0 -0.4 15.7  
2 Lag1_lnmc 954 5.5 1.8 -0.4 12.4 + 
3 cgq_indu 1178 52.4 29.3 0.3 100.0 + 
4 assets 1416 19436.0 129126.9 64.5 2223299.0 + 
5 age 1450 70.2 47.7 0 177.0 + 
6 agesq 1450 7197.3 7654.6 0 31329.0 ? 
7 dist2def 1299 16.5 9.8 -2.9 158.4 + 
8 tier1 1089 11.7 3.5 0 35.4 + 
9 tier1sq 1089 148.0 101.6 0 1251.7 - 
10 dcgq 1178 0.5 0.5 0 1 - 
11 dRus3000 1178 0.3 0.5 0 1 base 
12 dsp400 1178 0.0 0.2 0 1 ? 
13 dsp500 1178 0.0 0.2 0 1 ? 
14 dsp600 1178 0.1 0.3 0 1 ? 
15 y05 1450 0.2 0.4 0 1 base 
16 y06 1450 0.2 0.4 0 1 ? 
17 y07 1450 0.2 0.4 0 1 ? 
18 y08 1450 0.2 0.4 0 1 ? 
19 y09 1450 0.2 0.4 0 1 ? 
 
Having in mind that the period of analysis includes one the largest financial crises since 
1929, exerting a strong influence on the operation of banks and their corporate 
governance practices, and that there is not much previous theoretical or empirical work 
dealing with this period, most of the relationships tested by the model have not been 
used by previous research to model the relation between corporate governance and 
valuation. 
The case for using market capitalisation as a measure of bank valuation has been made 
in the previous chapter where it is mentioned that several studies estimate the 
relationship between corporate governance and share prices (Deutsche Bank 2004; 
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Bauer et al. 2005) as a measure of valuation. This study, similar to Black (2001)13, takes 
the measure of valuation a step further and uses market capitalisation which is a 
product of share price and number of outstanding shares. Also, throughout this thesis, 
there have been references to other studies that have analysed the existence of a 
relationships between corporate governance and measures of performance and/or 
valuation that may have ceased to exist in certain time periods (Bebchuk, 2010), so the 
introduction of different measures to capture the value or/and performance of 
companies has been an integral part of the theoretical and empiric literature on this 
field.  
For the purpose of this chapter and the thesis in general, the most important parameter 
in the model is β2 i.e. the coefficient of corporate governance. The following Table 5-2 
contains the coefficients to be estimated and their expected signs. 
Table 5-2- Coefficients to be estimated and their expected signs 
Coefficient Expected sign Coefficient Expected sign 
β 1 + β 7 + 
β 2 + β 8 - 
β 3 + β 9 + 
β4 ? β 10 + 
β 5 + β 11-12 ? (-) 
β 6 + β 13-16 ? 
 
The expected sign of the coefficient of the lagged value of the dependent variable is 
positive, because the size of market capitalisation in the current year is expected to be 
positively related to its value in the previous period. Mangan et al. (2005) suggest that 
including the lagged dependent variable, even if it is not of direct interest, caters for 
dynamics in the model – i.e. the effects of history - which may help in consistent 
estimations of other parameters.  
                                                          
13 Black (2001) also uses market capitalisation when estimating the relationship between the 
valuation of Russian firms in 1999 and their corporate governance. It would be interesting to find 
out whether this is a mere coincidence or whether Market Capitalisation is a measure robust to 
crisis; but there are no other studies to date exploring this relationship? 
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The corporate governance index (cgq_indu) enters the model as an endogenous 
variable. The reasons why this is treated as such are explained in section 5.3.1 above. 
The a priori expected sign of the coefficient is positive, since the contrary would suggest 
that good corporate governance will decrease the value of the bank. 
The control variables such as age and assets are introduced to the model as exogenous 
and their expected signs are positive. agesq also enters the model as exogenous and the 
expected sign is unknown. While the signs of the first two variables are easy to 
understand and interpret, the agesq is expected to produce information on whether the 
relationship between market capitalisation and the age of the bank is non-linear or not 
(different for older banks rather than for newer ones). 
The three variables dist2def, tier1, tier1sq squared are included in the model in order to 
capture the impact of the quality of governance, specifically the bank’s and 
management’s attitude to risk. These variables are treated as endogenous, because the 
higher the market capitalisation, the higher the availability of funds to be used as buffers 
in the form of Tier 1 capital ratio or distance to default. As these aspects are either 
directly or indirectly related to corporate governance practices, they are discussed 
below in some more detail. 
In line with the finding of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010) that better-capitalised banks, as 
proxied by tier 1 capital ratio, cope better with crisis. Tier 1 (risk weighted) ratio is the 
ratio of the risk-weighted and Core (Tier 1) Capital to total capital.14 According to 
Appendix A of the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) this ratio should be equal to or exceed 4%.15 The Tier 1 (risk weighted) ratio 
emerged as one of the requirements of the 1991 FDIC Act as a measure of proper 
capitalisation of United States banks (Jorge and Amadou, 2006). After the failure of 
                                                          
14 “Core (Tier 1) capital is defined as the sum of core capital elements minus all intangible assets 
(other than mortgage servicing assets, nonmortgage servicing assets and purchased credit card 
relationships eligible for inclusion in core capital pursuant to § 325.5(f)), minus credit-enhancing 
interest only strips that are not eligible for inclusion in core capital pursuant to § 325.5(f), minus 
any disallowed deferred tax assets, and minus any amount of nonfinancial equity investments 
required to be deducted pursuant to section II” (p. 198). For full definition of Core (Tier1) capital 
follow link: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title12-vol5/pdf/CFR-2012-title12-vol5-
part325-appA.pdf  
15 The Federal Act, FDICIA, recapitalised the Bank Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and expanded the authority of banking regulators so to protect banking 
consumers’ interests.  
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saving and loan associations in 1980s in United States, the FDICIA has set the general 
capital thresholds displayed in Table 5-3.  
 
 
 
Table 5-3 – Capitalisation of US banks according to FDICIA 
Capitalisation Tier 1 (risk weighted) ratio 
Well capitalised ≥ 6% 
Adequately capitalised ≥ 4% 
Undercapitalised < 4% 
Significantly undercapitalised < 3% 
Critically undercapitalised Tangible net worth (equity) ≥ 2%, and 
≤ 65% of the required leverage limit 
Source: US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, available at: 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/inactivefinancial/1995/fil9564.pdf p. 45607, footnote 3 and 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/1992/0901.pdf. 
The FDICIA sets the guidelines for regulators on how to deal with banks especially if they 
fall in one of the three bottom categories. Prompt Corrective Actions, as they are 
otherwise known, are measures that help limit the losses faced by taxpayers in case of 
failure of a depository institution (Pike and Thomson, 1992).  
However, since there is no upper cap on the Tier 1 Ratio, the economic reasoning 
suggests that there has to be a limit to how much capital should be set aside for this 
purpose.16 It can be argued that after a certain point increasing the Tier 1 Ratio capital 
may start to produce negative effects. For this reason the tier1sq variable is introduced 
in the model to capture the non-linearity effect and help identify the point where 
increasing Tier 1 Ratio capital will start effecting the market capitalisation of the 
company adversely.  
Similar to Tier 1 Ratio, dist2def (distance to default) is a measure to capture the risk 
attitude and, implicitly, the quality of bank governance. In finance vocabulary, a higher 
                                                          
16 The obvious theoretically possible Tier 1 Ratio is 100% of the capital. 
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distance to default ratio means that a bank can suffer larger negative returns before 
being rendered insolvent (Beltratti and Stulz, 2010). The difference between the two 
variables is that the former is quite heavily regulated and monitored by FDIC but the 
latter is not. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) find that a typical firm has a 2% probability to 
default (with AAA rated firms at the top of the spectrum with a probability of 0.02% and 
the CCC rated firms at the other end with a probability of 4%). They find that although 
some firms default when their asset value reaches the book value of their total 
liabilities, others continue trading and servicing their debts. Whether a firm will default 
at this point has to be looked at in the context of the firm’s business risk. Jorge and 
Amadou (2006) argue that distance to default in banking might not be the most 
appropriate indicator, especially in a sample with several countries as it might not pick 
up all the regulatory and supervisory complexities. They make an argument in favour of 
a Distance to Capital measure which supposedly is more appropriate.17 However, since 
this chapter looks at US banks only and the variable could be computed from the 
available balance sheets, distance to default is deemed appropriate for the purpose of 
this investigation. The use of Tier 1 Ratio should help satisfy the argument of Jorge and 
Amadou. 
According to Mangan et al. (2005), in order to address the cross-sectional dependence in 
the panel data, time dummies should be included in a dynamic model. Roodman (2006, 
p.14) explains how GMM estimators in respect of idiosyncratic disturbances are based 
on two (out of eight) assumptions which are: 1) idiosyncratic disturbances have 
individual-specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; and 2) the 
idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals. While the first 
assumption can be addressed by estimating standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2006), the second assumption implies that if time-related 
effects are not modelled in the observed part of the model they will be captured by the 
error term, which might cause correlation across individuals or groups. Roodman (2006, 
p.25), therefore, suggests including time dummies as a means of removing time-related 
shocks from errors.  
                                                          
17 Distance to Capital is a measure of credit risk based on Merton (1974) according to which the 
equity of a firm should be based on the value of its assets. Consequently, firm defaults when its 
asset value falls below the face value of its debt. 
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The time dummies for the years 2006-2009 with 2005 as base year, enter the model as 
exogenous variables and the expected signs are positive for 2006 and 2007 and, due to 
the crisis, unknown (potentially negative) for 2008 and 2009.  
Finally, as explained in the data section, most of the banks in the sample are listed in 
one of the four listing indices i.e. S&P 400, S&P 500, S&P 600 and Russell3000. Other 
banks that are not listed in one of the mentioned listed indices but for which CG 
quotient is provided, are pooled together in a virtual listing index by ISS and labelled 
CGQ Universe. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is listed in any 
particular index and 0 otherwise enter the model. These variables are endogenous by 
construction, as market capitalisation is one of the main factors that determines in 
which index a company is listed (this is especially relevant for S&P listing indices). There 
is no expected sign for this group of dummies (except for the CGQ Universe which is 
negative) and the benchmark group is Russell3000. 
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5.5 Interpretation of the results 
The results of the GMM system estimation using Stata command ‘xtabond2’ with 
Windmeijer (2005) two-step robust correction of errors are presented in Table 5-4 
below. 
Table 5-4 – System GMM Results 
Dependent variable ‘lnmc’  
Explanatory variables Coefficient z values Treated as 
lnmc  
L1  
 
 
0.29 
 
1.47 
 
Exogenous 
cgq_indu 0. 01 1.97** Endogenous 
age -0.01 -0.51 Exogenous 
assets 2.73e-06 1.97** Exogenous 
dist2def 0.04   1.30    Endogenous 
tier1 0.27 2.40** Endogenous 
tier1sq -0.01 -1.65* Endogenous 
agesq  0.01 0.36 Exogenous 
y06  0.77 3.17*** Exogenous 
y07 0.58 2.56** Exogenous 
y08 0.31 3.07*** Exogenous 
dsp400 0.95 0.91 Endogenous 
dsp500 -0.03 -0.02 Endogenous 
dsp600 0.361 0.72 Endogenous 
dcgq -1.29 -4.28***  Endogenous 
_cons -0.14 -0.39  
Group variable: bank                                                                      Number of obs       =        595 
Time variable : year                                                                       Number of groups   =       200 
Number of instruments = 28                                                        Obs per group: min =           1 
Wald chi2(19) =   3117.34                                                                                          avg =      2.98 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                                                                               max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.79  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.18  Pr > z =  0.482 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  25.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  14.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.621 
 
For a full stata printout, including the pattern of instrumentation, please see Appendix 5-3. 
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The model displays satisfactory diagnostic statistics: indicating first-order serial 
correlation, significant at 1 per cent; but no second order serial correlation. These are 
denoted by the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences, and the Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) in first differences presented in the table above. The implication of these 
results is that the instruments can be accepted as valid and that the GMM method is a 
consistent estimator.  
The Sargan Test is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions (instruments). 
However, the problem of the Sargan test, as Roodman (2008) suggests, is that it is 
consistent only under the assumption of homoscedasticity of errors, which in this 
context is not an assumption often made.  
Conversely, the Hansen test is also designed to test for the exogeneity of, hence the 
validity of, the overidentifying instruments but is heteroscedasticity robust. Roodman 
(2008) warns researchers not to feel comfortable by not rejecting the H0 at conventional 
levels of 5 or 10 per cent levels as, due to instrument proliferation, the test might not 
perform well. He recommends that p-values below 25 per cent should be viewed with 
concern.  
In line with advice from Roodman (2009), to test the consistency of the model, given 
that the preferred model was estimated with the ‘collapse’ option to reduce the number 
of instruments, a model specification without the collapse option is estimated. “[In] the 
standard, un-collapsed form each instrumenting variable generates one column for each 
time period and lag available to that time period, the number of instruments is 
quadratic in T. To limit the instrument count, one can restrict the lag ranges used in 
generating these instrument sets. Or one can collapse them” (Roodman 2009, p.108). By 
this logic, the number of instruments is reduced when the ‘collapse’ option is applied. 
However, if the reduction in number of instruments is large, and the estimated 
coefficients change substantially compared to the ‘un-collapsed’ estimation along with 
the change in p-values, this should cast some doubts on the model consistency.  
In the case of the model estimated above, when the ‘collapse’ option was removed from 
the ‘xtabond2’ stata command, the number of instruments increases by 5, from 28 to 
33, and the statistical significance of the main variable of interest, cgq_indu, improves 
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slightly changing the band of significance from 5 to 1 per cent. Also, the number of 
instruments generated, which is 28 and 35 respectively for the two estimations, is 
considered appropriate also based on footnotes 16 and 17 above. The Stata printout of 
the estimated model with the ‘collapse’ option is presented in Appendix 5-4.  
In terms of economic interpretation, as shown in Table 5-4 above, the model does 
provide empirical support for a few relationships. The main variable of interest, 
corporate governance (cgq_indu) has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. The estimated coefficient is 0.02 which can be 
interpreted as follows: an increase of the corporate governance score by 1, ceteris 
paribus, will increase the market capitalization of the bank by 0.02 percentage points. As 
stated earlier in section 4.8 of this thesis, the low magnitude of the coefficient can be 
due to the existence of depositors as an important stakeholder in the corporate 
governance of banks, and the heavy regulations to protect their interests can dampen 
the direct effects of corporate governance on the market capitalisation of the bank.  
 Assets and market capitalisation of the bank have, as anticipated, a positive and 
statistically significant (at 5 per cent) relationship. However, the coefficient is very small, 
such that the increase of bank assets by 1 million US dollars, ceteris paribus, will have a 
negligible effect on market capitalisation of the bank. 
Tier 1 weighted ratio (tier1) is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent. The 
estimated coefficient is 0.27 meaning that the increase of the Tier 1 ratio capital by 1 
(per cent), ceteris paribus, will increase the market capitalisation by 0.27 percentage 
points. However, as explained elsewhere, it is not reasonable to increase the tier 1 ratio 
capital constantly and indefinitely as the squared value of this variable (‘tier 1 ratio 
squared’, tier1sq) has a negative sign. This means that increasing the tier 1 ratio capital, 
beyond a certain point, by 1 per cent, all else equal, the market capitalisation of the 
bank will start decreasing as suggested by tier1sq. When estimated with the cross 
section data in the previous model tier1 was not statistically significant.  
Obviously, it is important for this discussion to find the point beyond which the increase 
of tier 1 capital ratio would have negative effect on the bank’s market capitalisation. A 
relatively straightforward mathematical differencing produces a figure of 20.1 per cent 
 163 
 
Corporate Governance and Bank Valuation - A Panel Data Analysis 
163 
as the break point of positive effect of tier 1 ratio on market capitalisation (see Appendix 
5-7 for mathematical derivation). At first, this figure appears to be quite excessive, 
especially in light of the 6 per cent threshold. However, this chapter due to data 
constraints (5 years of observations), deals with the crisis period exclusively and, during 
crisis, it would not be so unusual to consider that firms having made more provisions 
than suggested by laws and regulations have been appreciated more by markets. Both 
economic theory and common sense dictate that in times of economic prosperity such 
banks would be punished for being too conservative. 
Out of four year dummies included in the model, one is dropped by the model for lack of 
variability in the data (year 2009), the remaining three (years 2006-2008) are positive 
and statistically significant. This means that compared to the base year, which is 2005, 
the market capitalisation of the bank, all else equal, is higher in these three years.  
In addition, the dummy variable for the listing index Universe is statistically significant at 
1 per cent and has a negative sign, which means that banks listed in this index, all else 
equal, have lower market capitalisation than those listed in the Russell 3000 index. 
Finally, although the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not 
statistically significant, it can nonetheless be used to calculate a statistically significant 
long-term relationship between the dependent variable (lnmc) and the main variable of 
interest, corporate governance (cgq_indu). The argument behind calculating the long-
run effect coefficient is the assumption that the historical effect of all estimated 
variables on the dependent variable is captured by the lagged dependent variable. Thus 
as expected, the estimated long-run coefficient of corporate governance is higher than 
the short-run or impact effect, indicating that corporate governance exerts a cumulative 
effect on the market capitalisation of banks in the sample. The software package Stata 
12 calculates the long-run coefficient using the command ‘nlcom’; the underlying 
arithmetic explanation is laid out in Appendix 5-5. Results of the long-run coefficient 
estimation are presented in  
Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5 Calculation of the long run coefficients using ‘nlcom’ 
lnmc Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
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_nl_1 0.03 0.01 2.10 0.036 0.0018    0.0534 
Given that the focus of this thesis is the relationship between corporate governance and 
bank performance, then only the long-run coefficient for the main variable of interest is 
calculated. The estimated long-run coefficient for cgq_indu is statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level, indicating that there is a long-run relationship between corporate 
governance and the market capitalisation of the bank. However, the coefficient’s 
magnitude is only a little larger than the short-run estimated coefficient, which is due to 
the low persistence of market capitalisation in the sample period. 
5.5.1 Testing for Robustness  
The testing for robustness of the model specifications follows two approaches. One 
approach, which is a check rather than a test, is based on intuitive and suggestive value 
of the lagged variable’s estimated coefficient as used by Roodman (2009). The other 
approach is a comparison with a model specified using different variables than the one 
reported above.  
OLS estimation produces upwardly biased estimates of the effect of the lagged 
dependent variable (in this case the coefficient is 0.90) and the fixed effects estimation 
produces a downwardly biased coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (in this case 
0.37) (see Appendix 5-8). The true estimate of the lagged variable then, according to 
Roodman (2009) should lie between these two values. Since the coefficient of the 
lagged variable of the main model is 0.29 with the confidence interval lying between -
0.09 and 0.68, it can be considered that this check holds.  
This does not mean that some further investigation should not be undertaken to 
understand why the estimated coefficient on the lagged variable is slightly outside the 
suggested limits set by the procedure above (although, crucially, well above the lower 
limit of the FE confidence interval). In an extensive research of GMM system estimators, 
Bazzi and Clemens (2009, p. 17) find that in their reproduction of Levine, Loayza and 
Beck (2000) results, face a similar situation where the estimated coefficient on the 
lagged variable sits slightly beyond the upper bound. Their conclusion is that the system 
estimators might be upward biased. The same explanation can be applied to the results 
of the preferred model, presented in Appendix 5-3 with the difference that that the 
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estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is slightly below the lower 
bound hinting that the estimators might be downward biased. Even if this is the case 
with the estimation of this chapter, there is not much harm as the purpose of this 
chapter is to investigate whether there is a relationship between corporate governance 
and firm valuation, rather than to precisely quantify this relationship.  
The other, more important test of robustness is the estimation of an alternative model 
in order to observe whether the relationships persist. Here, the model used as a 
robustness check uses a different measure for corporate governance. As explained in 
more detail in sections 4.6.1 and 5.2 of this thesis, ISS produces two groups of indices for 
each rated bank, one comparing corporate governance of any given bank with all the 
banks in the banking industry (cgq_indu used in the preferred model) and the other that 
compares the corporate governance framework of any given bank with other banks 
listed in the same listing index (cgq_inde).  
The results of the estimated model show that the relationships defined in the preferred 
model persist (see Appendix 5-6). This model too displays very satisfactory diagnostics, 
implying that the model is well specified. This specification also allows estimation of a 
statistically significant long-run coefficient, which in terms of magnitude is of similar size 
to the one estimated by the preferred model specification (0.03, significant at the one 
per cent level, in both the preferred model and in the model estimated as a robustness 
check). 
5.6 Conclusion  
This empirical investigation confirms the findings of a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm valuation identified in the previous chapter using cross 
section data. The relationship between market capitalisation and corporate governance 
seems to hold over the period of five years which is an investigative restriction imposed 
by the availability of data. The period investigated, 2005-2009, encompassing one of the 
largest financial crisis since 1929 has impacted this investigation in terms of the 
disappearance of more established relationships explored in previous empirical 
research, to produce statistically acceptable and economically reasonable results. These 
studies use other measures of firm valuation or performance such as Tobin’s Q value, 
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return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), stock returns and alike. The persistence 
of the valuation measure used in this chapter, market capitalisation, can be prescribed 
to its simplicity as it the product of two elements: a) number of outstanding shares and 
b) share price. Corporate governance can be argued to influence firm valuation via the 
share price. 
As an important issue, this chapter has pointed out the importance of methodology 
applied for the estimation of the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance or/and valuation of companies. The investigation here showed that 
omitting dynamics from the model, which is the case with almost all the previous 
research in this field, may produce misleading results.  
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 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of banks in two South East European (SEE) countries, Kosova and 
Montenegro. The concept of corporate governance is new in both countries and the 
corporate governance practices of banks in these countries have not been studied 
before.1 The two countries in question have recently become independent with their 
central banks being the regulatory institution to develop and enforce corporate 
governance principles. The banks play an important role in the development of these 
countries and their corporate governance practices can influence their behaviour and 
performance and, therefore, this thesis has decided to investigate them and empirically 
test the relationship between return on equity and corporate governance.  
These two relatively young independent countries share a number of characteristics, 
which justify their joint study. First is the history. Both of these countries were 
administrative entities2 of the same state, Yugoslavia during the second half of the 20th 
Century. Second is their transformation process as both countries at some point have 
declared independence from Serbia; Montenegro on 3rd of June 2006 and Kosova on 17th 
of February 2008. And finally, both countries use the Euro as their currency, renouncing 
their monetary policies, although they are not members of the European Union yet. 
For the purpose of the empirical part of this chapter, data related to corporate 
governance was collected directly from the banks via a survey.3 In 2009 a survey 
focusing on corporate governance practices of financial institutions was carried out in 
both countries. The questionnaire used for the survey was designed on the basis of the 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles. Financial data was gathered from the financial 
reports published by banks and the dataset was augmented with additional information 
                                                          
1 A part of this Chapter has been previously published by the Riinvest Institute for Development 
Research (Riinvest, 2009) which was conducting a research project on the corporate governance 
of financial institutions in Kosova. The author of this thesis was a member of the project team 
and the principal author of the main part of the project report, which is most of the findings for 
Kosova, presented in this chapter. The sections about Montenegro and the empirical report 
investigation for both countries were not part of that report. As per agreement, the initial results 
of the Survey were presented in a conference organised by the RIINVEST Institute in April 2009. 
2 Autonomous Province of Kosova and Republic of Montenegro respectively. 
3 In Kosova the data is collected for Insurance Companies too. 
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gathered from various stakeholders such as representatives of central banks and 
chambers of commerce (the questionnaire used in the survey is presented as Appendix 
6-1). 
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. Section 6.2 will present a brief 
overview of the development of the banking sector in both Kosova and Montenegro; 
section 6.3 will provide an overview of the banking laws and regulations in both 
countries; section 6.4 will discuss the results of the survey; section 6.5 will present the 
empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of banks in the two countries; and section 6.6 will conclude.4 
6.2 The Banking Sectors in Kosova and Montenegro 
In order to understand the current developments in the banking sectors of the two 
countries better, a brief historical background of the banking system is necessary. This 
section aims at providing this brief background, first for Kosova and then for 
Montenegro. 
6.2.1 Brief History of Kosova’s Banking Sector 
For the period 1945 -2008, Kosova was de jure a constituent part of another state: 
initially Yugoslavia, then Serbia and Montenegro and finally Serbia. De facto, however, 
Kosova was separated from Serbia following the 1999 War, and has been a separate 
country, initially under the United Nation Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) set up 
under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and independent from 2008.  
In 1999 UNMIK was faced with a war torn country which in addition to severe damages 
to its infrastructure and human resources inflicted during the war, had also suffered a 
continuous and deliberate depletion of resources during the period 1989-1999 (Riinvest, 
1998). The Yugoslav banks that used to operate in the region left Kosova before the 
Serbian Army in 1999, leaving Kosova without any banks or a banking system. In the 
same year, 1999, UNMIK established the Banking and Payment Authority of Kosova 
which took on the functions of the central bank and eventually, in 2008, became the 
                                                          
4 Section 6.4 of this chapter (the part about Kosova) was published in the 2009 report by 
RIINVEST as mentioned in footnote 1. 
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Central Bank of Kosova (CBK). One of the functions of this institution has been to license 
and regulate banks in Kosova. Foreign banks entered the market first in 19995 and 
operating as the only bank for more than a year. By the end of 2005 there were seven 
banks in Kosova, two of them foreign (Toçi 2008). In subsequent years one small bank 
was closed down by the regulator, two domestically owned banks merged and were 
then acquired by a foreign bank (Slovenian), and a few foreign banks entered the market 
afresh, thus changing ownership landscape of the banking sector of Kosova.  
The banking system in Kosova now consists of eight commercial banks, of which six are 
foreign-owned, owning some 89 per cent of total assets of the banking system. Total 
assets of all banks in Kosova during 2011 reached EUR 2.65 billion and exhibited a 
growth of 8.3% compared to the previous year. The banks operating in Kosova and their 
ownership are listed alphabetically in 
Table 6-1 below:  
Table 6-1 Banks operating in Kosova 
No Bank Name Ownership 
1 Banka Ekonomike Domestic 
2 Banka Kombëtare Tregëtare (BKT) Foreign 
3 Banka për Biznes (BpB) Domestic 
4 Komercialna Banka Foreign 
5 NLB Prishtina Foreign 
6 ProCredit Bank Foreign 
7 Raiffesien Bank Foreign 
8 TEB Foreign 
 
Although the market structure of the banking system continues to be characterized by a 
high degree of concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) shows a small 
decrease in concentration although remains highly concentrated. Using the HHI for bank 
assets as presented in CBK reports, only in 2012 the banking sector in Kosova 
approaches the ‘moderately concentrated’ as per interpretation of the Federal Reserve 
System in the United States.6  
                                                          
5 Micro Enterprise Bank (MEB Kosovo) was established in 1999 to provide loans to small 
businesses, as well as usual banking activities. 
6 The Federal Reserve System guidelines are: Bank markets with HHI<1,000 are considered 
unconcentrated; Markets with an HHI >1,000 but <1,800 are considered moderately 
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Starting from a small role to oversee the payment system in the post war country, the 
CBK gradually developed to a fully-fledged Central Bank, gradually acquiring all the 
regulatory, prudential and monetary authority roles of a central bank. The corporate 
governance role of the Bank has gradually developed too and will be discussed in 
Section 6.4 of this chapter.  
6.2.2 Brief History of Montenegrin Banking Sector 
As stated in the Introduction to this chapter, Montenegro was also a constituent part of 
Yugoslavia since 1945 until the breakup of that state. The development of the banking 
industry in Montenegro has been shaped by the political developments which 
culminated with wars between Serbia and other republics during the 1990-2000 period.  
Unlike Kosova, however, the Montenegrin banking system did not have to be built from 
scratch. At the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, most of the banking services were 
provided by branches of Serbian based banks. Only at the beginning of the 2000, foreign 
banks led by Slovenian ones started to show interest in the Montenegrin market. The 
establishment of the Montenegrin Central Bank in 2002 and the adoption of Euro as the 
national currency in March 2002 were steps in the right direction to enable entry of 
foreign banks. The Central Bank signalled the intention to reform the banking system in 
Montenegro through the Law on Banks7 and established initial structures of banking 
supervision.  
As a result of these actions by the government (establishing the Central Bank, adoption 
of Euro, and passing the Law on Banks) between 2002 and 2004, two Montenegrin 
banks, Euromarket and Montenegro Banka were acquired and merged into the NLB 
Montenegro with Slovenian capital. In 2004 a Hungarian investment group acquired 
majority share ownership in Komercialna Banka. 
In 2006, following a referendum vote, Montenegro was officially separated from the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The same year also witnessed the big reform of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
concentrated. The HHI form Kosova’s banking industry year – HHI is: 2007 – 2864; 2008 – 2744; 
2009 – 2481; 2010 – 2254; 2011 – 2052; and 2012 – 1888.  
7 For the first time, banks were legally treated on their own and not looked at as a part of a larger 
group (when applicable).  
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role of the Montenegrin Central Bank with the focus on bank supervision. Modern 
approaches to risk evaluation were introduced along with prudential measures for the 
operation of commercial banks. In 2006 HIP and Adria banks merged and the 
Oportunity, an American funded bank, was established. In 2008, the latter was acquired 
by Erste Bank through its Croatian branch. 
In 2011, majority of banks in Montenegro were in foreign ownership. The list of banks 
operating in Montenegro and their ownership for the year 2008 is presented in Table 
6-2 below. 
Table 6-2 Banks operating in Montenegro 
No Bank Name Ownership 
1 Atlasmont banka Foreign 
2 Erste bank Foreign 
3 First financial bank Domestic 
4 Hipotekarna banka Foreign 
5 Hypo alpe-adria banka Foreign 
6 Invest banka Montenegro Foreign 
7 Komercijalna banka Budva Foreign 
8 Montenegrobanka NLB Foreign 
9 Podgorička banka Foreign 
10 Prva banka CG - osnovana 1901 Domestic 
 
6.3 Overview of Banking Laws and Regulations  
6.3.1 Kosova 
In the absence of a specific law, the regulation of the banking and insurance industries in 
the country is governed by, respectively, UNMIK regulations No. 1999/21 and 2001/25. 
The Banking and Payment Authority of Kosova (BPK), in the past, and CBK, since the 
independence, have also issued rules and other documents to supplement or amend 
these regulations which remain at the core of the regulatory framework for the banking 
industry.8 
                                                          
8 There are laws like the Law on Internal Audit 03/L-128 that would have had impact on the 
corporate governance of banks and insurance companies, but these were passed after the survey 
was conducted (like this one dated 13.10. 2009) or the Law on Banks and Micro Finance 
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Legal Provisions for the Banking Sector in Kosova. Regulation No. 1999/21, ‘On Bank 
Licensing, Supervision and Regulation’ has been in force since 15 November 1999. It is a 
document comprising 53 sections covering the three areas indicated in its title. Only a 
few of these sections address directly or indirectly the governance of banks and other 
issues related to good corporate governance. 
Articles 6.1(a) and 6.1(d) of ‘Section 6 – License Application’ under the heading 
‘Licensing of Banks’ require from the body applying for a bank license to provide ample 
information regarding the qualifications and experience of administrators and persons 
applying to be principal shareholders or have significant interest in the bank. 
Article 7.2(c) requires BPK to approve the qualifications, experience and integrity of 
administrators and principal shareholders before it grants a bank license. Furthermore, 
Section 18 demands that all persons elected or appointed as administrators of a bank 
must be fit and proper and of good repute and be approved by BPK prior to assuming 
office. However, this Article does not impose any measurable standard for a person to 
fulfil in order to be appointed to these positions in a new (or existing) bank. 
Article 14.1 requires prior written authorization of the BPK for the transfer of equity 
interest among a bank’s shareholders in order to prevent any person or interest group 
becoming a significant shareholder, i.e. owning more than 20 per cent of any class of 
voting shares of the bank. 
Article 17.1 stipulates that each bank should be governed by a Governing Board 
consisting of an uneven number of members (not less than five), of which two shall be 
non-executive directors, and shall have an Audit Committee, a Credit Risk Management 
Committee and an Asset and Liability Management Committee. Articles 17.2 and 17.3 
stipulate that the Governing Board should be elected by shareholders, appointed by the 
general meeting of shareholders and held responsible for establishing, supervising and 
implementing policies. 
                                                                                                                                                               
institutions and financial non-banking organisations 04/L-093 (dated: 12.04.2012) thus will not be 
discussed in this chapter. 
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Articles 23.1–23.10 provide a wide range of advice and rules on conflict of interest for 
bank administrators and other employees of the bank, disclosure of information and an 
upper limit on the proportion of unsecured credit. 
Section 30 restricts banks to enter into financial transactions with related parties or 
employees in a manner which would be under less favourable terms and conditions for 
the bank. No bank shall extend credit to or for the benefit of a person related to the 
bank in excess of limits established by the BPK. 
Section 32 instructs banks to prepare annual financial statements which adequately 
reflect their operations and financial condition in accordance with international 
accounting standards, reflecting the operations and financial condition of its subsidiaries 
and branch offices, both on an individual and consolidated basis. 
Section 33 provides explicit requirements regarding the role and the obligations of the 
audit committee and the external auditor, and the rights and obligations of the internal 
auditor. 
Section 34 stipulates that each bank shall within thirty days of each calendar quarter 
publish in a national newspaper a summary of its quarterly balance sheet, and also 
within four months of the end of its financial year publish in a national newspaper a fair 
summary of its balance sheet and its auditor’s opinion for the preceding financial year. 
Each bank shall also publish its annual report and provide free of charge copies to the 
public. This section was amended by Rule XXIV in September 2003. 
By comparing and contrasting the rules and regulations of banking in Kosova against the 
OECD principles of Corporate Governance (2004) it can be seen that most of the 
regulations address financial reporting and disclosure corresponding to the fifth OECD 
principle: Disclosure and Transparency. A reasonable proportion of the regulations 
discussed above specify the obligations and responsibilities of key executives and 
shareholders as well as different committees, which corresponds to the sixth OECD 
principle: the Responsibilities of the Board. 
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Rules and regulations touch upon the areas covered by the first OECD principle— 
Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework—and the second 
principle—the Rights of Shareholders. 
The fourth OECD principle—the Role of Stakeholders—is very vaguely addressed in 
Amended Rule VIII, where the rights of depositors are mentioned. However, the list of 
stakeholders is not limited to depositors only since there are a significant number of 
groups that are stakeholders in a bank (e.g. employees, clients, community, etc.). What 
the rules and regulations of the banking industry in Kosova fail to address is the third 
OECD principle—Equal Treatment of Shareholders—and perhaps this should be 
addressed in the near future. 
Another issue under discussion is the presence of non-executive executives on the 
governing boards (out of five, two should be non-executive directors). There is no 
provision requiring the presence of independent board members. 
6.3.2 Montenegro 
Banks and other financial institutions in Montenegro are regulated mainly by three laws. 
These are, the Company Law (“Sl. list RCG”, br. 06/02”), the Law on Banks (“Sl. list Crne 
Gore” br 17/08) and the Law on Accounting and Audit (“Sl. list RCG”, br. 69/05”). Each of 
these laws covers a vast range of companies (including the financial institutions) 
functioning but this report will look closely only at the Law on Banks and relevant 
articles addressing corporate governance from other laws. 
The Law on Banks (no. 17/08). This Law governs the foundation, management, 
operations and supervision of banks and micro-credit financial institutions and credit 
unions and it governs the conditions and supervision of operations of parties involved in 
credit and guarantee operations. Its aim is to establish and maintain a safe and sound 
banking system that protects the interests of depositors and other creditors. This law 
was passed in February 2008. For the purpose of this chapter, this law will be examined 
with regards to its corporate governance provisions for banks. 
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The law, compared to Kosova’s law and regulations is much more precise in addressing 
corporate governance practices.9 Although there is an entire section labelled “Corporate 
Governance” encompassing articles 29 through 41, there are other articles which will 
affect the corporate governance of banks. These articles are: 
Article 7 provides the information on who might be a founder of a bank. Article 9 
addresses the qualified participation10 in the bank and postulates that an ownership 
stake of 20%, 33% or 50% cannot be attained without prior approval of the Central Bank. 
Articles 13 and 14 explain what will happen if a bank allows qualified acquisition without 
the Central Bank approval and the legal consequences of such actions. Article 19 
regulates the ‘Shareholder’s agreement’ and restricts accession of new member/s to this 
initial agreement without the Central Bank approval. 
Article 29 is about the Shareholder Assembly. This article lists the powers of the 
shareholder assembly which are: adopting the bank’s articles of association; reviewing 
the annual report on the bank's operations with an independent external auditor’s 
report; appointing and relieving from duty members of the bank’s board of directors; 
deciding on the distribution of profits; deciding on capital increase and decrease; 
deciding on restructuring and closing of the bank; establishing the amount of 
remuneration of members of the board of directors;  and deciding on other issues as 
specified in the bank’s articles of association. 
Article 30 states that a bank shall be governed by a Board of Directors which is to consist 
of a minimum five members (who can be foreign nationals, provided that at least one 
director in the board is familiar with the official language and is resident in 
Montenegro). At least two of them must be independent from the bank, and the 
meaning of independent is explained in more detail in this article. The Banking law 
                                                          
9 Kosova has promulgated a Law on Banks, microfinance institutions and non-bank financial 
institutions on 30.04.2012 available from: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,191,884 
However, this chapter will be concerned only with laws and regulations in force during the period 
of conducting the survey, which is the year 2009. 
10 According to this law qualified participation is: 
- independently  or  mutually  with  other  related  parties,  direct  or  indirect 
participation in capital or voting rights of a legal person of at least 5%, 
- possibility of making significant influence on the management, i.e. policy of a legal 
person based on an agreement or a contract with another party, or in any other way, 
regardless of the amount of participation in capital or voting rights in a bank. 
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allows the election of the chairman from amongst the board members provided that this 
person is not the executive director. Executive directors may be appointed as board 
members provided that the total number of executive directors is not greater than one 
third of the total number of board directors.  The board members are elected for a 
period of four years and they can be reappointed.  
Article 31 lists the requirements to be fulfilled by a potential board member among 
which is the requirement that this person should have not been employed in the Central 
Bank for the last 24 months (up to application). Further restrictions are related to 
whether an applicant has held any important post in an institution which has faced 
bankruptcy or administration measures. Article 32 makes it clear that a board member 
cannot be appointed without prior Central Bank approval and that this approval can be 
withdrawn if it was obtained under false information provided to the authorities.  
Article 33 establishes the responsibilities of the board of directors. The list of 20 items, 
addressing various aspects of board responsibilities, will be condensed in this paragraph. 
As per this article, the board of directors should establish and maintain the system of 
managing risks; review the annual report on the bank's operations with an independent 
external auditor’s report. Article 33 lists the responsibilities of the board of directors, 
which include, among others: appoint and relieve from duty members of the bank’s 
board of directors; decide on the distribution of profits; decide on capital increase and 
decrease; decide on restructuring and closing of the bank; establish the amount of 
remuneration of members of the board of directors. Among other board responsibilities, 
Article 33 mentions the adoption of the internal audit annual plan and internal audit 
reports; establishing the bases of the internal control systems adequate to the size, 
complexity of operations and the level of assumed risk; reviewing the Central Bank’s 
examination reports; appointing executive directors and other persons responsible for 
managing the bank’s operations and set their salaries; elect the bank’s external auditor; 
appoint members of the audit committee; review annual reports of the audit 
committee; prepare proposals of decisions to be approved by the Shareholders’ 
Assembly and ensure their implementation; passing of the bank’s general acts, except 
those passed by the Shareholders’ Assembly; establishing the code of conduct for the 
bank employees; approving the introduction of new products and services of the bank; 
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convene meetings of the Shareholders’ Assembly; and performing other duties specified 
in the law and the bank’s articles of association. 
Article 34, like Article 33, is named “Responsibilities of the Board of Directors” and lists 
other responsibilities for board members:  ensuring that the bank’s operations are in 
compliance with the law, the Central Bank’s regulations and the bank’s internal policies 
and procedures, as well as that all measures imposed by the Central Bank are 
implemented. The board is made responsible for the operational safety and financial 
stability of the bank and for the accuracy of all operating reports of the bank that are 
published and submitted to the Shareholders’ Assembly, the Central Bank and 
competent authorities. 
Article 35 regulates the meetings of the board of directors. This article stipulates that 
board meetings can be held as frequently as needed, subject to a minimum of once a 
month. Other aspect of convening the meeting such as deciding whether there is 
quorum, the proportion of votes by which a member can be removed, and dealing with 
situations of conflict of interest are addressed under this article too. Finally, this article 
stipulates that the Central Bank can call an extraordinary board meeting to address 
issues related to bank’s stability and safety.  
Article 36 stipulates that banks in Montenegro should have executive directors and lists 
their main duties while Article 37 lists the requirements for a candidate to be considered 
for the position of the executive director among which are the possession of the 
University Degree and the relevant experience in the field. This article stipulates that 
foreign individuals can be appointed in executive director positions; however, two of 
them must be familiar with the official language used in Montenegro and have to reside 
in Montenegro during the period of performing their duties. 
Article 38 regulates powers and responsibilities of executive directors. Article 39 
postulates that the audit committee shall be comprised of three individuals not related 
to the bank other way than the audit committee and who should be experts in the field 
of finance. Article 41 addresses compliance monitoring function of the unit within a 
bank which should be concerned with the compliance of bank operations with laws and 
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regulations in power and paying special attention to provisions against money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. 
In addition, the Company Law (no. 06/21), which is applicable to all companies including 
banks unless regulated differently by a specific law, in Article 34 allows for the same 
person to serve as the Chairman and the CEO. Article 37 item 3 of the same law 
postulates that shareholders with minimum 10% of shares can add items to the agenda 
of AGM. These two articles can have direct impact on corporate governance practices of 
banks in Montenegro.  
6.4 The 2009 Survey 
Although in both countries there are legal provisions for good corporate governance, 
there was little empirical evidence as to the degree of implementation and compliance 
or the effectiveness of these provisions. It was therefore decided to investigate the state 
of compliance with the OECD Principles through a bank survey. 
The survey questionnaire was designed to investigate the compliance of the surveyed 
entities with OECD corporate governance principles and was adjusted to suit both banks 
and insurance companies in Kosova and Montenegro. It was addressed to the top 
management and the chairperson of the board with the assumption that they would be 
best prepared to provide accurate answers. Because of the high importance of the 
targeted respondents within their organisations, the design of the questionnaire took 
into account the value of these people’s time, reducing the number of questions to an 
absolute minimum so it would not take more than 20 minutes of the respondent’s time. 
For this reason, most of questions asked were multiple choice or ‘yes/no’ questions. 
Also, the questionnaire was prepared in English and translated into Albanian and 
Montenegrin languages to ensure that the respondents communicated in their mother 
tongues. 
The questionnaire consists of 85 questions which are designed to get some general 
information about the institution and the respondent, as well as more detailed 
responses regarding their compliance with the OECD principles. Since the first principle, 
‘Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework’ essentially deals 
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with the legal and regulatory aspect of the environment in which firms operate, and it 
falls upon the respective states and their regulatory bodies to ensure the best possible 
conditions for individual companies, this aspect was considered invariant across 
observations in each country and thus not included in the questionnaire. Five remaining 
OECD principles which are: ii. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions; 
iii. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders; iv. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance; v. Disclosure and Transparency; and vi. The Responsibilities of the Board, 
are addressed with the respective questions, according to the key to the questionnaire 
shown in Table 6-3 below: 
Table 6-3 Questions covering five OECD principles 
OECD Principle Corresponding questions 
II 6; 9-13; 20-28; 44-45. 
III 46-54; 60-61. 
IV 55-59. 
V 7-8; 29; 37-38; 62-84. 
VI 14-19; 30-36; 39-43. 
The approach to getting the respondents to answer the questionnaires was different in 
Kosova and Montenegro. In Kosova, this survey was complementary to the final phase of 
a project conducted by the RIINVEST Institute for Development Research and an 
agreement was reached to share resources and findings.11 The intention was to 
interview the chairperson of the board and the CEO separately. In many cases only CEOs 
were interviewed and only in few occasions it was possible to interview the chairperson 
of the board (domestic banks/insurance companies). The survey produced 16 interviews 
in Kosovo, 8 from the banking sector and 8 from insurance companies. The 8 
questionnaires from banks covered 6 banks and the 8 questionnaires from the insurance 
industry covered 7 companies.12  
In Montenegro the process of distributing the questionnaires and getting the CEOs to 
respond was much better organized. This was possible due to the fact that the survey 
                                                          
11 The process of interviewing respondents would have been extremely difficult without the help 
of the RIINVEST institute as they were able to use their resources to arrange appointments and 
share the workload for interviews. Because of potential conflict of interest (as a member of the 
management of an insurance company in Kosova), I personally was not involved in interviewing 
any of the insurance companies in Kosova. 
12 For two banks and one insurance company in Kosova it was possible to interview both the 
chairperson and the CEO. 
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was made a part of an ongoing project on corporate governance of banks by the 
Montenegrin Central Bank.13 All ten banks in Montenegro responded to the survey thus 
giving us the whole population of banks. However, in contrast to Kosova where the 
central bank supervises insurance industry also, in Montenegro it is the independent 
Insurance Supervising Agency and the same approach to ensure response by submitting 
the questionnaire via the supervising authority, was unsuccessful and therefore there 
are no insurance companies in the Montenegrin sample.14  Also, it was not possible to 
conduct interviews with Montenegrin stakeholders, thus, the next section contains only 
interviews of Kosovar ones. 
Interviews with stakeholders. In this survey, in addition to banks and insurance 
companies, other relevant stakeholders such as the Kosova Chamber of Commerce 
(KCC), and Central Bank of Kosova (CBK) have been interviewed. On behalf of KCC, the 
head of the Department for Economic Analysis and Policies has been interviewed while 
in the CBK it was the deputy governor and the head of banking supervision. They were 
asked for their opinions in respect of: board functionality and quality; relationship of 
Financial Institutions (FIs) with stakeholders; protection of shareholders’ rights and 
related party issues; and whether FIs in Kosova comply with OECD principles of 
Corporate Governance. 
In respect to first area, functionality and quality of boards, the KCC representative 
focused more on experiences that accompanied the setting up and functionality of 
banks and referred to corporate governance as the main problem at the time. Poor 
division of functions and responsibilities among governing bodies was particularly 
symptomatic to local banks. Arrival of foreign banks has introduced better corporate 
governance practices to the market according to the KCC representative. The CBK 
representatives referred to the current regulation and emphasized the application of “fit 
                                                          
13 I am greatly indebted to my fellow PhD Student Zorica Kalezić who implemented the survey in 
Montenegro and who allowed me to use the results. 
14 Several meetings were held with representative of the Albanian and Macedonian central banks 
in the attempt to engage them in this survey and disseminate and collect the questionnaires in 
their respective countries, but these attempts failed to produce any results. However, once 
more, I express my gratitude to fellow PhD students (former and current) for their assistance in 
setting up these meetings with relevant people within their respective institutions (Petrit Gashi, 
Valentin Toçi, Fatmir Besimi, Viktorija Atanasovska, Natasha Trajkovska, Erjon Luci, Hilda Shijaku, 
Igor Velickovski). 
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and proper” criteria as one of the important factors impacting positively the 
functionality and quality of boards. The processing of information for persons applying 
for board members and senior management positions involves a network of agencies 
outside CBK like Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that used to operate as a UNMIK 
‘agency’. For foreign banks, the information is verified with respective institutions of the 
‘parent’ country. For Insurance Companies the criteria are stricter since the mid-level 
management such as unit directors, are subjected to these procedures too. The CBK 
representatives stated that independent board members undergo same procedures 
before being approved by the CBK. 
Asked about their opinions regarding the relationship of Financial Institutions with their 
stakeholders such as depositors, employees, community et cetera, the KCC 
representative thinks that communication among these actors is still at an 
unsatisfactory level. The CBK representatives suggest that the relationship of Financial 
Institutions and stakeholders is condensed to quality of reporting and disclosure. There 
is a “reporting framework” which all Financial Institutions have to follow as well as there 
are strict regulations regarding the publishing of audited reports and financial 
statements. In additions, all banks and insurance companies have to disclose in their 
websites their interest rates and premium tariffs respectively, while for foreign banks 
the requirement is to publish their financial reports also for the whole group to which 
they belong. This increases the transparency of Financial Institutions towards their 
stakeholders, according to CBK representatives. 
Protection of shareholders’ rights and related party transactions should be regulated by 
law was the opinion of KCC representative. The CBK representatives confirmed that 
there is a clear definition of what is considered a related party transaction, and there are 
limits in place as far as the amounts of loans for bank management and employees are 
concerned. A crucial point in this aspect is the division of the post of CEO and Board 
Chairman which contributes to the independence of these two positions. CBK 
representatives emphasized that due to the reporting requirements, banks have to 
submit reports of the amount of “loans to management” on monthly basis.  
Finally, when asked whether they think the OECD principles on corporate governance 
are being implemented the KCC representative replied that it might be partially, due to 
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regulation which touches upon these principles, but there is room for improvement. 
According to CBK representatives, all insurance companies comply with these principles 
since International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) operates according to 
OECD principles. Banks however, are not required to comply with OECD principles since 
the regulation is based upon Basel Committee Principles for corporate governance. 
Through “advisory letters” CBK has adapted the Basel principles for the Kosovar market. 
In future, implementation of Basel II is aspired and this is expected to increase the 
management standards and improve corporate governance. 
After receiving all the questionnaires, the information obtained was processed and the 
results are presented and discussed in the following section.  
Survey Results. The survey of the banks and insurance companies operating in Kosova 
was carried out between the last week of December 2008 and the first week of February 
2009. Interviews were held with 16 persons, representing the boards or the 
management of six banks (out of eight) and six insurance companies (out of ten). The 
survey was conducted in Montenegro in October 2009. The results of the survey 
according to the five OECD principles will be discussed now. 
6.4.1 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions  
The OECD’s second principle of corporate governance states that ‘The corporate 
governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights’. The questions and results from the present survey related to this principle are 
summarized in Appendix 6-3, which reports that banks in Kosova have on average 18.5 
shareholders and insurance companies 2.1. The Montenegrin banks have on average 
237 shareholders. The main method used to announce shareholders’ meetings is 
through email: two thirds of banks and the majority of insurance companies use this 
tool, though some use the public media and more traditional means, such as phone or 
written notification by post. In Montenegro, two thirds of banks use the public media to 
announce shareholders’ meeting and few use email notification of written notification 
by post. 
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One third of banks surveyed announce their general meetings one month in advance, 
another one third two weeks in advance and one bank makes its announcement of the 
general meeting only one week in advance. Half of the insurance companies announce 
the shareholder meeting one month in advance, one a fortnight in advance and another 
company only one week in advance. In Montenegro most banks announce the 
shareholder meeting 1 month in advance, but there is one that announces two weeks 
ahead of time, and another one that announces only one week ahead.15 Along with the 
announcement of time and place of the general meeting all banks publish the agenda 
and the material to be approved in the meeting. Only half of the insurance companies 
follow this practice. Few Montenegrin banks publish some additional information. 
To put an item on the agenda of the general meeting, half of the banks in the survey 
require 50%+1 of the shares or votes and one third require 25 per cent or fewer shares 
or votes (with some banks requiring as little as 10%). On the other hand, only one third 
of insurance companies require 50%+1 shares to put an item on the agenda of general 
meetings; the other two thirds of respondents did not reply to this question. Most of 
Montenegrin banks require 5% of votes but there is one that requires 10% and another 
one 100% (see footnote 15). 
Electing or removing board members requires 50%+1 of shareholders’ votes in half of 
the banks, with one bank requiring 100 per cent. Two banks did not respond to this 
question. For insurance companies half of the respondents did not reply to this 
question, one third require 50%+1 of shareholders’ votes and one company requires 100 
per cent of shareholders’ votes. Seven Montenegrin banks require 5 per cent, two 
require 50%+1 and one bank 100% (see footnote 15). Attention is drawn here to the 5 
per cent shareholders’ votes required to elect or remove board members which is very 
low and could potentially increase the turnover of board members significantly 
rendering the board unstable and eventually not functional. However, since these are 
the responses received from the bank, they are reported here with the caveat that the 
question might have been misinterpreted or misunderstood.   
                                                          
15 This study assumes that the bank that announces one week ahead of the shareholder meeting 
is the bank that has a single shareholder. 
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For amending their statutes half of the banks and insurance companies require the 
approval of two thirds of shares, one third of banks require the approval of all the 
shareholders, while one third of insurance companies require either one third or 50%+1 
of shareholders’ votes. In Montenegro two banks require two thirds of the votes, two 
require 50%+1, one requires 100%, another one requires 10% and four banks require 
5%. Same reasoning as in the previous paragraph is applicable here regarding the low 
percentages required by Montenegrin banks for amending statutes. To approve mergers 
or takeovers, half of banks require two thirds of shareholders’ votes, one requires the 
approval of three-quarters and one all shareholders’ votes. In Montenegro eight banks 
require two thirds of the votes, one 50%+1 and another one the approval of all 
shareholders. For insurance companies, two thirds of them require two thirds of 
shareholders’ votes and one requires three-quarters of shareholders’ votes. 
These findings suggest that shareholders are informed properly and in a timely manner 
about their rights. Also, there are indications that these rights are respected, with 
shareholders able to exercise their key functions. These results indicate that compliance 
with the second OECD principle is at acceptable levels. Once more, attention is drawn to 
the ability of minority shareholders to exercise excessive powers in some Montenegrin 
banks with respect to appointing or removing board members, and changing the 
statutes of the bank. In addition, this should be treated with caution as a significant 
proportion of questions in this section did not receive any response from 
representatives of Kosovar banks or insurance companies, or both. 
6.4.2 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders  
The OECD third Principle of Corporate Governance, regarding the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, states, ‘The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of 
their rights.’ Through the present survey these statements as applied in Kosova and 
Montenegro were tested, and the results are summarized in Appendix 6-3.  
The survey results indicate that the issue of minority shareholders in Kosova and 
Montenegro is not of great importance. This most certainly is due to the fact that there 
  
Corporate Governance and Performance of Banks in Kosova and Montenegro 
186 
is no stock exchange in Kosova where shares can be floated and traded. Not surprisingly 
this has limited the number of shareholders, shown from our survey to be a maximum of 
40 (Appendix 6-3). Such a small number of shareholders have ameliorated the problems 
of minority shareholders. This however is not the case with Montenegro which has a 
Stock Exchange since 1993 though it is not as active as stock exchanges in developed 
countries, thus the results are fairly similar in both countries. But the existence of the 
stock exchange has impacted the number of shareholders as there is a bank with 237 
shareholders in Montenegro (Appendix 6-3).  
The way these institutions deal with minority shareholders’ concerns depends on 
whether these are foreign banks or local banks. The foreign banks act according to the 
corporate culture and laws of the country of the parent bank to address and deal with 
such concerns, while the local banks appear not to have a formal mechanism, or at least 
one that the survey was able to identify.  
One half of respondents did not reply to the question ‘How do you address and deal 
with minority shareholder concerns?’ in Kosova while the other half gave answers 
indicating that there was no explicit mechanism for dealing with minority shareholders’ 
concerns. In Montenegro there was one bank that didn’t respond (see footnote 15) 
while the remaining banks in the sample reported that there has never been any 
minority shareholder problem so far.  
Some answers indicate that there is an ‘agreement’ amongst large and minority 
shareholders conjoined by the right to delegate their votes. In the case of one bank 
there is a minority shareholder representative on the board, while another answered 
that it was possible to discuss openly all the issues at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM), and for some banks all decisions taken up to now have been agreed upon by 
consensus.  
What these answers do not provide is what happens if a minority shareholder has a 
concern, i.e. whether his rights are being violated. Open discussion at the AGM might 
provide a way to voice one’s concerns and this method gives one the opportunity to 
appeal to the other shareholders, but this is where the issue ends. The fact that all 
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decisions have so far been taken by consensus is no guarantee that they will be in the 
future. 
There are even fewer shareholders among Kosovo’s insurance companies than among 
its banks, with a maximum of four, and an average of 2.1, shareholders per company. 
The fact that one third of companies interviewed in our survey are owned by one 
shareholder, and another one third by two shareholders, means that the problem of 
minority shareholders is mitigated. This is accentuated by the fact that the companies 
owned by two, three or four shareholders were often one of several other businesses 
that these people had set up jointly in the past. Hence, there is a degree of trust and 
mutual understanding among them that has developed over time, even if one were to 
hold more shares than any other shareholder or even group of shareholders. It is 
important to emphasize this situation because even if a shareholder were to hold a 
majority of shares in an insurance company for example, he or she might not do so in 
other joint businesses. Thus the incentive to abuse the minority shareholders’ rights is 
minimized. This situation is indicated by the answers given in our survey to the question 
‘How do you address and deal with minority shareholder concerns?’ Only two thirds 
answered the question, and did so along the lines of, ‘Their interests are taken into 
consideration,’ or, ‘All decisions are taken by consensuses. 
Voting in absentia is possible in the majority of Kosovar banks and all Montenegrin ones, 
and there appears to be no cost for using this method, which provides shareholders with 
an already established alternative when exercising their voting rights. However, the 
insurance companies were more reserved than banks over the issue of proxy voting. 
Only a few of them answered that it was possible to vote in absentia. One reply was 
negative and the others did not have a view on this issue, responding that they ‘have 
never had to deal with such situation’. 
To summarize, the survey found no indication that banks and insurance companies treat 
their shareholders inequitably. If anything, as seen in section 6.4.1 of this chapter, 
minority shareholders are positively discriminated in certain instances. Nevertheless, it 
is of concern that there are no mechanisms in place to protect minority shareholders. 
Although it is comforting to know that there have been no cases of abuse of minority 
shareholders’ rights reported for the period when the survey was conducted, absence of 
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relevant rules or regulations might give rise to such behaviour in the future. The 
respective governments and their regulatory bodies should act proactively to guide 
banks and insurance companies to implement appropriate procedures which address 
equitable treatment of shareholders fairly.   
6.4.3 Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance  
A stakeholder is a person or a group of people that stand to affect or be affected by the 
actions of a company. The 2004 OECD fourth Principle defines the role of stakeholders 
as follows: ‘The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active 
cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises’. 
The issue of stakeholders in the banking and insurance industries in Kosova and 
Montenegro is not fully regulated. There are certain groups of stakeholders such as 
employees whose rights are regulated by labour laws, and depositors who are protected 
by laws and regulations constraining risk exposure of banks, but in general it is up to the 
individual companies to address the stakeholders as they see fit, which has led to a 
situation where stakeholders are addressed mainly for public relations purposes. The 
survey reflects the fact that there is no legal requirement in place, particularly for 
employees in Kosova as the Labour Law was promulgated mid-2010. Appendix 6-4 
reports the survey’s findings on the role of stakeholders. 
When asked to identify stakeholders for their companies, all banks picked borrowers, 
depositors and the community, and the majority also chose employees. In contrast only 
one insurance company gave ‘the insured’ as a stakeholder, and one gave ‘employees’ 
and ‘the community’: the majority of insurance companies chose not to answer this 
question. This was the case also with the Montenegrin banks where four out of ten did 
not reply to this question. Although the majority of banks selected employees as 
stakeholders, all responded negatively to the question of whether they have an 
employee representative on the board. The same answer was given by the majority of 
insurance companies too. 
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It was expected that, due to lack of regulation, the majority of banks do not have 
deposit insurance, and this was the case in Kosova with five of them, with only one, a 
branch of an international bank, replying positively. The situation was different in 
Montenegro where seven banks indicated that they have deposit insurance.  
6.4.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
The OECD fifth principle on transparency and disclosure states the following: ‘The 
corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company’.  
In the present survey, all the Kosovar banks and insurance companies replied positively 
to the question about the publication of financial statements and operating results, but 
only eight Montenegrin replied positively while the remaining two did not select any of 
the options (See Appendix 6-5). This was to be expected as such publication is required 
by the rules and regulations governing these industries (for the two banks not answering 
the question, it is assumed that it was due to a human error, such as m the question 
during the process of providing responses to the questionnaire).16 However, a different 
response was given when the question concerned the publication of strategic objectives. 
About one third of the banks and most (more than two thirds) of the insurance 
companies do not publish their strategic objectives. Also eight banks from Montenegro 
responded negatively and only two positively to this question.  
The survey findings emphasized that publication of names of major shareholders is an 
unregulated matter and it is up to individual institutions to decide whether to publish 
the names or not. Nevertheless, all Kosovar respondents replied positively to the 
question, ‘Do you publish the names of your large shareowners?’ However, there were 
differences among the banks in terms of the threshold before declaring a shareholder. 
The majority of respondents either did not provide an answer or were unsure whether 
there is a set limit of ownership before an owner have to be declared. However, while 
                                                          
16 For the banking industry it is UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/21, sections 28, 32, 35, 36 and 
Amended Rules XI and XXIV, while for the insurance industry it is UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/25 
provisions 50.1, 50.2, Rule 7 and Rule 8. 
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one responded that all shareholders are listed on their web page, another replied that 
they declared only the eight largest shareholders; the third respondent’s answer was 
that seven per cent ownership is necessary for an owner to be declared. Three of 
Montenegrin banks do not publish their large shareholders while the other seven do. Of 
all insurance companies interviewed, only one gave an answer, replying negatively to 
having a threshold for declaring a shareholder. The low level of response from the 
insurance industry may again be explained by the small number of shareholders (from 
one to four) and perhaps the respondents assumed that it is obvious that all 
shareholders are disclosed. 
According to the survey results, Kosovar banks are quite transparent when it comes to 
publishing information about their board members.17 Two thirds of the banks responded 
positively to the question about publishing such information. Out of those one third 
publish full CVs and the qualifications of their board members; one half of banks publish 
information on the qualifications of their board members in addition to their CVs. Some 
banks publish a short biography in addition to the qualifications of their board members. 
However, the fact remains that one third of Kosovar banks in the survey do not publish 
any information on their board members, while none of the banks in the sample publish 
any information on remuneration of the bank managers or board members. In 
Montenegro the situation is different. Only half of the banks publish information on 
their board members out of which on publishes the CVs of board members, one in 
addition to CVs publishes the qualifications of the board members, and the remaining 
three publish other company directorships. Half of the Kosovar banks and insurance 
companies in the survey disclose to the regulatory authority the remuneration of both 
board members and managers, with the other half considering this information 
confidential. Four out of ten banks in Montenegro disclose this information (three only 
to the relevant authorities) while the remaining six do not disclose such information. 
A similar situation applied to the insurance companies: although two thirds publish 
some information on their board members, the information consists of only their names 
and percentage of ownership. One company responded that only a short profile of the 
                                                          
17 The question was asked whether any (or all) of the following information is published: full CV; 
qualifications – other company directorships; selection process; remuneration.  
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board member is published.18 The survey also shows that neither banks nor insurance 
companies publish information regarding the process of selecting their board members, 
or information regarding other directorships. 
Perhaps, the most controversial result of the survey was the fact that all Kosovar banks 
responded negatively to the question of the presence of independent board members 
despite the fact that Regulation 1999/21 section 17 states that two of the board 
members should be non-executive directors. In this respect, insurance companies were 
different from banks with two-thirds having independent directors on their board, 
though this still leaves one-third that responded negatively to this question. Seven of 
Montenegrin banks responded positively to having independent board members on 
their boards, two negatively and one bank did not provide any response to the question.  
In respect to related party transactions, most banks in both countries replied positively 
to having policies on dealing with companies in which board members or managers are 
important shareholders or employees. The response from insurance companies to the 
question on related party transactions was similar. Interestingly, only one Kosovar bank 
responded negatively to the question of whether there are procedures in place 
addressing related party transactions while the other five banks responded positively; 
the insurance companies also had one negative response to this question but the other 
companies chose not to respond.19 The responses from Montenegrin banks were split 
down the middle with five responding positively and five negatively.  
Regarding disclosure and publication of financial information, all banks use a 
combination of international and local accounting standards, while insurance companies 
use only international accounting standards. The frequency of disclosure of information 
is regulated for both banks and insurance companies, and it is also required by the 
                                                          
18 We have found that one insurance company publishes the names of board members while 
another company publishes the name and ownership percentage of its two shareholders (which 
are two of five board members). Once again, we were unable to find any further information in 
respect of board members of insurance companies 
19 In 2004-2005 the issue of related party transactions emerged as a serious problem. The failure 
to implement sound standards in corporate governance has led to serious problems in at least 
two Kosovar banks, one of which, Credit Bank of Prishtina, went bankrupt in 2004. The main 
problem appeared to be the conflict of interest of certain BoD members in these banks through 
the issuing of credits for their own or related businesses and subsequent failure to repay these 
debts. 
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regulations to publish audited reports in a timely manner in national newspapers.20 All 
banks in the survey publish operating results on their own website, though some publish 
in national newspapers only their balance sheet. One-third of banks in the survey 
responded that they contract a different independent auditor every three year with the 
other two-thirds doing so every five year. The independent auditor in all banks reports 
to shareholders (AGM) and for half of banks in the survey it also reports to the BoD. 
Publishing of audited reports is different for insurance companies since this is not 
regulated as it is for banks. All insurance companies in our survey publish their reports 
on their web sites and only a few also publish this information in their annual report. 
When appointing a new independent auditor, one-third replied ‘every six months‘, 
another third replied ‘every year‘, and the remaining one-third replied ‘every five years’. 
Attention is drawn to the fact that the response of one third of insurance companies 
appointing a new independent audit is every six months. This raises the suspicion that 
the question was misinterpreted for internal audit activities. In the case of insurance 
companies, the survey found that the independent audit reports to the BoD in 
approximately 85 per cent of cases, with the remaining 15 per cent additionally 
reporting to the CBK and to the shareholders. 
To summarize, from the results of the survey it appears that banks and insurance 
companies are very diligent about issues related to transparency and disclosure that are 
imposed by laws or regulations, though in general banks publish more information than 
insurance companies. Perhaps the fact that the regulatory bodies have paid attention to 
this issue has resulted in better compliance with the OECD principle. However, the 
survey showed that respondents were reluctant to publish information regarding the 
remuneration of managers or board members. 
6.4.5 Responsibilities of the Board 
Principles of corporate governance place a heavy responsibility on company boards, 
even though in some cases they do not take this responsibility seriously.21 The quality of 
a company can often be judged by the quality of its board (Rezaee, 2009). The sixth 
                                                          
20 UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/21, Section 34. 
21 Such a case was Banka Kreditre e Prishtines which was closed by the CBK in March 2006 due to 
a number of problems including related parties dealings of board members. 
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OECD Principle highlights the role of the board: ‘The corporate governance framework 
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of 
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders.’ Appendix 6-6 summarizes the findings of the present survey in terms of 
board functioning.  
Attendance of board members in board meetings was very good for Kosovar banks 
(100%) and relatively good for insurance companies (two thirds have between 80% and 
100% participation). The Montenegrin banks did not match their Kosovar counterparts 
as only half of them reported 100% participation, one reported over 80% and the 
remaining banks reported over 50% participation. Although half of the banks did not 
have a system of penalties for non-attendance, the rest had quite severe measures in 
place: e.g. if a board member fails to attend three meetings (in one bank’s case it is two 
meetings), the board chairperson may request his or her replacement. A majority of 
Montenegro’s banks (6) do not have a system of penalties for non-attendance. For 
insurance companies, the situation was slightly different, with only one applying 
penalties for non-attendance and three not doing so, with the other companies not 
responding. (The penalty for non-attendance was that the per diem payment would not 
be made – hardly a penalty.)  
Bank BoDs seem to have met more often during 2008 than did those of insurance 
companies. Three Kosovar banks had twelve or more board meetings, with the rest 
meeting on a quarterly or bimonthly basis. The average for all Montenegrin banks is 15.2 
indicating that in Montenegro banks tend to meet more often than in Kosova. The 
majority (5) of insurance companies met on a monthly basis during 2008, with only one 
meeting more than once a month.  
All banks replied to the survey questions of whether their boards deal with corporate 
strategy, major action plans, risk policy, annual budget, and a business plan. All 
insurance companies responded that their boards deal with corporate strategy, major 
action plans, and risk policy, with two replying that their boards also deal with an annual 
budget and a business plan. Half of the banks have their corporate strategy approved by 
the board for a three-year period and five years for the other half. One third of 
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insurance companies approve their corporate strategy for a period of three years and 
the other two thirds do so for five years. 
All banks and insurance companies, with the exception of one Montenegrin bank, 
declared that their boards set performance objectives for management. The 
performance objective most frequently used by the boards was the ‘market share’, but 
quite often ‘number of clients’ was used as a performance target too. Boards of banks 
also use qualitative and quantitative performance criteria such as the quality of the 
portfolio, the proportion of projects implemented successfully, the achievement of set 
goals (such as increase in deposits), development of certain lines of business, etc. Other 
objectives used by boards of insurance companies are not as elaborate as those used in 
the banking industry. Only one insurance company mentioned ‘development and 
training of staff’ and ‘creativity’ as performance objectives. 
The situation proved to be different when the question was asked whether there were 
performance objectives for board members. Only half of Kosovar banks and one 
Montenegrin bank in the survey responded positively to this question. One third of 
insurance companies responded positively too. Performance objectives for board 
members included finishing projects on time, increase in the bank’s overall profit, 
increase in the number of clients, achievement of objectives as set in the short- and 
medium-term plan, etc. For insurance companies the target was the fulfilment of plans 
on time.  
For the majority of Kosovar banks (5) and three Montenegrin banks in our survey, 
monitoring the implementation of strategic plans and corporate performance and 
overseeing major capital expenditures are conducted jointly by the BoD and 
management. Seven Montenegrin banks have responded that it is only the BoD that 
monitors the above mentioned processes. In the remaining Kosovar bank this is done by 
the internal audit committee while one Montenegrin bank reported that the AGM in 
addition to BoD monitors the processes. For two thirds of insurance companies it is the 
BoD alone that deals with these issues and for the remaining one third of companies the 
BoD and management jointly monitor implementation of strategic plans and corporate 
performance, and oversee major capital expenditures. 
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Banks in the survey appear to have more committees and better qualified members 
than insurance companies. All Kosovar banks and eight out of ten Montenegrin banks 
have audit committees, in contrast to only five insurance companies; some Kosovar 
banks have remuneration and appointment committees while insurance companies 
have neither of these; all Kosovar banks and nine out of ten Montenegrin banks have a 
risk management committee in contrast to one third of insurance companies having 
one. Some banks have other committees such as Asset/Liability Management 
Committee (ALCO) while some insurance companies have committees such as claims 
evaluation committee, underwriting committee, committee for evaluation of training 
needs, etc.  
Finally, the boards decide on corporate governance practices of the majority of banks 
and insurance companies. The survey found the implementation and monitoring of 
these practices is very similar for both industries. Reports from different levels of 
management, as well as from the internal audit person or committee are used to 
monitor and implement corporate governance practices. However, the impression from 
at least some of the interviews was that board members need more insight about higher 
standards of corporate governance and OECD principles, especially concerning the 
relationships among shareholders, BoD and management.  
To sum up, according to the survey shareholders are informed properly and in timely 
manner about their rights, and they are able to exercise their key functions. The banks 
and insurance companies appear to treat their shareholders equitably (in the sense that 
minority shareholders are not negatively discriminated) but not always diligent about 
issues related to transparency and disclosure beyond legal requirements. This is 
especially the case of disclosure of remuneration for board members and managers. 
There are slight differences in how bank boards and insurance company boards work as 
bank boards tend to have more committees and better qualified members. The survey 
also picked up few issues that deserve attention by the respective authorities. Namely, it 
became known that a few Montenegrin banks have granted excessive rights to minority 
shareholders in some cases. In neither Kosova nor Montenegro there are any 
mechanisms to protect minority shareholders. Another failure in complying with OECD 
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principles is the lack of attention to some stakeholder groups. This is symptomatic of 
both industries in both countries.   
6.4.6 The Corporate Governance Score - CGS 
The information gathered via the survey offers more than what was presented in the 
section above narratively. The questionnaires ask most of the questions in such a way 
that allows quantifying the answers which then can be computed to produce a value for 
each surveyed entity. There are many ways to decide what value to assign to a particular 
response, but this study uses an approach similar to Gompers et al. (2003) where a value 
of 1 is assigned to a practice which is considered to be in line with laws and regulations 
and promotes good corporate governance practices and 0 to practices that do not. The 
precise description of the responses to each question which would be assigned the value 
of 1 is explained in Appendix 6-7. 
A simple adding up of the values assigned to each of the 62 questions shows that the 
total Corporate Governance Score (CGS) can be ranging from 62 to 0 with 62 
representing the ideal company with best corporate governance practices on all 
observations. Also, using the information in Table 6-4 it is possible to quantify the ideal 
values for each of five OECD corporate governance principles. Table 6-4 below presents 
this information in two formats, the actual score as calculated by the values assigned to 
each response and by normalising the results to 100 for ease of interpretation. 
Table 6-4 Maximum Calculated (and weighted) Score 
 Actual 
Score 
Weighted 
score 
Maximum Score for all questions 62 100 
Maximum Score for questions on OECD Principle 2 14 23 
Maximum Score for questions on OECD Principle 3 5 8 
Maximum Score for questions on OECD Principle 4 3 5 
Maximum Score for questions on OECD Principle 5 26 42 
Maximum Score for questions on OECD Principle 6 14 23 
Table 6-5 shows the corporate governance scores for the Montenegrin and Kosovar 
financial institutions, allocated on the basis of responses to the survey questions. Due to 
the sensitivity of the data upon which the Corporate Governance Score is calculated, this 
study will present the results for the surveyed entities by replacing the names of banks 
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and insurance companies with numbers - KBi (i=1,2,…,6) for Kosovar Banks, KIi 
(i=1,2,…,6) for Kosovar insurance companies and MBj (j=1,2,…,10) for Montenegrin 
banks. 
 
 
 
Table 6-5 Corporate Governance Score of Surveyed Institutions 
Company Weighted 
CGS 
Company Weighted 
CGS 
MB1 58 KB2 47 
MB2 55 KB3 60 
MB3 61 KB4 66 
MB4 71 KB5 58 
MB5 74 KB6 66 
MB6 68 KI1 44 
MB7 50 KI2 66 
MB8 55 KI3 58 
MB9 63 KI4 40 
MB10 68 KI5 45 
KB1 68 KI6 40 
 
The findings presented in Table 6-5 reflect the reality observed at the time of the survey. 
Montenegrin banks have scored slightly higher (highest CGS=74; lowest CGS=50; 
average CGS=62) than Kosovar banks (highest CGS=68; lowest CGS=47; average 
CGS=61). It can be argued that better legal framework in Montenegro has provided 
better guidance to banks in building and maintaining their corporate governance 
practices. A similar statement can be made with regards to Kosovar insurance 
companies as compared to Kosovar banks. Insurance companies have scored lower than 
banks in both countries (highest CGS=66; lowest CGS=40; average CGS=49) and once 
more this can be attributed to poor legal framework and supervision of this industry in 
Kosova. The statistics mentioned above seem to capture the importance of the first 
principle of OECD Corporate Governance.  Broadly speaking, it appears that 
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Montenegrin banks, which operate in better legal framework, have outscored Kosovar 
banks and insurance companies, which operate in poorer legal framework. 
Similar analysis can be drawn for each of the five OECD corporate governance principles 
(Pi, i=2-6). Table 6-6 below present the corporate governance sub-scores for five 
Principles. 
 
 
Table 6-6 Corporate Governance Sub-Scores 
Company Weighted 
CGS 
P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 
KB1 68 16 8 2 26 16 
KB2 47 6 0 2 26 13 
KB3 60 16 5 3 21 15 
KB4 66 16 6 2 24 18 
KB5 58 11 2 2 27 16 
KB6 66 15 8 2 31 11 
KI1 44 8 2 3 18 13 
KI2 66 15 5 2 29 16 
KI3 58 16 3 2 23 15 
KI4 40 10 3 3 16 8 
KI5 45 5 5 2 23 11 
KI6 40 5 3 2 19 11 
MB1 58 13 5 2 24 15 
MB2 55 11 6 2 24 11 
MB3 61 18 5 2 27 10 
MB4 71 15 5 2 35 15 
MB5 74 19 6 3 29 16 
MB6 68 15 8 0 24 21 
MB7 50 15 5 0 19 11 
MB8 55 16 6 0 21 11 
MB9 63 11 5 3 34 10 
MB10 68 15 8 2 27 16 
 
These findings show that respective authorities should pay attention particularly to P3 – 
equitable treatment of shareholders where one Kosovar bank has a CGS sub-score of 0, 
and P4 - The role of stakeholders in corporate governance where three Montenegrin 
banks have a CGS sub-score of 0. 
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The normalised CGS to 100 (%), compares the achieved CGS as compared to the ideal 
company i.e. MB5 in Table 6-6 has achieved 74% of corporate governance practices 
quality (similarly KI6 has only managed up to 40% of the ideal company). This means 
that on average across the board, the entities have only managed to reach 58% of 
quality of corporate governance as compared the ideal company which highlights the 
need of these companies to invest in improving their corporate governance practices. 
To summarize, the findings suggest that when better legal framework is in place, the 
banks and insurance companies appear to have better corporate governance practices 
in place. Also, the findings indicate that in both countries there are aspects of corporate 
governance that need to be better regulated by law or regulations such as the equitable 
treatment of shareholders, and the role of stakeholders.  
6.5 Empirical Investigation 
The information gathered via the survey which led to rating corporate governance of 
surveyed banks and insurance companies creates the opportunity to test the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance or valuation of financial 
institutions, which this thesis has been concerned with, in the context of banks in 
Kosova and Montenegro. 
A model similar to that used in chapter 4 and chapter 5 can be constructed and 
estimated for this purpose. The information available allows the use of a measure of 
performance, return on equity, and the corporate governance score explained in the 
previous section (6.4.6), and few variables to control for size and industry. However, the 
estimation is constrained by the small number of observations. This makes the 
estimation process very difficult and limits the model in terms of the number of 
variables that can be included.  
Return on Equity (ROE; lower case in the empirical specifications, roe), as a measure of 
bank performance has many positive properties but, in the context of the observations 
used in this chapter, amongst the most important ones are the straightforward 
relationship with profitability and availability (it was found that banks and insurance 
companies often report ROE but, even when they do not, it is very easy to compute the 
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ratio from the available accounting data). In simple terms, ROE measures a 
corporation's profitability by indicating how much profit a company generates with 
the capital that shareholders have invested. ROE is therefore an appropriate 
indicator of performance, the dependent variable in the corporate governance- 
performance relationship. The preferred model is specified as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑏 + 𝜀 
Lnroe – is the returns on equity in the natural logarithmic form and is calculated from 
the published information of banks and insurance companies by dividing the net income 
at the end of the year by the shareholders equity. Also, in the literature, there are a 
number of studies that use ROE as a measure of performance (Brown and Caylor 2004, 
2006; Trayler, 2007). The log-lin form is chosen to satisfy the diagnostic requirements of 
the estimation procedure. 
CGS – the corporate governance score. 
Assets – represent the assets of the surveyed institutions as presented in their 
respective financial reports. 
db – is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the observation is a bank and 0 if 
it is an insurance company. 
The dataset used in the empirical work has been explained earlier in this chapter, 
nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the mechanics of the process. The starting point 
was the calculation of corporate governance score for banks and the insurance 
companies that participated in the survey. The next step was to obtain the financial 
information for the respective bank or insurance company. For each individual 
institution in the dataset, this information was obtained from their financial reports 
(most often from the annual report) for the year 2008. These reports were the source of 
the financial data which are used as proxy for the performance (return on equity) and as 
control variable for size (total assets) in the model. 
The model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique. The advantages of 
using the OLS technique is that this method is suitable for estimating models with a 
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small number of observations (in this case, 23). However, one should bear in mind that 
in the case of Montenegrin banks and Kosovar insurance companies the whole 
population is covered by the survey, and in the case of Kosovar banks six out of eight 
banks are represented in the survey. Consequently, the data used for this estimation can 
be considered to be the population of financial institutions in the two countries. Other 
properties of OLS have been explained in greater detail in the previous chapters of this 
thesis. 
 
6.5.1 Interpretation of the Results 
The results of the estimated model are presented in Table 6-7 below. 
Table 6-7 - Estimation with CGS 
Lnroe Coefficient 
(SE) 
CGS 0.01 
(0.026) 
assets 2.80e-06*** 
(6.75e-07) 
Db 1.01** 
(0.398) 
cons 0.91   
(1.098)  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Before interpreting the relationships, a word on the diagnostics and model specification. 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity shows that there is 
homoscedasticity in the estimated data, while the Ramsey RESET test suggests that the 
model does not suffer from omitted variables. The Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition 
of IM-test supports the previous diagnostic tests that suggest the model does not suffer 
from any sort of misspecification (see Appendix 6-8). However, the relationship between 
the main variable of interest, CGS and return on equity, despite the expected positive 
sign is insignificant. 
There are few reasons why this may be the case. First, it can be argued that the small 
number of observations limits the process of estimation. Second, it could happen that 
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the calculated corporate governance score, because it reflects the five OECD principles 
in practice, contains too much information to be utilised by the small dataset.  
If the second argument were to hold, then perhaps individual subscores, may provide 
some empirical insights into the relationship – this is because such an approach would 
reflect compliance with only one of the five subscores each time. This is in line with the 
discussion of section 4.3.1 where it was pointed out that sometimes a sub-index yields 
better results. Thus this chapter will estimate the following model:  
  
𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃2 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑏 + 𝜀 
 
Where the CGS variable is replaced with P2, representing the second OECD principle – 
rights of shareholders and key ownership functions. Estimation of this model produced 
the following results presented in Table 6-8: 
Table 6-8 Estimation with P2 
lnroe Coefficient 
(SE) 
P2 0.13* 
(0.061) 
assets 3.11e-06*** 
(5.81e-07) 
Db 1.12** 
(0.310) 
cons 0.14 
(0.601) 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Let us start by investigating the specification of the model. Looking at the Stata printouts 
(Appendix 6-9), the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table indicates that 70 per cent of the 
variance of the dependent variable in the model is explained by the variables used in the 
model. The F values of the overall model fit suggest that the independent variables 
explain the dependant variable at the significance level of 1.5 per cent and the 
proportion of the variance in the dependent variable is at levels in excess of 71 per cent. 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test; The Ramsey RESET test; and, The Cameron & 
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Trivedi’s diagnostic tests suggest the model does not suffer from any sort of 
misspecification.  
With the model specification meeting the required criteria at satisfactory levels, the 
chapter turns to interpreting the results. The initial impression of the estimated βs is 
that all the coefficients are statistically significant and exhibit the expected signs. The 
results suggest that, ceteris paribus, the increase of the corporate governance subscore 
P2, reflecting the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions by one, will 
translate into 0.13 percentage point increase in the return of equity. The estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant at 10% level. In economic terms, this can be 
interpreted as follows: banks and insurance companies that pay attention to the rights 
of shareholders and their key ownership functions can improve their performance as 
measured by the return on equity.  
The estimated coefficient of the assets is significant at 1 per cent level and is positive. 
Also, the extremely small value of the estimated coefficient 3.11e-06. This means that, 
all else equal, an increase of 1 thousand Euros in assets of a banks or insurance company 
will translate to a very small increase (0.00000311 percentage points) in the 
performance depicted by the return on equity. 
The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable is positive and statistically significant 
at 5%, meaning that, everything else equal, Kosovar banks have higher returns on equity 
compared to the insurance companies. 
To summarize, this section has shown that there is a positive relationship between some 
aspect of corporate governance (the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights), and 
the performance of banks and insurance companies in Kosova and Montenegro.   
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter started by investigating the corporate governance of banks in two SEE 
countries, Kosova and Montenegro. When talking about two countries from the same 
region with a number of similarities such as size, recent history, currency and the 
absence of monetary policy powers, it would be safe to assume that the corporate 
governance practices of similar industries in these countries will be fairly similar too. 
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Kosova was faced with the situation of building the banking systems from scratch. For 
Kosova, this meant the establishment of the Payment Authority of Kosova in 1999, 
subsequently transformed to central bank, and the establishment of the Central Bank of 
Montenegro in 2002. The banking systems of both countries are dominated by foreign 
banks, 6 out of 8 in Kosova and 8 out of 10 in Montenegro.  
In Kosova the regulation of the banking industry was governed by UNMIK regulations up 
to 2012, while Montenegro promulgated its Law on Banks in 2002.22 The lack of specific 
banking laws is compensated by other laws, such as company law applicable to banks 
and regulations issued by central banks of respective states. With respect to corporate 
governance, the laws of each country have attempted to set the framework for good 
governance, concentrating on the responsibilities of the board of directors, composition 
of the boards, dealings with related party transactions and so on. In Montenegro, the 
same person can serve as the chairperson of the board and the CEO because the 
practice is allowed under the company law.23 
Faced with the lack of empirical evidence for SEE countries, it was decided to conduct a 
survey which would investigate the degree of implementation of OECD Principles on 
corporate governance. The same questionnaire was distributed to banks and insurance 
companies in Kosova and the banks in Montenegro. The questionnaire was designed to 
obtain information regarding compliance with 5 out of 6 OECD principles, as the first 
principle, the sound corporate governance framework was investigated through review 
of relevant laws and regulations in both countries. 
The findings show, there are some subtle but relevant differences between Kosovar and 
Montenegrin banks. The survey showed that it is very important to have a sound legal 
framework governing the corporate governance practices of banks (and insurance 
companies). Banks operating in the country with better rules and regulations, have 
better corporate governance practices than the banks operating in the country that 
lacks such regulation. However, it has to be mentioned that all institutions covered by 
the sample have gaps in their practices, when corporate governance is measured by a 
                                                          
22 Kosova up to now (October 2013) does not have a Law on Insurance. 
23 Since the Law on Banks, which is the specific law, does not regulate on this issue, technically, 
the same person can be the CEO and the Chairperson. However, the 2009 survey did not show 
any of the banks having that situation. 
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questionnaire based on OECD corporate governance principles. The results show that 
none of the banks belong to top 25% as far as the corporate governance practices are 
concerned thus indicating that there is room for improvement. 
In addition, the empirical results show a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of banks and insurance companies in Kosova and 
Montenegro. For the purpose of this chapter, the corporate governance is proxied by 
the subscore on the performance of the surveyed firms with respect to second OECD 
principle, i.e. the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, while performance 
is measured by return on equity. This finding is in line with the behaviour of firms in 
transition economies as discussed in chapter one of this thesis. The active involvement 
of shareholders, increases the performance of companies. This is expected in countries 
with less dispersed ownership and weak legal framework, as is the case in Kosova and 
Montenegro. 
If the comparison were to be broadened to corporate governance of developed 
economies and corporate governance of SEE countries, it would be safe to say that the 
two countries studied in this chapter aspire towards the Anglo-American, single tier 
system of corporate governance. Because Kosovar regulations prohibit the possibility of 
the same person serving as the Chairman and the CEO while the Montenegrin law allows 
it, it can be said that Kosovar corporate governance system is more like the United 
Kingdom (Anglo) and the Montenegrin one like American system. The empirical 
evidence from this chapter seems to support the view that concentrated ownership has 
emerged as the main corporate governance mechanism in transition economies. This is 
in line with findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (2000), arguing that 
in the absence of a well-developed legal system and the protection it offers the 
shareholders, large shareholder groups become the vehicle for corporate governance. 
The level of development of legal systems supporting corporate governance in the SEE is 
very low, which is understandable given the fact that they have been established only 
recently.  
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 7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of firms with focus on financial institutions. It started with investigation of 
corporate governance as a concept exploring the situations where it is most likely to 
appear, what may be the consequences and who the involved parties are, and where do 
the corporate governance practices come from.  
The literature on corporate governance and different theories and empirical evidence in 
the area were critically reviewed. There is sporadic evidence for a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance in a variety of circumstances and 
countries. However, the research review showed that studies measuring this 
relationship in the banking sector are rather scarce.  
Aiming to narrow this gap in the literature, this thesis embarked on an empirical 
investigation of whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and the 
performance or valuation of financial institutions. The approach was to study this 
relationship in context of developed market economies as well as South East European 
(SEE) economies and find out if there any parallel developments between the two 
regions. While the data on measuring of corporate governance practices for banks in the 
United States was not easy to obtain, there was no data on corporate governance 
practices of financial institutions in the SEE region and therefore we had to embark on a 
bank survey of our own in order to construct indicators of corporate governance 
practices in these countries 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 will present the main 
findings of the research; section 7.3 will discuss the contribution of this thesis to 
knowledge, section 7.4 draws policy implications from this research, section 7.5 points 
out the limitations of this research and section 7.6 will consider the ways in which this 
research can be further developed.  
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7.2 Main Findings 
The importance of corporate governance for the proper functioning of capital markets 
and ensuring investor confidence has been well established in the last two decades, 
particularly since the corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, etc. in the late 
1990s through to the late 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008. The underlying concepts 
which are based on the separation of ownership and control and the principal-agent 
relationship, however, were introduced by Berle and Means (1932) and Fama, (1965; 
1980) respectively. In recent times, cg has been viewed as a mechanism which, on the 
one hand, assures investors that their capital is protected and that they will not be the 
target of expropriation by managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); and, on the other hand, 
assures minority shareholders that they will not be expropriated by the majority 
shareholders (LaPorta, et al., 2000). This implies that a certain framework and 
institutional set ups have to be in place to protect the interest of the parties involved.  
The experience of different developed countries, and also transition economies, has 
shown that the above aims can be achieved in one of two ways. An efficient way is a 
well-established legal system geared to investor protection - and the experience has 
shown that countries that have managed to ensure good functioning legal systems 
focused on protection of investors have also developed deep capital markets and 
diffused ownership structures of companies. In other countries, where the legal system 
was not focused on investor protection (particularly minority investors), many 
companies experienced concentrated ownership (the emergence of large shareholders 
who can look after their own interests better if they have large enough bundle of shares 
to be able to control the management) (La Porta et al. 2000). This means that owners 
can exercise their powers to align managements’ activities with the profit maximising 
aim of the company.  
The shareholder value maximisation approach is one approach to corporate governance 
whereby the owners are concerned with preventing management from diverting 
company profits for their own private benefit. However, another approach is that the 
company is not a body consisting of only two entities, shareholders and managers, but 
there are other interested parties such as employees, suppliers, customers and so on, 
otherwise known as stakeholders who affect or are affected in some form by the 
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achievement of company’s objectives (Freeman,1984). This is the stakeholder approach 
to corporate governance. The role of the stakeholders in corporate governance up to 
date is not very much elaborated. It is important to note that the stakeholder approach 
implies that the management will not be maximising any particular objective function: 
when firms have more than one objective to pursue, they will not be able to maximise 
anything (they will display ‘satisficing behaviour’ rather than ‘maximising behaviour’). 
Corporate governance of banks is different from other companies because: i) there is an 
important and very different type of stakeholder (depositors) whose relationship to the 
bank  involves serious agency cost;1 ii) the principal-agent problem is more complex in 
the banking sector since managers are required to act in a way that profit maximisation 
for shareholders does not have adverse implications for depositors (Alexander, 2006; 
Mullineux, 2006); iii) unlike most industries, bank activities are opaque to depositors and 
the general public – with greater potential for opportunistic behaviour by managers and 
iv) also unlike most other industries, banking is one the most regulated industries in all 
countries because of the need to protect the interest of depositors (as primary 
stakeholders) (Mishkin, 2004). For governments it also makes sense to regulate the 
banking industry because of their importance of this sector for the economy and the 
potential systemic effects of banking industry failure spilling over to the whole economy 
(and the recent history has not been short of such examples). This has warranted a 
broad range of institutions providing guidelines, regulation and laws to ensure the 
effective functioning of the banking industry. Only in the United States there have been 
thirteen highly relevant pieces of legislation for the period 1913 – 2010 some of which 
have had indirect effect on corporate governance practices of banks. However, there is 
legislation that targeted important aspects of corporate governance practices of the 
United States banks. The most important laws, with strong impact on corporate 
governance following the corporate failures in early 2000s is Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), 
and following the last financial crisis is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (2010). On a global scale, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has started issuing accords since 1988 to guide banks on how to better 
                                                          
1 Insurance companies, as another example, have the insured as an interested group, with a 
particularly problematic relationship to the company (best described in a principal-agent 
framework). 
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protect their assets by putting appropriate provisions in place. In this way, these accords 
were addressing the interests of depositors by improving the quality of portfolio and 
restricting the excessive risk taking of bank managers and shareholders. The aspect that 
was prevalent in all the legislation, regulation and guidelines is the increase of 
transparency and disclosure as means of improving corporate governance of banks. In 
addition, many stock exchanges have imposed the requirement of board majority 
independence which is the case with NYSE, or other forms of controlling the quality of 
corporate governance by asking the listed companies to provide information on the 
‘comply or explain’ principle as the case of WSE. 
Another aspect of corporate governance addressed by this thesis was the corporate 
governance in transition countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the socialist system in 
Europe collapsed giving way to the transition of these economies from a planned to a 
market oriented system. The governments of former-socialist countries needed to 
create a new legal infrastructure to support the process of ownership transformation - 
in most cases from scratch. This resulted in a dispersion of ownership which did not 
prove to be a suitable structure in these countries as the legal systems were not 
equipped to protect the interests of investors and minority shareholders. Eventually, as 
predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and LaPorta et al. (2000), forms of concentrated 
ownership, insider or outsider ownership, emerged in all these countries. Furthermore, 
there is some evidence that outside ownership proved to be more effective form of 
ownership because, among other advantages, they employed the more advanced 
corporate governance practices which improved their efficiency.  
There have been a number of studies exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The seminal paper by Gompers et al. (2003) found 
that firms with better corporate governance practices that provide shareholder 
protection, as measured by an index constructed by them, outperform (measured by 
equity prices) firms where managers had strongest rights. Other studies have used 
various indices and indicators for measuring corporate governance have reported 
positive relationship with performance which is also measured by a variety of indicators 
such as Tobin’s Q, valuation, profit margins, return on assets, dividends etc. (Klapper and 
Love, 2002; Dunev and Kim (2003; Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004). Van 
Concluding remarks 
  
 
212 
den Berghe and Levrau (2003) that find evidence that firm-level corporate governance 
provisions matter more in countries with weaker legal systems. 
With the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance empirically 
documented, the focus of this thesis was turned to investigating whether such a 
relationship also holds, first for financial institutions in a broad sense and, second, for 
banks in particular. The very first thing that can be noticed is that there are only few 
studies which look at this relationship. The common suggestion of the few that do, seem 
to suggest that banks that managed to address the agency problem better, had better 
results. Caprio et al. (2007) find that larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner 
boosts valuation; weak shareholder protection laws lower bank valuation; and 
regulatory policies have no effect on bank valuation (measured by the Tobin’s Q). 
Looking at 100 top banks in the world, Trayler (2007) finds that better performing banks, 
as measured by their ROA, ROE, capital adequacy and other measures, feature more 
independent directors with the chairperson being appointed by large shareholder or 
investor groups. Spong and Sullivan (2007) looking and community banks in American 
Midwest find that providing ownership stakes to members of management, improves 
banks’ performance. In addition, the more efficient banks had more insider board 
members who held greater ownership stake of the bank. Adams and Mehran (2008) 
looking at Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) do not find any relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and the proportion of independent directors on the board but they do find a positive 
relationship between the size of the board and Tobin’s Q.  
In the light of these debates and the previous literature, this thesis has investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance empirically (proxies 
by the CGQ published by ISS for the United States banks and CGS computed from banks’ 
responses to the author’s survey questionnaire for SEE countries) and bank performance 
(as measured by market capitalisation for developed markets and ROE for SEE banks). 
This research is distinct from the few existing ones focusing on banks because this thesis 
has utilised a measure of corporate governance which is generated by ISS and 
investigated how is that related to bank performance, while the previous research has 
considered the impact of corporate governance aspects (such as proportion of 
independent board members; size of the board; frequency of meetings; remuneration 
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policies; etc.) on bank performance.  In this investigation, the measures of bank 
performance such as Tobin’s Q, ROE, ROA used in the previous literature did not show a 
meaningful relationship with the measure of corporate governance. There can be two 
reasons for this. First, as Bebchuk et al. (2010) have argued, the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance may have disappeared for the banks in the post 
SOX period because of the massive financial crisis of 2008. Second, in line with Huizinga 
and Laeven (2009) the banks have managed to persuade the relevant authorities in the 
United States to relax the ‘fair valuation’ rule with the argument that during the times of 
crisis, markets cannot be the only measure of valuation of assets. This enabled banks in 
the United States to keep on their books as assets financial vehicles known as mortgage 
backed up assets (MBA) up to their maturity even in cases where it was known that 
these assets are worth far less. This meant that indicators which rely on balance sheet 
data of banks were not representative of the actual situation, which was picked up by 
the earlier models discussed in the thesis. 
The empirical part of the thesis consisted of developing a model of the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance for financial institutions which avoided 
the problems of previous studies referred to above and also with the specific conditions 
of SEE countries in mind. For developed market economies, United States was chosen as 
a country with well-developed financial institutions and available data on the 
measurement of corporate governance practices for these institutions. For SEE 
countries, the initial aim was to conduct bank surveys in four SEE countries (Albania, 
Macedonia, Kosova and Montenegro) but in the course of the field work it became clear 
that it was not possible to conduct the survey in Albania and Macedonia, despite the 
intervention of many institutions and individuals supporting the research project. The 
survey was therefore limited to Kosova and Montenegro.  
The data for US banks was compiled from two sources. The Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ), the measure of effective corporate governance together with its 
subscores measuring the effectiveness of different elements of corporate governance, 
are generated by the Institutional Shareholder Services. The financial data for banks 
were obtained from the Bankscope database. Initially the data for CGQ was available 
only for the year 2009, allowing only a cross section analysis, but later the data became 
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available for the years 2005-2008 which enabled a panel data estimation for the period 
2005-2009. The data for Kosovar and Montenegrin institutions were compiled by the 
author from the results of the bank surveys in the two countries and the financial 
reports of the institutions. Using the responses to survey questionnaire, corporate 
governance scores were developed for Kosovar banks and insurance companies as well 
as Montenegrin banks. The financial data for the institutions in these two countries 
were compiled from the financial accounts of these companies which are in the public 
domain. 
Using market capitalisation as a measure of performance for American banks seemed to 
circumvent the issue of problematic balance sheets and also suggested that the markets 
were paying attention to corporate governance of banks even during the crisis period as 
there was a positive relationship between the two. The OLS estimation of course 
involves caveats such as the results might be a snapshot of the relationship rather than a 
representation of the situation on the population, and the inability to address the 
endogeneity issues arising from estimating such relationship. When a larger database of 
CGQ was obtained, we embarked on panel data estimation techniques to respond to 
some of these caveats. The findings of the cross section estimation were supported also 
in context of panel data (albeit a weaker relationship) which takes into account a greater 
amount of information over a number of years. Furthermore, this thesis reports positive 
a relationship between the corporate governance score (developed from the 
questionnaire survey) and return on equity for banks in Kosova and Montenegro.  
In terms of policy implications, two issues have been highlighted. In context of the 
United States banks, and banks in other developed economies, the change in the 
accounting system, without paying sufficient attention to the potential outcomes, may 
result in adverse impact for corporate governance practices of these institutions - as was 
the case with the relaxing of the ‘fair valuation rule’ during the crisis period. For the 
policymakers in SEE countries, it may be relevant to pay more attention to laws and 
regulations explicitly addressing the corporate governance practices of financial 
institutions. Better legal frameworks does seem to induce better corporate governance 
practices of the subjected institutions.  
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7.3 Main Contributions to Knowledge 
The lack of sufficient empirical exploration in the field, and the absence of any 
quantitative measure of corporate governance for the financial institutions of SEE 
countries, were the main motivations for this thesis. The aim, therefore, has been to 
attempt to contribute by investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance or valuation in both developed and SEE countries. The 
comparison is important as it will enhance our understanding of the role of corporate 
governance practices in countries with different levels of development of the market 
system and institutions. The empirical work in both areas constitute contributions to 
knowledge made by this research 
Given the data availability in the early part of the research, a cross section model similar 
to Brown and Caylor (2004) was estimated using the ordinary least squares method. The 
main distinction was that Brown and Caylor investigated all the United States companies 
in one stock exchange listing (S&P 500) whereas the model used in this thesis focused 
only on American banks listed in S&P 400, S&P 500, S&P 600, Russell 3000, and a group 
of banks that were not listed in any of the mentioned listing indices but for which the 
corporate governance ratings were available in the ISS database. By furthering the 
investigation in light of Huizinga and Laeven (2009) study and using market capitalisation 
as a measure of performance, a positive and significant relationship between the quality 
of banks’ corporate governance and their performance was obtained. 
The results of this estimation, despite the diagnostic testing indicating a well specified 
model, failed to provide evidence of meaningful relationship between corporate 
governance and measures of performance (the Q-value of the firm, ROE or ROA).  
A major contribution of the thesis is the panel investigation of the corporate 
governance-bank performance relationship. The investigation supports all the findings 
of the cross section estimation. First it supports the lack of statistically significant 
relationship between corporate governance and measures of bank performance used in 
previous studies such as the Q-value, ROE, ROA; and second, it supports a statistically 
significant relationship between corporate governance and market capitalisation. These 
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results are considered more reliable as the panel data allows for the endogeneity 
problem to be addressed and treated properly.  
Furthermore, as there was insufficient economic explanation for the results of the static 
model, the thesis embarked on dynamic panel model estimation of the relationship. 
Using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique to estimate the 
relationship, which in addition to treating endogeneity issues, takes into consideration 
influences from previous periods, a statistically significant relationship between market 
capitalisation and corporate governance emerged.  
Considering that none of the important studies2 which empirically investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, consider the 
dynamics of the relationship, and that many of them do not even acknowledge or treat 
the endogeneity issues, it can be argued that the treatment of these issues constitutes 
an important contribution to knowledge of this thesis. 
Another contribution of the thesis is the investigation of the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance in two SEE transition economies. For these 
two countries, there was no published corporate governance data prior to this research. 
None of the rating institutions or other agencies had embarked on rating the corporate 
governance practices of banks in these countries. This meant that it was necessary to 
collect the data via a survey questionnaire, using a questionnaire similar to the ROSC 
questionnaires of the World Bank, but adjusted so that it revolved around the OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles. 
The purpose of the survey was to obtain a snap shot picture of the corporate 
governance situation in the surveyed entities at the time of the survey (2008-2009). In 
order to get a better understanding of the corporate governance environment, 
additional interviews were conducted with other stakeholders such as the Central Bank 
and the chamber of commerce. The findings suggested that better legal frameworks 
induce better corporate governance practices of banks and insurance companies. The 
                                                          
2 To our knowledge, only one previous study attempted to use the GMM model to estimate the 
corporate governance-performance relationship but, as explained in Chapter 5, it had many 
unresolved issues in terms of diagnostics that made the use of method inappropriate (at least 
judging by what was reported by this study. E.g. Rafferty and O’Connor (2011)). 
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findings also indicate that in both countries there are aspects of corporate governance 
that need to be better regulated by law or regulations such as the equitable treatment 
of shareholders, and the role of stakeholders. 
The responses to the survey questionnaire enabled us to construct a measure of 
corporate governance practice (with its subscores), the ‘corporate governance score 
(CGS)’ for each bank or insurance company. Since the questionnaire was designed with 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles as benchmark, it was possible to calculate 
individual sub-scores for each of five OECD principles (second to sixth). In theoretical 
sense, the index measures the level of compliance of respondents with OECD principles.  
Even though the bank survey was limited to two countries, this methodology which can 
be extended to banks in other SEE countries, where the corporate governance rating is 
still unavailable, constitutes another contribution to knowledge of this thesis. 
The empirical analysis of the data using OLS method, the estimated model did not 
establish a statistically significant relationship between bank performance measured by 
ROE and the CGS. It may be argued that with a small number of observations which 
limits the degrees of freedom, and the complex nature of compliance with the OECD 
principles accounted by the CGS, the limited data was unable to reveal any underlying 
relationship. However, the sub-score for the second OECD Corporate Governance 
Principle – Shareholder Rights and Key Ownership Functions, and the ROE was 
statistically significant. This empirical evidence, though limited, is another contribution 
of the thesis as, to date, there are no other studies that have dealt with the issue of 
corporate governance of banks and insurance companies in Kosova and Montenegro. 
7.4 Policy implications 
Given that this thesis has provided evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between corporate governance and the performance of financial institution, it can be 
expected that it should have some policy implications. The distinct nature of the 
empirical research presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 is that it is based on both developed 
market economies as well as transition economies. Chapters 4 and 5 consider banks 
from the United States of America, which can be used as the representative of 
developed economies, while chapter 6 is concerned with the two SEE countries of 
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Kosova and Montenegro, as representatives of less developed (transition) economies. As 
such, the main audience of these findings are regulatory and supervisory bodies dealing 
with corporate governance. These findings should be interesting also to banks and their 
respective boards. 
For the developed economies, the policy implications from this thesis are at a broad 
level. Namely, the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance, 
as evidenced by the empirical results, implies that regulatory and supervisor bodies in 
these economies should continue to ensure that good corporate governance is observed 
and implemented and, when possible, improved. Throughout this thesis, it has been 
argued that corporate governance reduces the principal agent problem by aligning the 
incentives of shareholders and managers. One of the mechanisms used for the 
alignment of interests of the two parties is the compensation scheme for executives. 
The last financial crisis pointed out a number of flaws with this mechanism and  perhaps 
the regulators in developed economies should pay special attention to this aspect of 
corporate governance. In a series of recent studies carried out by Bebchuk and Hamdani 
(2009), Bebchuk (2010) and Bebchuk et al. (2010) on bankers’ pay, they showed that the 
incentives of managers were not properly aligned with the profit maximisation aim of 
the companies they manage, but rather designed to maximise the managers’ earnings. 
In their research on Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers for the period 2000-2008, 
Bebchuk et al. (2010) found that the executives of these two corporations had managed 
to cash out through equity sales around USD 2 billion combined by ‘unloading’ large 
amounts of their shares before the meltdown of their respective companies. Better 
observance of corporate governance rules would imply closing the loop holes which 
allowed this kind of self-seeking behaviour by bank managers. 
In terms of Kosova and Montenegro and other transition countries, here too the 
regulators should try to implement the existing corporate governance rules fully and 
improve them whenever possible. However, as the corporate governance framework in 
these countries is not well developed yet, more focused policies need to be formulated. 
Since this thesis has presented empirical evidence of a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between corporate governance (or one aspect of it) and bank 
performance, the policy makers should consider the following.  
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Regulators and other relevant bodies dealing with corporate governance should make 
sure that current laws, regulations, and rules on corporate governance are observed and 
implemented fully by the banking industries in their respective countries. When 
shortcomings of these rules and regulations are identified, then they should be 
amended and improved by taking into consideration best practices from developed 
economies.    
The particular aspect of corporate governance which is positively related to bank 
performance in Kosova and Montenegro is the OECD Corporate Governance Principle II, 
which means that banks that better observe shareholder rights and their key ownership 
functions, tend to have better performance. This leads to the belief that if banks were to 
pay attention to the OECD Corporate Governance Principle III, the equitable treatment 
of all shareholders, the minority shareholders will be encouraged to invest in the 
banking industry in the future which would give rise to a more dispersed ownership in 
these countries. As has been explained by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. 
(2000), dispersed ownership requires good legal protection, thus the regulators of the 
respective countries should insist on observance of laws and regulations by banks. 
The importance of the legal framework also is confirmed by the Corporate Governance 
Score computed in chapter 6 of this thesis. As shown in Table 6-5, Montenegrin banks 
score the highest, followed in the second place by Kosovar banks and then by Kosovar 
insurance companies. This corresponds to the analysis of legal frameworks of these 
countries carried out in section 6.3 where it was made clear that the legal framework 
governing Montenegrin banks is more developed and better implemented than those 
applied to Kosovar banks, while the legal framework for the insurance industry in 
Kosova is the weakest of all. Thus the regulators and other relevant actors should put 
their efforts into improving the legal framework in Kosovo as a starting point, if they 
expect these industries to perform better. 
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
This thesis, similar to most other research projects, encountered a number of 
unexpected problems and became subject to a number of limitations. The main 
limitation in the case the United States banks was that the period of study encompasses 
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the crisis period when a lot of relationships are distorted and ‘out of equilibrium’ as 
compared to normal non-crisis periods. This means that findings of this research warrant 
some caution if one were to stretch the findings and implications beyond the studied 
period. The ability to extend the sample period beyond 2005-2009 would provide 
insights on the behaviour of banks during the period of calm and times of crisis. Also, 
given the central role of the banks in the economy, it would help if other types of 
financial institutions (as well as the financial institutions of other developed economies) 
are included in the sample. In terms of the financial institutions in SEE countries, the 
main problem (and limitation) was the unwillingness of these institutions in Albania and 
Macedonia to participate in the survey. Broadening the geographical coverage to cover 
other SEE countries would help further this research. As it was discussed earlier, the 
sample in Kosova and Montenegro represented 90 per cent of the population of banks 
(Montenegro 100 per cent and Kosova 80 per cent), yet the sample is very small. The 
non-inclusion of other finance institutions in the sample is another limitation of this 
thesis. The cross section analysis of the small sample developed in Chapter 6 did not 
allow us to address the potential endogeneity problems.   
7.6 Further Research 
There are several ways in which this research can be expanded. First and foremost, in 
terms of developed economies, the period of investigation can be broadened to include 
observations before and after the crisis period. This would enable the researcher to 
potentially isolate the bank behaviour which is peculiar to crisis, and maybe identify 
which corporate governance practices contributed to good or bad performance before, 
during and after the crisis period. 
Also, including banks from other developed countries the research could perhaps 
benefit from investigating which countries apply better corporate governance systems 
thus using this information to guide policymakers in other countries during the process 
of designing or implementing corporate governance related policies. In addition, the 
sample can be enriched with other financial institutions and explore what are the 
implications of certain laws or regulations for banking and other non-banking financial 
institutions.  
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In terms of the investigation of corporate governance of SEE countries, there are two 
ways to further this research. First, it would be highly rewarding to conduct another 
survey of the same entities at a different point in time, i.e. another snap shot of 
corporate governance practices after a given number of years. This would enable the 
researchers to identify any changes during this period, and if there was any progress in 
terms of corporate governance behaviour of these institutions. Second, by broadening 
the sample to include other SEE countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia would provide more variation in the sample and facilitate better 
econometric analysis and more robust results. Finally, it would be a good idea to 
persuade the central banks of respective countries to help with the survey on annual 
basis. The questionnaire designed for this thesis, with minor alterations, could serve for 
this purpose. This would help the central banks, which usually are the regulatory and 
supervisory body for the banking sector, to remain informed about the corporate 
governance behaviour of the institutions under their supervision. 
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Appendices related to chapt. 2    
Appendix 2-1 – The ISS Minimally Acceptable Corporate Governance Standard 
BOARD 
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse  
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies   
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors   
4. Board size is at greater than five but less than 16  
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction  
6. No former CEO on the board   
7. Compensation committee comprised solely of independent outsiders  
8. Chairman and CEO are separated or there is a lead director   
9. Nominating committee comprised solely of independent outsiders   
10. Outsider controlled board or board controlled by 50% to 75% of independent 
outsiders with officer and director ownership between 5% to 30% 
 11. Governance committee exists and met in the past year   
12. Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies   
13. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed   
14. Annually elected board (no staggered board)   
15. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements   
16. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines   
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)   
18. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights   
19. Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size   
20. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points   
21. Director term limits exist   
22. Board controlled by 50% or more independent outsiders and all committees are 
comprised solely of independent outsiders 
  
AUDIT 
23. Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors 64.0% 
98.0% 53.0% 
24. Audit committee comprised solely of independent outsiders 70.3% 86.2% 22.7% 
25. Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting 56.4% 65.5% 16.2% 
26. Policy disclosed regarding auditor rotation 2.8% 45.7% 1548.1% 
 
CHARTER 
27. Single class, common  
28. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)  
29. Shareholders may call special meetings  
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)   
31. Poison pill with a trigger >= 20%   
32. Shareholder may act by written consent   
33. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred and either has no poison 
pill or a pill that was shareholder approved. 
34. Poison pill with a qualified offer clause   
35. Poison pill with TIDE provision   
36. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so under 
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limited circumstances 
37. Poison pill with sunset provision   
 
STATE 
38. Incorporation in state w/o a control share cash-out statute, or with a control share 
cash-out statute but company has opted out 
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills   
40. Incorporation in a state without stakeholder laws, or independent directors 
comprise 75% or more of the board 
41. Incorporation in state w/o a control share acquisition statue, or with a control share 
aquisition statute but company has opted out 
42. Incorporation in state with a fair price provision   
43. Incorporation in state w/o a freezeout provision, or with a freezeout but company 
has opted out 
44. Incorporation in state without any state anti-takeover provisions  
 
COMPENSATION 
45. Interlocks among compensation committee members   
46. Non-employee directors participate in pension plan   
47. No option repricing within last three years   
48. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock   
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval   
50. The last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed the cost 
reasonable 
51. Company does not provide any loans to executives for exercising options   
52. Repricing prohibited  
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate   
54. Company expenses stock options  
 
PROGRESSIVE PRACTICES 
55. Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors   
56. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly   
57. Board approved succession plan in place for the CEO   
58. Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met   
59. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job   
60. Mandatory retirement age for directors   
 
OWNERSHIP 
61. Does not ignore shareholder proposal   
62. All directors with more than one year of service own stock  
63. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total 
shares outstanding  
64. Majority of directors have participated in a director education program. 
Source: Aggarwal and Williamson (2006). 
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Appendix 2-2 – GMI Research Categories and Sample metrics 
1.  BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY  
Sub-Categories 
1.1   Board Leadership 
1.2   Board Composition 
1.3   Board Elections 
1.4   Pursuit of Shareholder Value 
1.5   CEO Evaluation 
1.6   Succession Planning 
1.7   Governance Committee 
1.8   Corporate Governance Policies 
1.9   Board Evaluations 
1.10 Board Meetings 
1.11 Board Procedures 
1.12 Code of Ethics 
1.13 Scrutiny of Related-Party Transactions 
1.14 Director Stock Ownership 
1.15 Company Response to Shareholder Proposals 
Sample Metrics 
 Does the company disclose the criteria used by the board or a board committee to 
formally evaluate CEO performance? 
 Does a committee of the board evaluate the performance of the board on a regular 
basis? 
 Does each board committee undertake an evaluation of its own performance on a 
regular basis? 
 Is it the board's policy to hold meetings of the non-executive directors before or 
after every board meeting? 
 Is training and orientation required for new board members? 
 Does the board have a policy concerning directors whose principal occupation has 
changed? 
 Is there a limit to the total number of years an individual is able to serve as a board 
member, or is there a limit to the number of times a director is allowed to be re-
elected to the board? 
 Have any directors served on the board for fifteen years or more? 
 Has there been a related-party transaction involving the Chairman, CEO, President, 
COO or CFO or a relative within the last three years? 
 Has the number of company shares held by the senior management decreased by 10 
per cent or more over the last twelve months? 
2.  FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND INTERNAL CONTROLS 
Sub-Categories 
2.1 Audit Committee Composition 
2.2 Audit Committee Oversight Powers 
2.3 Audit Board 
2.4 Annual External Audit 
2.5 Review of Internal Controls 
2.6 Financial Statements 
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2.7 Earnings Management 
2.8 Accounting Standards 
2.9 Management Discussion and Analysis 
Sample Metrics 
 Is training required for audit committee members? 
 Does the company have a policy for selection of auditors that includes either 
periodic rotation of the outside audit firm or competitive procurement? 
 Does the company measure, value or report one or more intangible assets such as 
intellectual property, long-term service contracts, and brand equity on a regular 
basis? 
 Has the company restated earnings at least twice within the past three years? 
 Has the company taken two or more extraordinary charges representing five per 
cent or more of revenue within the last three years? 
 Is the company under investigation for accounting irregularities? 
 Has the company been forced to restate earnings within the past three years due to 
regulatory action or pressure? 
3.  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Sub-Categories 
3.1 Shareholder Protection 
3.2 Annual Meeting Agenda 
3.3 Ballot Access 
3.4 Votes per Share 
3.5 Confidential Voting 
3.6 Cumulative Voting 
3.7 Dissident Resolutions 
3.8 Right to Convene an EGM 
3.9 Votes Results Disclosure 
Sample Metrics 
 Do all common or ordinary equity shares have one vote per share with no 
restrictions? 
 Is there a securities regulatory body with significant enforcement powers in the 
main jurisdictions in which the company operates or is headquartered? 
 Does the company have confidential voting with no exceptions other than those 
required by law or when shareholders expressly request disclosure of their own 
votes? 
 Do shareholders have the right to convene a special meeting with 10% or less of the 
shares requesting one? 
 Do shareowners have the right to act in concert through written communication? 
 Must shares be deposited or blocked from trading in order to vote? 
 Are voting rights different depending on the duration of ownership? 
 Are voting rights capped at a certain percentage, no matter how many shares the 
investor owns? 
4.  REMUNERATION 
Sub-Categories 
4.1 Remuneration Committee 
4.2 Executive Remuneration Disclosure 
4.3 CEO Incentives 
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4.4 CEO Remuneration Disclosure 
4.5 Board Remuneration 
4.6 Stock Ownership Guidelines 
4.7 Cost of Stock Options 
4.8 Potential Dilution 
Sample Metrics 
 Is the remuneration committee wholly composed of non-executive board members? 
 Was the CEO's last annual bonus cut or capped in response to a decline in earnings 
or a loss? 
 Are there stock ownership guidelines for the CEO and the other members of the 
senior management team? 
 Are a portion of executive stock options granted with exercise prices set 5% or more 
above market value at the time of grant, or does the company require that 
executives already holding a certain amount of company stock pay a premium to 
exercise additional stock options? 
 Does the company take an annual charge against earnings to reflect the expense of 
employee stock option grants? 
 Do restricted stock grants include performance hurdles? 
 What is the potential dilution as a result of stock options and related awards 
outstanding? 
 What is the total potential dilution as a result of stock options and related awards 
outstanding, plus options and other equity-based awards approved for grant but not 
yet granted? 
 Within the last three years, has the company either repriced outstanding executive 
stock options or used a stock option exchange program in which senior 
management was allowed to participate? 
 
5.  MARKET FOR CONTROL 
Sub-Categories 
5.1 Unilateral Defenses 
5.2 Tender Offer and Proxy Contest Defenses 
5.3 Ownership Structure 
5.4 Right to Elect Board Members 
Sample Metrics 
 Does the company have a fair price provision in place or is it subject to fair price 
protection under applicable law? 
 Can directors be removed without cause? 
 Has the company's poison pill been ratified by a shareholder vote? 
 Does the poison pill include a provision allowing it to be redeemed by a vote of the 
majority of shareholders other than the potential acquirer ("chewable" pill)? 
 Does the poison pill have a "dead-hand" provision? 
 What is the per cent of shares owned outright by officers and directors? 
 Is the company involved in a series of cross-shareholdings with related companies? 
 Is there a single shareholder or shareholder group that controls a majority of the 
voting power of the company? 
 Does the company have a shareholder holding "golden" shares? 
6.  CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
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Sub-Categories 
6.1 Employee Relations 
6.2 Sourcing Policies 
6.3 Environmental Risk Management 
6.4 Overall Reputation 
Sample Metrics 
 Does the company comply with an established workplace code such as the ILO 
Fundamental Conventions or SA 8000? 
 Does the company disclose its workplace safety record in the annual report or in 
another form accessible to shareholders? 
 Does the company subscribe to an established code for sourcing its contractors? 
 Does the company have in place a program to monitor its contractors? 
 Does the company disclose its environmental performance in its annual report, on 
its website, or in a special environmental report? 
 Does the company follow the Global Reporting Initiative to disclose its 
environmental performance? 
 Does the company employ ISO 14001 as its environmental management system? 
 Does the company report to shareholders on its exposure to and management of 
climate change risks? 
 Has the company been subject to a regulatory investigation for a material issue 
other than for accounting irregularities? 
 Does the company have pending criminal litigation against it, has it been found 
guilty within the last 3 years, or has it pled the equivalent of no contest in such 
litigation in the past three years? 
 
Source: Governance Metrics International (2007). Example available at: 
http://www.gmiratings.com/(vspl5c2ltzrxby45iljihlzi)/Images/HighRatedCompany3.pdf  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 245 
 
 
245 
Appendix 2-3 – Abbreviated CLSA questionnaire 
Discipline (15%)3 
1. Has the company issued a "mission statement" that explicitly places a priority on good 
corporate governance 
<…>4? 
2. Is senior management incentivised to work towards a higher share price for the 
company eg, <…> expected 
remuneration for the top executive(s) is tied to the value of the shares? 
3. Does management stick to clearly defined core businesses? (Any diversification into 
an unrelated area in last 3 
years would count as "No".) 
4. <…> Is management's view of its cost of equity within 10% of a CAPM derived 
estimate? 
5. <…> Is management's estimate of its cost of capital within 10% of our estimate based 
on its capital structure? 
6. Over the past 5 years, is it true that the Company has not issued equity, or warrants 
for new equity, for 
acquisitions and/or financing new projects where there was any controversy over 
whether the acquisition/project was financially sound? <…> 
7. Does senior management use debt for investments/capex only where ROA (or 
average ROI) is clearly higher 
than cost of debt and where interest cover is no less than 2.5x? <…> 
8. Over the past 5 years, is it true that the company has not built up cash levels <…> ? 
9. Does the company's Annual Report include a section devoted to the company's 
performance in implementing 
corporate governance principles? 
 
Transparency (15%) 
10. Has management disclosed three- or five-year ROA or ROE targets? <…> 
11. Does the company publish its Annual Report within four months of the end of the 
financial year? 
12. Does the company publish/announce semiannual reports within two months of the 
end of the half-year? 
13. Does the company publish/announce quarterly reports within two months of the 
end of the quarter? 
                                                          
3 Percentages reflect the weight in the CLSA weighted average index. 
4  We kept the wording of the questions exactly as specified in the CLSA report, however 
to save the space and without loss of contents we cut out portions of the questions, 
these cuts are marked with <…> . For example we removed all clarifications as to how 
the analysts should answer the questions and endings such as “as far as the analyst can 
tell”. 
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14. Has the public announcement of results been no longer than two working days of 
the Board meeting? <…> 
15. Are the reports clear and informative? (Based on perception of analyst.) <…> 
16. Are accounts presented according to IGAAP? <…> 
17. Does the company consistently disclose major and market sensitive information 
punctually? <…> 
18. Do analysts have good access to senior management? Good access implies 
accessibility soon after results are 
announced and timely meetings where analysts are given all relevant information and 
are not misled. 
19. Does the Company have an English language web-site where results and other 
announcements are updated 
promptly (no later than one business day)? 
 
Independence (15%) 
20. Is it true that there has been no controversy or questions raised over whether the 
board and senior management 
have made decisions in the past five years that benefit them, at the expense of 
shareholders? (Any loans to group 
companies/Vs, non-core/non-controlled group-investments, would mean "No"). 
21. Is the Chairman an independent, non-executive director? 
22. Does the company have an executive or management committee <…> which is 
substantially different from 
members of the Board and not believed to be dominated by major shareholders? (ie, no 
more than half are also Board members and major shareholder not perceived as 
dominating executive decision making.) 
23. Does the company have an audit committee? Is it chaired by a perceived genuine 
independent director? 
24. Does the company have a remuneration committee? Is it chaired by a perceived 
genuine independent director? 
25. Does the company have a nominating committee? Is it chaired by a perceived 
genuine independent director? 
26. Are the external auditors of the company in other respects seen to be completely 
unrelated to the company? 
27. Does the board include no direct representatives of banks and other large creditors 
of the company? (Having 
any representatives is a negative.) 
 
Accountability (15%) 
28. Are the board members and members of the executive/management committee 
substantially different <…>? (ie, no more than half of one committee sits on the other?) 
29. Does the company have non-executive directors who are demonstrably and 
unquestionably independent? 
(Independence of directors must be demonstrated by either being appointed through 
nomination of non-major 
shareholders or having on record voted on certain issues against the rest of the Board. 
<…>) 
30. Do independent, non-executive directors account for more than 50% of the Board? 
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31. Are there any foreign nationals on the Board <…> ? 
32. Are full Board meetings held at least once a quarter? 
33. Are Board members well briefed before Board meetings? <…>(Answers 33-35 must 
be based on direct contact 
with an independent Board member. If no access is provided <…> answer "No" to each 
question.) 
34. Does the audit committee nominate and conduct a proper review the work of 
external auditors <…>? 
35. Does the audit committee supervise internal audit and accounting procedures <…> ? 
 
Responsibility (15%) 
36. If the Board/senior management have made decisions in recent years seen to 
benefit them at the expense of 
shareholders (cf Q20 above), has the Company been seen as acting effectively against 
individuals responsible and 
corrected such behavior promptly, ie, within 6 months? (If no such case, answer this 
question as "Yes".) 
37. <…> Over the past five years, if there were flagrant business failures or 
misdemeanors, were the persons 
responsible appropriately and voluntarily punished? (If no cases <…> then answer "No.") 
38. Is there any controversy or questions over whether the Board and/or senior 
management take measures to 
safeguard the interests of all and not just the dominant shareholders? <…> 
39. Are there mechanisms to allow punishment of the executive/management 
committee in the event of 
mismanagement <…> ? 
40. Is it true that there have been no controversies/ questions over whether the share 
trading by Board members 
have been fair, fully transparent and well intentioned? <…> 
41. <…> Is the board small enough to be efficient and effective? (If more than 12, answer 
"No".) 
 
Fairness (15%) 
42. Is it true that there have not been any controversy or questions raised over any 
decisions by senior management 
in the past 5 years where majority shareholders are believed to have gained at the 
expense of minority shareholders? 
43. Do all equity holders have the right to call General Meetings? <…> 
44. Are voting methods easily accessible (eg proxy voting)? 
45. Are all necessary <…> information for General Meetings made available prior to 
General Meeting? 
46. Is senior management unquestionably seen as trying to ensure fair value is reflected 
in the market price of the 
stock <…> ? 
47. Is it true that there has been no questions or perceived controversy over whether 
the Company has 
issued depositary receipts that benefited primarily major shareholders <…> ? 
48. Does the majority shareholder group own less than 40% of the company? 
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49. Do foreign portfolio managers, and/or domestic portfolio investors who have a track 
record in engaging management on CG issues, own at least 20% of the total shares with 
voting rights? 
50. Does the head of Investor Relations report to either the CEO or a Board member? 
51. <…> Over the past five years, is it true that total directors remuneration has not 
increased faster than net profit 
after exceptionals ? <…> 
 
Social awareness (10%) 
52. Does the company have an explicit (clearly worded) public policy statements that 
emphasize strict ethical 
behavior: ie, one that looks at the spirit and not just the letter of the law? 
53. Does the company have a policy/culture that prohibits the employment of the 
under-aged <…> ? 
54. Does the company have an explicit equal employment policy <…> ? 
55. Does the Company adhere to specified industry guidelines on sourcing of materials 
<…> ? 
56. Is the company explicitly environmentally conscious? <…> 
57. Is it true that the company has no investments operations in Myanmar? 
 
Source: Klapper and Love (2002) 
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Appendices related to chapt. 4    
Appendix 4-1 – Governance Provisions used by Gompers et al. 
Governance Provisions 
I. Delay 
1. Blank check 
2. Classified board 
3. Special meeting 
4. Written consent 
II. Protection 
5. Compensation 
6. Contracts 
7. Golden parachutes 
8. Indemnification 
9. Liability 
10. Severance 
III. Voting 
11. Bylaws 
12. Charter 
13. Cumulative voting 
14. Secret ballot 
15. Supermajority 
16. Unequal voting 
IV. Other 
17. Antigreenmail 
18. Directors’ duties 
19. Fair price 
20. Pension parachutes 
21. Poison pill 
22. Silver parachutes 
V. State 
23. Antigreenmail law 
24. Business combination law 
25. Cash-out law 
26. Directors’ duties law 
27. Fair price law 
28. Control share acquisition law 
Source: Gompers et al. (2003). 
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Appendix 4-2 – Classification of Corporate Governance Criteria (Chidamabaran) 
Governance Measure Ex-ante “Good” Governance Changes 
 
Board Monitoring: 
 
 
Bsize  
Decrease 
Boutsiders  Increase 
Bmeeting  Increase 
 
 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity: 
 
 
Bonus  
Increase 
Options  Increase 
Ppswealth  Increase 
Newoptions  Increase 
Shares  Increase 
 
Shareholder Rights: 
 
 
G-Index  
Decrease 
E-Index  Decrease 
 
Other Governance Measures: 
 
 
Instshares  
Increase 
Insiders Increase when Insiders < 5% 
Decrease when 5% < Insiders < 25% 
Unknown for Insiders > 25% 
Turnover  High 
Source Chidamabaran et al. (2008) 
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Appendix 4-3 – A sample of ISS database printout 
 
Copyright 2010 Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., 
All Rights Reserved  
ISS Corporate Governance Quotient Profiles 
 
REPORT DATE: June 24, 2010 
 
xxxxx Bank  
 
 
xxxxxx 
 
* * * * * * * * * * COMPANY IDENTIFIERS * * * * * * * * * * 
TICKER: xx  
PRIMARY CUSIP: xxxxxxxx  
ISIN: xxxxxxxxxxx 
SEDOL: xxxxxx 
WKN: xxxxxxxxx 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT  
Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
Is shareholder quorum for 
shareholders' meetings at least 2 
persons representing at least 
25% of the outstanding shares? 
Shareholder quorum 
is less than 2 
persons and/or 
representing less 
25% of the shares 
-1 .2 Quorum for shareholder 
meetings is less than 2 
persons representing at 
least 25% of the shares 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
         
Do NEDs receive compensation 
other than board/committee 
attendance fees? 
No 0 .5 Non-employee directors 
do not receive cash 
compensation other 
than board/committee 
attendance fees 
         
Does the company provide loans 
to directors? 
Yes -2.5 .5 The company provides 
loans to directors 
         
What part of the total 
remuneration received by 
directors is options based? 
Enter percentage if 
known 
0 .22 0% of the total 
remuneration received 
by non-employee 
directors is options 
based 
         
Do directors participate to equity 
based plans? 
No 3.9 .78 Non-employee directors 
do not participate in 
equity based plans 
         
What is the independent director 
composition of the board? 
Percentage 1.5 .4 87.5% of the board is 
independent 
         
Does the company disclose the 
performance measures, hurdle 
rates, and target payout 
thresholds for the short-term cash 
incentive plan that generated the 
awards reported? 
The company 
discloses complete 
information on the 
short-term 
performance-based 
program 
1.67 .3333 The company discloses 
complete performance 
measure information for 
the short-term cash 
incentive plan 
         
What percentage of the annual 
bonus for CEO is or can be 
deferred? 
No deferral or no 
information 
-.33 .1667 There is no deferral or 
the company has not 
readily disclosed 
whether any portion of 
 253 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
the CEO's annual 
bonus is or can be 
deferred 
         
What percentage of the annual 
bonus for Executives is or can be 
deferred? 
No deferral or no 
information 
-.33 .1667 The company has not 
readily disclosed 
whether any portion of 
the NEOs' annual 
bonuses are or can be 
deferred 
         
Is part of the bonus granted or to 
be granted guaranteed? 
No 0 .3333 No portion of the 
Named Executive 
Officers' cash 
compensation 
components are 
guaranteed 
         
Does the company disclose a 
performance measure for stock 
options plans (for executives)? 
The company 
discloses or it is clear 
from the disclosure 
of the company that 
there are no 
performance 
conditions 
0 .6 There are no 
performance measures 
attached to treasury-
based executive stock 
options 
         
Does the company disclose a 
performance measure for 
restricted share plans (for 
executives)? 
Executives receive 
restricted shares 
based on a target 
which is disclosed 
2 .4 Executive treasury-
based restricted shares 
are based on a target 
which is disclosed 
         
What are the minimum vesting 
periods mandated in the plan 
documents for executives' stock 
options or SARS in the equity 
plans adopted/amended in the 
Number in months .4 .2 The vesting period for 
treasury-based 
executives' stock 
options is 48 months 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
last 3 years? 
         
What are the minimum vesting 
periods mandated in the plan 
documents, adopted/amended in 
the last three years, for 
executives' restricted stock? 
Number in months .2 .2 The vesting period for 
executives' treasury-
based restricted stock 
awards is 36 months 
         
What are the vesting periods 
mandated in the plan documents, 
adopted/amended in the last 
three years, for executives' other 
long-term plan? 
Number in months 1 .2 The vesting period for 
executives' other 
treasury-based long-
term equity awards is 
36 month(s) 
         
What is the holding period for 
stock options (for executives)? 
No information -1 .2 The company has not 
readily disclosed any 
holding period for 
executives' treasury-
based stock options 
         
Has the company backdated 
options within the past two 
years? 
No 0 .3 The company has not 
backdated treasury-
based options within 
the past 2 years 
         
Does one or more of the 
company's equity plans approved 
or amended in the past three 
years permit option/ SAR 
repricing and cash buyouts? 
The company's 
equity plans prohibit 
repricing, but are 
silent on cash 
buyouts 
1.05 .35 The company's 
treasury-based equity 
plans prohibit repricing, 
but are silent on cash 
buyouts 
         
Has the company repriced 
options or exchanged them for 
shares, options or cash without 
shareholder approval in the last 
No 1.75 .35 The company has not 
repriced treasury-based 
options or exchanged 
them for shares, 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
three years? options or cash without 
shareholder approval in 
the last 3 years 
         
Is the CEO subject to stock 
ownership guidelines? 
Robust 1 .3333 The company's CEO 
stock ownership 
guidelines are greater 
than five times salary 
         
Are directors subject to stock 
ownership guidelines? 
Standard 1 .3333 The company's director 
stock ownership 
guidelines are between 
three and five times 
retainer 
         
Do all directors with more than 
one year of service own stock? 
No -1.67 .3333 One or more directors 
with more than one 
year of service do not 
own stock or deferred 
share units 
         
What's the trigger under the 
change-in-control agreements? 
Company has double 
trigger agreements 
5 1 The CEO's change-in-
control agreement is a 
double trigger 
         
What is the qualification of the 
Chairman of the Board? 
The Chairman is an 
independent director 
2 .4 The chairman is an 
independent director 
         
Do equity based plans or long 
term cash plans vest completely 
on change in control? 
Equity based plans 
or long term cash 
plans do not vest 
completely upon a 
change in control 
unless there is a loss 
0 0 Equity based (from 
treasury) or long term 
cash plans do not vest 
completely upon a 
change in control 
unless there is a loss of 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
of employment employment 
         
Does the company provide loans 
to executives? 
Yes -.5 .1 The company has 
provided loans to 
executives 
         
Did the company disclose a claw 
back provision? 
Yes .15 .05 A claw back provision 
was disclosed 
         
Are any of the NEOs eligible for 
multi-year guaranteed bonuses? 
None 0 .05 None of the named 
executive officers are 
eligible for multi-year 
guaranteed cash 
compensation 
         
Are the roles of Chairman and 
CEO separated? 
Yes 0 .2 The roles of chairman 
and CEO have been 
separated 
         
What is the multiple of salary plus 
bonus in the change-in-control 
agreements for named executive 
officers excluding the CEO? 
Acceptable 0 .2 The multiple of salary 
plus bonus in the 
change-in-control 
agreements for named 
executive officers 
excluding the CEO is 
acceptable 
         
What is the multiple of salary plus 
bonus in the severance 
agreements for the CEO upon a 
change-in-control? 
Acceptable 0 .2 The multiple of salary 
plus bonus in the 
change-in-control 
agreements for the 
CEO is acceptable 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
Are executives given credit 
toward pension for years not 
worked? 
No 0 .175 No executives are 
being granted 
additional service 
credits toward their 
pension for years not 
worked or the company 
does not have a 
pension plan 
         
Has the company voluntarily 
adopted a management 'say on 
pay' advisory vote resolution for 
the most recent annual meeting 
or committed to a resolution 
going forward? 
Yes, voluntarily 
adopted 
1.12 .225 The company has 
adopted a management 
'say on pay' advisory 
vote resolution 
         
What is the independent status of 
the nominating committee 
members? 
Percentage 5 1 100% of the nominating 
committee is 
independent 
         
Non-Audit fees represent what 
percentage of total fees? 
Percentage 0 1 Non-audit fees 
represent 0% of total 
fees 
         
What is the independent status of 
the compensation committee 
members? 
Percentage 5 1 100% of the 
compensation 
committee is 
independent 
         
Did the auditor issue an adverse 
opinion in the past year? 
Unqualified 0 .3846 The auditor issued an 
unqualified opinion in 
the past year 
         
What is the independent status of Percentage 5 1 100% of the audit 
committee is 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
the audit committee members? independent 
         
Has the company restated 
financials for any period within 
the past two years? 
No 0 .2308 The company has not 
restated financials 
within the past 2 years 
         
Does the company disclose a 
policy requiring an annual 
performance evaluation of the 
board? 
The company 
discloses an annual 
and individual 
performance 
evaluation 
.4 .08 The board and 
individual directors are 
subject to an annual 
performance evaluation 
         
Did any directors attend less than 
75% of the board meetings 
without a valid excuse? 
No .75 .15 No directors attended 
less than 75% of the 
board meetings without 
a valid excuse 
         
Did outside directors meet 
without management present? 
Yes .35 .07 Outside directors met 
without management 
present 
         
Can directors hire own advisors 
without management approval? 
Yes .35 .07 Directors can hire their 
own advisors without 
management approval 
         
How many directors received 
withhold/ against votes of 50% or 
greater at the last annual 
meeting? 
Number 0 .09 0 director(s) received 
withhold votes of 50% 
or greater at the last 
annual meeting 
         
Has the company made late 
financial disclosure filings in the 
past two years? 
No 0 .1538 The company has not 
made late financial 
disclosure filings in the 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
past 2 years 
         
What per cent of the directors 
were involved in material RPTs? 
Percentage .45 .09 0% of the directors 
were involved in 
material related party 
transactions 
         
Do the directors with RPTs sit on 
key board committees? 
Not applicable .25 .05 No directors were 
involved in material 
related party 
transactions 
         
Does the company have a 
majority vote standard in 
uncontested elections? 
The company has a 
plurality vote 
standard with a 
director resignation 
policy 
.6 .2 The company has a 
plurality vote standard 
with a director 
resignation policy 
         
Did the company have a slate 
ballot at its last shareholders' 
meeting? 
Company has 
individual director 
elections 
1 .2 Directors are elected on 
an individual basis 
         
Does the company have classes 
of stock with different voting 
rights? 
No 0 .6 The company has a 
single class share 
capital structure 
         
Are there any directors on the 
board who are not up for election 
by all classes of common 
shareholders 
No 0 .1 All common 
shareholders are 
entitled to vote on all 
directors standing for 
election 
         
Is there a sunset provision on the No unequal voting 0 .1 The company has a 
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Question Answer Points Weight Factor 
company's unequal voting 
structure? 
structure single class share 
capital structure 
         
Has a securities regulator taken 
enforcement action against the 
company in the past two years? 
Yes -1.15 .2308 A securities regulator 
has taken enforcement 
action against the 
company in the past 2 
years 
         
What percentage of the 
company's share capital is made 
up of non-voting shares? 
Percentage 1 .2 0% of the company's 
issued and outstanding 
common share capital 
is comprised of non-
voting shares 
         
Are all directors elected 
annually? 
Yes 2.5 .5 All directors are elected 
annually 
         
Is the board authorized to issue 
blank check preferred stock? 
No 2.5 .5 The board is not 
authorized to issue 
blank cheque preferred 
stock 
         
Has the company disclosed any 
material weaknesses in its 
internal controls in the past two 
years? 
No 0 1 The company has not 
disclosed any material 
weakness in its internal 
controls in the past 2 
years 
         
Has the board failed to implement 
a shareholder resolution 
supported by a majority vote 
No/ No majority 
supported 
shareholder 
proposals 
0 .6 The board has not 
ignored any majority 
supported shareholder 
proposals 
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Audit Score 85 
Audit Concern MEDIUM 
Board Structure Score 96.1716 
Board Structure Concern LOW 
Shareholder Score 91.6667 
Shareholder Concern LOW 
Compensation Score 78.5926 
Compensation Concern LOW 
 
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Company Profile 
 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
 
COMPANY: xxxxxx BANK (91%) 
 
LOAD-DATE: June 24, 2010 
  
  
 
262 
Appendix 4-4 – A sample of ISS printout 
FOCUS - 1 of 113 DOCUMENTS 
Copyright 2010 Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., 
All Rights Reserved.  
ISS Corporate Governance Quotient Profiles 
REPORT DATE: April 1, 2010 
Centerstate Banks, Inc. 
* * * * * * * * * * COMPANY IDENTIFIERS * * * * * * * * * * 
TICKER: CSFL  
PRIMARY CUSIP: 15201P109 
* * * * * * * * * * DESCRIPTION * * * * * * * * * * 
INDUSTRY: Banks 
* * * * * * * * * * SECURITIES INFORMATION * * * * * * * * * * 
STOCK INDEX: Russell 3000 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT 
 Index Score Industry 
Score 
Corporate Governance 
Quotient 
35.9 50.6 
Board Subscore 2 3 
Compensation Subscore 3 3 
Takeover Subscore 3 3 
Audit Subscore 2 3 
 
LOAD-DATE: April 1, 2010 
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Appendix 4-5 – Cross section regression with Approximate Q 
regress lnaq_2009 lncgq_in lnta_2009 lnAge dce Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 
Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     223 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   214) =    2.42 
       Model |  4.79354052     8  .599192565           Prob > F      =  0.0160 
    Residual |  52.9548503   214  .247452571           R-squared     =  0.0830 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0487 
       Total |  57.7483908   222  .260127886           Root MSE      =  .49745 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lnaq_2009 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0137496   .0426225     0.32   0.747    -.0702641    .0977633 
   lnta_2009 |  -.0141052   .0378491    -0.37   0.710      -.08871    .0604995 
       lnAge |   .2137021   .0891175     2.40   0.017     .0380415    .3893627 
         dce |  -.0679559   .1105521    -0.61   0.539    -.2858663    .1499545 
      Dsp500 |  -.5252669    .232273    -2.26   0.025    -.9831029    -.067431 
Drussell3000 |  -.1328135   .0863786    -1.54   0.126    -.3030752    .0374483 
      Dsp400 |  -.1099791   .1543637    -0.71   0.477    -.4142472    .1942889 
      Dsp600 |  -.0554383   .1306926    -0.42   0.672     -.313048    .2021714 
       _cons |   1.322929   .3134746     4.22   0.000     .7050361    1.940822 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnaq_2009 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.51 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2191 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      38.08     32    0.2121 
            Skewness |       9.96      8    0.2681 
            Kurtosis |       1.09      1    0.2955 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      49.13     41    0.1794 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnaq_2009 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 211) =      0.88 
                  Prob > F =      0.4516 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   lnta_2009 |      3.01    0.332448 
      Dsp500 |      2.28    0.438602 
      Dsp400 |      1.83    0.545928 
      Dsp600 |      1.42    0.702323 
Drussell3000 |      1.36    0.733710 
    lncgq_in |      1.25    0.802844 
       lnAge |      1.13    0.882707 
         dce |      1.06    0.945364 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.67 
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Appendix 4-6 – Cross section regression with averaged values 
regress lnAvAQ5 lncgq_in lnAvTA5 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     217 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   209) =    1.84 
       Model |  3.05151345     7  .435930493           Prob > F      =  0.0813 
    Residual |  49.5268193   209  .236970427           R-squared     =  0.0580 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0265 
       Total |  52.5783327   216  .243418207           Root MSE      =   .4868 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lnAvAQ5 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0222997   .0434542     0.51   0.608    -.0633651    .1079644 
     lnAvTA5 |  -.0162721   .0377125    -0.43   0.667    -.0906177    .0580735 
       lnAge |   .2360113   .0942571     2.50   0.013     .0501947    .4218278 
      Dsp500 |  -.3692555   .2456378    -1.50   0.134    -.8535009    .1149898 
Drussell3000 |  -.0332811   .0849321    -0.39   0.696    -.2007146    .1341523 
      Dsp400 |   .0267635   .1524876     0.18   0.861    -.2738474    .3273743 
      Dsp600 |   .1323121     .12793     1.03   0.302    -.1198865    .3845106 
       _cons |   1.176205   .3252532     3.62   0.000      .535008    1.817403 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnAvAQ5 
 
         chi2(1)      =    15.05 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0001 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      40.91     25    0.0235 
            Skewness |      10.20      7    0.1775 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3100 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      52.14     33    0.0183 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnAvAQ5 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 206) =      0.78 
                  Prob > F =      0.5083 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     lnAvTA5 |      2.88    0.346907 
      Dsp500 |      2.20    0.455258 
      Dsp400 |      1.78    0.561292 
      Dsp600 |      1.42    0.704174 
Drussell3000 |      1.35    0.741799 
    lncgq_in |      1.23    0.812789 
       lnAge |      1.14    0.877326 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.71 
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Appendix 4-6 (continued) 
Regress lnAvAQ5 lncgq_in lnAvTA5 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600, 
vce(robust)                                            Number of obs =     217 
                                                       F(  7,   209) =    9.08 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0580 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4868 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     lnAvAQ5 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0222997    .046422     0.48   0.631    -.0692158    .1138151 
     lnAvTA5 |  -.0162721   .0702011    -0.23   0.817    -.1546652     .122121 
       lnAge |   .2360113   .0919168     2.57   0.011     .0548084    .4172141 
      Dsp500 |  -.3692555   .3106082    -1.19   0.236    -.9815822    .2430711 
Drussell3000 |  -.0332811   .0709685    -0.47   0.640     -.173187    .1066248 
      Dsp400 |   .0267635   .1638043     0.16   0.870     -.296157     .349684 
      Dsp600 |   .1323121   .1116181     1.19   0.237    -.0877296    .3523537 
       _cons |   1.176205   .5528411     2.13   0.035     .0863459    2.266065 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress  lnAvAQ5 lncgq_in lnAvTA5 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600, 
vce(hc2)                                               Number of obs =     217 
                                                       F(  7,   209) =    8.61 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0580 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4868 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Robust HC2 
     lnAvAQ5 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0222997   .0466379     0.48   0.633    -.0696413    .1142406 
     lnAvTA5 |  -.0162721   .0717997    -0.23   0.821    -.1578165    .1252723 
       lnAge |   .2360113   .0924759     2.55   0.011     .0537061    .4183164 
      Dsp500 |  -.3692555   .3203471    -1.15   0.250    -1.000781    .2622701 
Drussell3000 |  -.0332811   .0727703    -0.46   0.648     -.176739    .1101767 
      Dsp400 |   .0267635   .1693365     0.16   0.875    -.3070631      .36059 
      Dsp600 |   .1323121   .1151301     1.15   0.252    -.0946531    .3592772 
       _cons |   1.176205   .5618091     2.09   0.038     .0686665    2.283744 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress  lnAvAQ5 lncgq_in lnAvTA5 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600, 
vce(hc3)                                               Number of obs =     217 
                                                       F(  7,   209) =    7.86 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0580 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4868 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Robust HC3 
     lnAvAQ5 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0222997   .0477501     0.47   0.641    -.0718338    .1164332 
     lnAvTA5 |  -.0162721   .0749947    -0.22   0.828    -.1641151    .1315709 
       lnAge |   .2360113   .0948198     2.49   0.014     .0490855     .422937 
      Dsp500 |  -.3692555   .3375433    -1.09   0.275    -1.034681    .2961704 
Drussell3000 |  -.0332811    .076283    -0.44   0.663    -.1836639    .1171016 
      Dsp400 |   .0267635   .1788193     0.15   0.881    -.3257572    .3792841 
      Dsp600 |   .1323121   .1213235     1.09   0.277    -.1068627    .3714868 
       _cons |   1.176205   .5826867     2.02   0.045     .0275089    2.324902 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 4-6 (continued) 
regress  lnAvAQ3 lncgq_in lnAvTA3 lnAge Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 Dsp500 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     234 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   226) =    2.97 
       Model |  5.24765011     7  .749664302           Prob > F      =  0.0054 
    Residual |  57.1257448   226  .252768782           R-squared     =  0.0841 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0558 
       Total |  62.3733949   233  .267696974           Root MSE      =  .50276 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lnAvAQ3 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0630627   .0419312     1.50   0.134    -.0195634    .1456888 
     lnAvTA3 |  -.0670688   .0361018    -1.86   0.065     -.138208    .0040705 
       lnAge |   .3016167    .093982     3.21   0.002     .1164236    .4868097 
Drussell3000 |   .0744372   .0842416     0.88   0.378    -.0915622    .2404366 
      Dsp400 |   .2463049   .1511086     1.63   0.104     -.051457    .5440669 
      Dsp600 |   .2899561    .128223     2.26   0.025     .0372906    .5426216 
      Dsp500 |  -.0378195   .2415797    -0.16   0.876    -.5138563    .4382173 
       _cons |   1.168673    .311468     3.75   0.000     .5549204    1.782426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnAvAQ3 
 
         chi2(1)      =     4.63 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0314 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      40.60     25    0.0253 
            Skewness |      10.01      7    0.1881 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3113 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      51.63     33    0.0205 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnAvAQ3 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 223) =      0.89 
                  Prob > F =      0.4481 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     lnAvTA3 |      2.64    0.378910 
      Dsp500 |      2.00    0.500488 
      Dsp400 |      1.65    0.605225 
      Dsp600 |      1.35    0.741305 
Drussell3000 |      1.29    0.773659 
    lncgq_in |      1.22    0.816974 
       lnAge |      1.14    0.877623 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.61 
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Appendix 4-6 (continued) 
regress  lnAvAQ2 lncgq_in lnAvTA2 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     223 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   215) =    2.47 
       Model |  3.88347375     7  .554781965           Prob > F      =  0.0188 
    Residual |  48.3840535   215  .225042109           R-squared     =  0.0743 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0442 
       Total |  52.2675272   222  .235439312           Root MSE      =  .47439 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lnAvAQ2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0138651   .0406776     0.34   0.734    -.0663128    .0940431 
     lnAvTA2 |   -.006314   .0357299    -0.18   0.860    -.0767398    .0641118 
       lnAge |    .191937   .0851061     2.26   0.025     .0241879    .3596862 
      Dsp500 |  -.4985359   .2206165    -2.26   0.025     -.933384   -.0636878 
Drussell3000 |  -.0907855   .0817389    -1.11   0.268    -.2518977    .0703267 
      Dsp400 |  -.1001416   .1456247    -0.69   0.492    -.3871765    .1868933 
      Dsp600 |   .0225364   .1239211     0.18   0.856    -.2217193    .2667922 
       _cons |   1.243409   .2935077     4.24   0.000     .6648882     1.82193 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnAvAQ2 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.57 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4513 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      36.57     25    0.0634 
            Skewness |       9.39      7    0.2256 
            Kurtosis |       1.05      1    0.3046 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      47.02     33    0.0539 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnAvAQ2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 212) =      0.93 
                  Prob > F =      0.4284 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     lnAvTA2 |      2.95    0.338776 
      Dsp500 |      2.26    0.442145 
      Dsp400 |      1.79    0.557863 
      Dsp600 |      1.41    0.710429 
Drussell3000 |      1.34    0.745162 
    lncgq_in |      1.25    0.801624 
       lnAge |      1.14    0.880224 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.73 
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Appendix 4-7 – Cross section regression with Approximate Q (2007-08) 
regress lnaq_2008 lncgq_in lnta_2008 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     236 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   228) =    2.23 
       Model |  3.29304313     7  .470434733           Prob > F      =  0.0329 
    Residual |  48.1217304   228  .211060221           R-squared     =  0.0640 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0353 
       Total |  51.4147735   235   .21878627           Root MSE      =  .45941 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lnaq_2008 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0130766   .0386394     0.34   0.735    -.0630593    .0892125 
   lnta_2008 |  -.0115074   .0319884    -0.36   0.719    -.0745381    .0515234 
       lnAge |   .1677072   .0806707     2.08   0.039     .0087519    .3266625 
      Dsp500 |  -.3879409    .204506    -1.90   0.059    -.7909042    .0150224 
Drussell3000 |  -.0162167   .0762406    -0.21   0.832     -.166443    .1340096 
      Dsp400 |  -.0293828   .1353249    -0.22   0.828    -.2960301    .2372644 
      Dsp600 |   .1400042   .1169633     1.20   0.233     -.090463    .3704714 
       _cons |   1.243072   .2740938     4.54   0.000     .7029912    1.783153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnaq_2008 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.89 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0894 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      35.88     25    0.0734 
            Skewness |       8.90      7    0.2599 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3108 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      45.81     33    0.0683 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnaq_2008 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 225) =      1.87 
                  Prob > F =      0.1351 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   lnta_2008 |      2.68    0.372602 
      Dsp500 |      2.08    0.481206 
      Dsp400 |      1.66    0.602428 
      Dsp600 |      1.35    0.743210 
Drussell3000 |      1.28    0.778461 
    lncgq_in |      1.22    0.817792 
       lnAge |      1.14    0.876477 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.63 
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Appendix 4-7 (continued) 
 
regress lnaq_2007 lncgq_in   lnta_2007 lnAge Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     241 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   233) =    2.58 
       Model |  4.81610254     7  .688014648           Prob > F      =  0.0142 
    Residual |  62.2534424   233  .267182156           R-squared     =  0.0718 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0439 
       Total |   67.069545   240  .279456437           Root MSE      =   .5169 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lnaq_2007 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lncgq_in |   .0558072   .0416596     1.34   0.182    -.0262704    .1378849 
   lnta_2007 |  -.0624999   .0367107    -1.70   0.090    -.1348272    .0098275 
       lnAge |   .2878884   .0899999     3.20   0.002     .1105708     .465206 
      Dsp500 |  -.1033163   .2292319    -0.45   0.653    -.5549484    .3483157 
Drussell3000 |   .0208303   .0855866     0.24   0.808    -.1477922    .1894528 
      Dsp400 |   .1476288   .1523309     0.97   0.333    -.1524932    .4477508 
      Dsp600 |   .2031088   .1310457     1.55   0.123    -.0550772    .4612948 
       _cons |   1.194659   .2965409     4.03   0.000     .6104144    1.778903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnaq_2007 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.46 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4992 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      36.95     25    0.0584 
            Skewness |       9.23      7    0.2366 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3112 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      47.20     33    0.0520 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnaq_2007 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 230) =      0.19 
                  Prob > F =      0.9025 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   lnta_2007 |      2.75    0.363293 
      Dsp500 |      2.06    0.484344 
      Dsp400 |      1.66    0.600629 
      Dsp600 |      1.34    0.747815 
Drussell3000 |      1.29    0.775997 
    lncgq_in |      1.24    0.804838 
       lnAge |      1.15    0.869010 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.64 
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Appendix 4-8 – Cross section regression with Market to Book value  
regress mb_2009 cgq_industry ta_2009 age dce Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     223 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   214) =    0.44 
       Model |   5884.9637     8  735.620463           Prob > F      =  0.8947 
    Residual |  356082.008   214  1663.93462           R-squared     =  0.0163 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0205 
       Total |  361966.972   222  1630.48186           Root MSE      =  40.791 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mb_2009 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cgq_industry |   .0796901   .1050182     0.76   0.449    -.1273125    .2866928 
     ta_2009 |   7.05e-07   .0000177     0.04   0.968    -.0000341    .0000355 
         age |  -.9001953   .6983192    -1.29   0.199     -2.27666    .4762695 
         dce |  -4.284213    9.03653    -0.47   0.636    -22.09622    13.52779 
      Dsp500 |   -7.28458   15.06917    -0.48   0.629    -36.98758    22.41842 
Drussell3000 |  -5.306412   6.717289    -0.79   0.430    -18.54694    7.934112 
      Dsp400 |   -8.15826   10.32775    -0.79   0.430    -28.51541    12.19889 
      Dsp600 |  -6.915032   9.997237    -0.69   0.490     -26.6207    12.79064 
       _cons |    13.0381   10.25014     1.27   0.205    -7.166073    33.24227 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of mb_2009 
 
         chi2(1)      =   408.57 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      10.27     32    0.9999 
            Skewness |       4.89      8    0.7690 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3107 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      16.20     41    0.9998 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of mb_2009 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 211) =      2.60 
                  Prob > F =      0.0530 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      Dsp500 |      1.43    0.700703 
     ta_2009 |      1.29    0.777418 
cgq_industry |      1.26    0.790809 
      Dsp600 |      1.24    0.807092 
Drussell3000 |      1.23    0.815817 
      Dsp400 |      1.22    0.820085 
         age |      1.06    0.942864 
         dce |      1.05    0.951423 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.22 
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Appendix 4-8 (continued) 
regress mb_2008 cgq_industry  ta_2008 age dce  Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     223 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   214) =    0.42 
       Model |  1356.22127     8  169.527659           Prob > F      =  0.9077 
    Residual |  86181.5568   214  402.717555           R-squared     =  0.0155 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0213 
       Total |  87537.7781   222  394.314316           Root MSE      =  20.068 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mb_2008 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cgq_industry |   .0384235   .0516587     0.74   0.458    -.0634015    .1402485 
     ta_2008 |   4.82e-07   9.98e-06     0.05   0.962    -.0000192    .0000202 
         age |  -.4428594   .3437309    -1.29   0.199    -1.120391    .2346724 
         dce |  -2.203601   4.445745    -0.50   0.621    -10.96666    6.559457 
      Dsp500 |  -3.603047   7.506872    -0.48   0.632    -18.39993    11.19383 
Drussell3000 |  -2.389088   3.304693    -0.72   0.471    -8.903006    4.124829 
      Dsp400 |  -3.743674   5.081001    -0.74   0.462    -13.75889    6.271544 
      Dsp600 |  -2.979908   4.918153    -0.61   0.545    -12.67413    6.714318 
       _cons |    6.63008   5.043088     1.31   0.190    -3.310407    16.57057 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of mb_2008 
 
         chi2(1)      =   405.83 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      10.26     32    0.9999 
            Skewness |       4.89      8    0.7690 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3107 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      16.18     41    0.9998 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of mb_2008 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 211) =      2.58 
                  Prob > F =      0.0548 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      Dsp500 |      1.46    0.683375 
     ta_2008 |      1.32    0.755072 
cgq_industry |      1.26    0.791005 
      Dsp600 |      1.24    0.807130 
Drussell3000 |      1.23    0.815798 
      Dsp400 |      1.22    0.820042 
         age |      1.06    0.941855 
         dce |      1.05    0.951376 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.23 
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Appendix 4-8 (continued) 
 
regress mb_2007 cgq_in  ta_2007 age dce  Dsp500 Drussell3000 Dsp400 Dsp600 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     223 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   214) =    0.45 
       Model |  17526.5991     8  2190.82488           Prob > F      =  0.8893 
    Residual |  1040613.41   214  4862.67947           R-squared     =  0.0166 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0202 
       Total |     1058140   222  4766.39642           Root MSE      =  69.733 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mb_2007 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cgq_in |   .1398686   .1794966     0.78   0.437    -.2139391    .4936763 
     ta_2007 |   2.00e-06   .0000439     0.05   0.964    -.0000846    .0000886 
         age |  -1.520786   1.191905    -1.28   0.203    -3.870163    .8285913 
         dce |  -7.562235   15.44363    -0.49   0.625    -38.00335    22.87888 
      Dsp500 |  -12.84086    26.0893    -0.49   0.623    -64.26577    38.58406 
Drussell3000 |  -9.408035   11.47752    -0.82   0.413    -32.03151    13.21544 
      Dsp400 |  -14.35239    17.6601    -0.81   0.417     -49.1624    20.45762 
      Dsp600 |  -12.38189   17.08518    -0.72   0.469    -46.05868    21.29489 
       _cons |   22.13641   17.51473     1.26   0.208    -12.38707     56.6599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of mb_2007 
 
         chi2(1)      =   409.19 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      10.26     32    0.9999 
            Skewness |       4.89      8    0.7688 
            Kurtosis |       1.03      1    0.3107 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      16.18     41    0.9998 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of mb_2007 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 211) =      2.57 
                  Prob > F =      0.0554 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      Dsp500 |      1.46    0.683167 
     ta_2007 |      1.31    0.763278 
      cgq_in |      1.26    0.791094 
      Dsp600 |      1.24    0.807577 
Drussell3000 |      1.22    0.816627 
      Dsp400 |      1.22    0.819641 
         age |      1.06    0.945830 
         dce |      1.05    0.951957 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.23 
 
. 
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Appendix 4-9 – Cross section regression with Market Capitalisation 
regress lnmc_2009 cgq_in d2d_2009  t1r_2009 roe_2009 Drussell3000 Dsp400 
Dsp600  DcgqUniv 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     207 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   198) =   87.26 
       Model |  635.023882     8  79.3779852           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  180.112784   198  .909660525           R-squared     =  0.7790 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7701 
       Total |  815.136665   206   3.9569741           Root MSE      =  .95376 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lnmc_2009 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cgq_in |   .0050851   .0026111     1.95   0.053    -.0000641    .0102343 
    d2d_2009 |   .0332611    .016025     2.08   0.039     .0016596    .0648626 
    t1r_2009 |  -.0127002   .0259294    -0.49   0.625    -.0638334     .038433 
    roe_2009 |   .0154758   .0029043     5.33   0.000     .0097486     .021203 
Drussell3000 |  -3.310125   .3165108   -10.46   0.000     -3.93429   -2.685961 
      Dsp400 |  -1.433237   .3480163    -4.12   0.000    -2.119531   -.7469428 
      Dsp600 |  -2.416836   .3405228    -7.10   0.000    -3.088353   -1.745319 
    DcgqUniv |  -4.660027   .3265186   -14.27   0.000    -5.303927   -4.016126 
       _cons |    7.97616   .5004645    15.94   0.000     6.989235    8.963085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnmc_2009 
 
         chi2(1)      =     4.20 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0404 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      26.86     34    0.8029 
            Skewness |      11.31      8    0.1846 
            Kurtosis |       2.58      1    0.1082 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      40.76     43    0.5690 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnmc_2009 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 195) =      1.52 
                  Prob > F =      0.2094 
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Appendices related to chapt. 5    
Appendix 5-1 Estimation of Fixed effects and the test for serial correlation 
xtreg lnmc  cgq_indu age assets dist2def  tier1  tier1sq y06 y07 y08 y09 
Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600 dcgq, fe 
note: y09 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       745 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       233 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7046                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0114                                        avg =       3.2 
       overall = 0.0010                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(13,499)          =     91.57 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9875                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    cgq_indu |   .0005422   .0015998     0.34   0.735     -.002601    .0036854 
         age |  -.2709236   .0159533   -16.98   0.000    -.3022676   -.2395797 
      assets |   1.79e-06   4.16e-07     4.31   0.000     9.73e-07    2.61e-06 
    dist2def |   .0066867   .0025997     2.57   0.010     .0015791    .0117944 
       tier1 |   .2963409   .0253011    11.71   0.000     .2466311    .3460507 
     tier1sq |  -.0079123   .0009169    -8.63   0.000    -.0097138   -.0061108 
         y06 |   .4155784   .0501861     8.28   0.000     .3169763    .5141806 
         y07 |   .5088299   .0480868    10.58   0.000     .4143523    .6033076 
         y08 |   .1826051   .0483618     3.78   0.000     .0875872     .277623 
         y09 |  (omitted) 
      Dsp400 |   .3814083   .1841813     2.07   0.039     .0195418    .7432747 
      Dsp500 |   .7899305   .3775095     2.09   0.037     .0482266    1.531635 
      Dsp600 |   .6148249   .1249044     4.92   0.000     .3694216    .8602282 
       Dcgq  |  -.6175615   .0771809    -8.00   0.000     -.769201    -.465922 
       _cons |   20.82597   1.086285    19.17   0.000     18.69171    22.96023 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13.382442 
     sigma_e |   .4339534 
         rho |  .99894959   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(232, 499) =    25.38            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xtserial lnmc  cgq_indu age assets dist2def  tier1  tier1sq y06 y07 y08 y09 Dsp400 
Dsp500 Dsp600 dcgq 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     136) =     43.944 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Appendix 5-2 - Instrumental variables 
  
ivreg2 lnmc  age assets dist2def   tier1 tier1sq y06 y07 y08 y09 Dsp400 
Dsp500 Dsp600 dcgq( cgq_indu =  sharepri roa), endogtest( cgq_indu) 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      737 
                                                      F( 14,   722) =    27.34 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  2973.922293                Centered R2   =  -0.1825 
Total (uncentered) SS   =   25951.9729                Uncentered R2 =   0.8645 
Residual SS             =  3516.613251                Root MSE      =    2.184 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    cgq_indu |  -.0658672   .0178056    -3.70   0.000    -.1007656   -.0309688 
         age |   .0071217   .0022394     3.18   0.001     .0027325    .0115109 
      assets |   1.42e-06   8.31e-07     1.71   0.087    -2.07e-07    3.05e-06 
    dist2def |   .0282162   .0092063     3.06   0.002     .0101722    .0462603 
       tier1 |   .2937512    .084657     3.47   0.001     .1278266    .4596759 
     tier1sq |  -.0100661   .0029021    -3.47   0.001    -.0157541   -.0043781 
         y06 |   .2716432   .2766218     0.98   0.326    -.2705256     .813812 
         y07 |   .3310985   .2804297     1.18   0.238    -.2185335    .8807306 
         y08 |  -.1705476   .2855722    -0.60   0.550    -.7302588    .3891637 
         y09 |  -.1253481   .2833485    -0.44   0.658     -.680701    .4300048 
      Dsp400 |   2.293882   .4259715     5.39   0.000     1.458993    3.128771 
      Dsp500 |   4.966941   .6235567     7.97   0.000     3.744792    6.189089 
      Dsp600 |   1.200605   .3600836     3.33   0.001     .4948545    1.906356 
       Dcgq  |  -2.841594   .3286603    -8.65   0.000    -3.485756   -2.197431 
       _cons |   6.947977   1.147978     6.05   0.000      4.69798    9.197973 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          22.573 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               11.390 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             19.93 
                                         15% maximal IV size             11.59 
                                         20% maximal IV size              8.75 
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.25 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.098 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.7541 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              46.731 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    cgq_indu 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         cgq_indu 
Included instruments: age assets dist2def tier1 tier1sq y06 y07 y08 y09 
                      Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600 dcgq 
Excluded instruments: sharepri roa 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5-3– GMM system estimation ‘industry’ – (collapse) 
 
xtabond2 lnmc  L.lnmc cgq_indu  age assets dist2def  tier1tier1sq agesq y06 y07 
y08 y09 Dsp500 Dsp400 DspP600  Dcgq, gmm(L.lnmc, laglimits (1 .) collapse) 
gmm(cgq_indu, laglimits (3 .) ) gmm (dist2def  tier1tier1sq, laglimits (4 .) 
collapse) gmm(Dsp500 Dsp400 DspP600  Dcgq, laglimits (4 .)) iv(age assets  agesq 
y06 y07 y08 y09 ) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
y09 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       595 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       200 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(15) =   3317.34                                      avg =      2.98 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnmc | 
         L1. |   .2935421   .2001551     1.47   0.142    -.0987546    .6858388 
             | 
    cgq_indu |   .0194872   .0098694     1.97   0.048     .0001435     .038831 
         age |  -.0029678   .0058455    -0.51   0.612    -.0144249    .0084893 
      assets |   2.73e-06   1.39e-06     1.97   0.049     1.02e-08    5.45e-06 
    dist2def |   .0443327   .0341629     1.30   0.194    -.0226253    .1112907 
       tier1 |   .2796316   .1163888     2.40   0.016     .0515136    .5077495 
     tier1sq |   -.006962   .0042289    -1.65   0.100    -.0152504    .0013265 
       agesq |    .000013    .000036     0.36   0.718    -.0000576    .0000835 
         y06 |   .7744727   .2439716     3.17   0.002     .2962971    1.252648 
         y07 |   .5809332   .2273145     2.56   0.011      .135405    1.026461 
         y08 |   .3177462   .1034708     3.07   0.002     .1149471    .5205453 
      Dsp500 |  -.0314394   1.296852    -0.02   0.981    -2.573222    2.510343 
      Dsp400 |   .9592993   1.050944     0.91   0.361    -1.100513    3.019112 
      Dsp600 |   .3618471   .5033101     0.72   0.472    -.6246225    1.348317 
       Dcgq  |  -1.293383   .3018886    -4.28   0.000    -1.885074   -.7016926 
       _cons |  -.1412011   .3604457    -0.39   0.695    -.8476616    .5652595 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnmc collapsed 
    L(3/.).cgq_indu 
    L(4/.).(dist2def tier1tier1sq) collapsed 
    L(4/.).(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnmc collapsed 
    DL2.cgq_indu 
    DL3.(dist2def tier1tier1sq) collapsed 
    DL3.(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.22  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.70  Pr > z =  0.482 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  14.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   9.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.621 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  gmm(dist2def    tier1tier1sq, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   7.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.607 
  iv(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   4.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.627 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   5.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
 
 
nlcom ( _b[cgq_indu]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc])) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[cgq_indu]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0275844   .0131466     2.10   0.036     .0018176    .0533512 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5-4 –Estimation of the preferred model without the 'collapse' option 
xtabond2 lnmc  L.lnmc cgq_indu  age assets dist2def  tier1  Tier1sq Agesq y06 y07 
y08 y09 Dsp500 Dsp400 Dsp600  dCGQ, gmm(L.lnmc, laglimits (1 .) ) gmm(cgq_indu, 
laglimits (3 .) ) gmm (dist2def  tier1  Tier1sq , laglimits (4 .) ) gmm(Dcgq  
Dsp400 Dsp500 dSP 
> 600, laglimits (4 .)) iv(age assets  Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09 ) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
y09 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       595 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       200 
Number of instruments = 33                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(15) =    429.70                                      avg =      2.98 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnmc | 
         L1. |   .1513969   .2035216     0.74   0.457    -.2474982     .550292 
             | 
    cgq_indu |   .0294621   .0104679     2.81   0.005     .0089455    .0499787 
         age |  -.0026853   .0079722    -0.34   0.736    -.0183105    .0129399 
      assets |   3.27e-06   1.86e-06     1.75   0.080    -3.85e-07    6.92e-06 
    dist2def |   .0684668   .0349517     1.96   0.050    -.0000373    .1369709 
       tier1 |   .3332148   .1377455     2.42   0.016     .0632386    .6031909 
     Tier1sq |  -.0093781   .0047066    -1.99   0.046    -.0186029   -.0001534 
       Agesq |   3.63e-06   .0000471     0.08   0.939    -.0000887     .000096 
         y06 |   .7153282   .2839304     2.52   0.012     .1588347    1.271822 
         y07 |    .543612   .2525441     2.15   0.031     .0486346    1.038589 
         y08 |   .3585064   .1054793     3.40   0.001     .1517707    .5652422 
      Dsp500 |  -.0207701   1.757605    -0.01   0.991    -3.465613    3.424072 
      Dsp400 |   1.778369   1.488437     1.19   0.232    -1.138915    4.695653 
      Dsp600 |   .2486026   .5408927     0.46   0.646    -.8115275    1.308733 
       Dcgq  |  -1.047808   .3603475    -2.91   0.004    -1.754076   -.3415402 
       _cons |  -.6701031   .7923924    -0.85   0.398    -2.223164    .8829575 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnmc 
    L(3/.).cgq_indu 
    L(4/.).(dist2def tier1 T1Rsq) 
    L(4/.).(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 dSP600) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnmc 
    DL2.cgq_indu 
    DL3.(dist2def tier1 T1Rsq) 
    DL3.(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 dSP600) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.51  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.26  Pr > z =  0.207 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  18.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.376 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  10.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.867 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  gmm(dist2def tier1 T1Rsq, lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   4.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.592 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   6.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.862 
  gmm(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 dSP600, lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   3.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.213 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =   7.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.935 
  iv(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =   6.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.842 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   4.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.629 
 
. nlcom ( _b[cgq_indu]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc])) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[cgq_indu]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0347183   .0124216     2.79   0.005     .0103724    .0590643 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5-5 Calculation of the Long-run effect on the dependent variable 
Let’s agree to rewrite the main estimated model as: 
yit = c + 1yit-1 + 2xit + 3xit-1 + uit  
Where yit is the market capitalisation of the bank i in year t and xit is corporate 
governance i in year t. 
2. To obtain the long-run – or equilibrium steady state – effect of changes in 
market capitalisaton, time subscripts are dropped: 
yi = c + 1yi + 2xi + 3xi + ui  
3. Collect variables: 
(1-1)yi = c + (2+ 3)xi + ui 
 
Drop the error term: it is assumed that the variables correspond to theory: i.e., to 
their long-run equilibrium quantities. Hence: 
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Appendix 5-6 Robustness Check (estimation of the model with cgq_inde) 
xtabond2 lnmc  L.lnmc cgq_inde  age assets dist2def tier1 tier1sq Agesq y06 y07 
y08 y09 Dsp500 Dsp400 Dsp600  Dcgq, gmm(L.lnmc, laglimits (1 .) collapse) 
gmm(cgq_inde, laglimits (3 .) ) gmm (dist2def tier1 tier1sq, laglimits (4 .) 
collapse) gmm(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600, laglimits (4 .)) iv(age assets  Agesq 
y06 y07 y08 y09 ) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
y09 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       595 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       200 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(15) =    799.12                                      avg =      2.98 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnmc | 
         L1. |   .1828887   .1875907     0.97   0.330    -.1847824    .5505598 
             | 
    cgq_inde |    .021292   .0083377     2.55   0.011     .0049505    .0376336 
         age |  -.0006374   .0063951    -0.10   0.921    -.0131715    .0118967 
      assets |   3.19e-06   1.23e-06     2.59   0.010     7.73e-07    5.61e-06 
    dist2def |   .0740837   .0435494     1.70   0.089    -.0112715    .1594389 
       tier1 |    .315439   .1056361     2.99   0.003     .1083961    .5224819 
     tier1sq |  -.0085306   .0043652    -1.95   0.051    -.0170862    .0000249 
       Agesq |   1.10e-06   .0000395     0.03   0.978    -.0000762    .0000784 
         y06 |   .5947261   .2752333     2.16   0.031     .0552787    1.134174 
         y07 |   .4226629   .2480408     1.70   0.088    -.0634882    .9088139 
         y08 |   .2670204   .0836862     3.19   0.001     .1029985    .4310424 
      Dsp500 |   .8170465   .9880909     0.83   0.408    -1.119576    2.753669 
      Dsp400 |   1.434431   1.060318     1.35   0.176    -.6437542    3.512617 
      Dsp600 |   .8939843   .3765519     2.37   0.018     .1559561    1.632012 
       Dcgq  |   -1.61394    .327945    -4.92   0.000      -2.2567   -.9711793 
       _cons |  -.1148168   .4271234    -0.27   0.788    -.9519634    .7223297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnmc collapsed 
    L(3/.).cgq_inde 
    L(4/.).(dist2def tier1tier1sq) collapsed 
    L(4/.).(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnmc collapsed 
    DL2.cgq_inde 
    DL3.(dist2def tier1 tier1sq) collapsed 
    DL3.(Dcgq  Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.39  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.00  Pr > z =  0.316 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  14.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.257 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   7.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.790 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  gmm(dist2def    tier1tier1sq, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   7.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.497 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   0.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.966 
  iv(age assets Agesq y06 y07 y08 y09) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   3.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.772 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   4.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.589 
 
. nlcom ( _b[cgq_inde]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc])) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[cgq_inde]/(1-_b[l1.lnmc]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0260577   .0086898     3.00   0.003     .0090261    .0430893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5-7 – Tier 1 Ratio limit 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐶)
𝑑(𝑇1𝑅)
=  ?̂?11𝑇1𝑅 + ?̂?12𝑇1𝑅
2   
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐶)
𝑑(𝑇1𝑅)
=  ?̂?11 + 2?̂?12𝑇1𝑅   
 
?̂?11 + 2?̂?12𝑇1𝑅 = 0 
 
2?̂?12𝑇1𝑅 = −?̂?11 
  
2(−0.006962)𝑇1𝑅 = −0.27963 
 
𝑇1𝑅 = 20.08 
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Appendix 5-8 – Robustness check (OLS and Fixed Effects estimation of the 
lagged variable) 
OLS 
 
regress lnmc  L.lnmc cgq_indu age assets dist2def  tier1  tier1sq Agesq 
y06 y07 y08 y09 Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600  dcgq 
note: y08 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     595 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   579) =  587.56 
       Model |  1969.50492    15  131.300328           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  129.388155   579  .223468315           R-squared     =  0.9384 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9368 
       Total |  2098.89307   594  3.53349002           Root MSE      =  .47272 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnmc | 
         L1. |   .9072769   .0196258    46.23   0.000     .8687305    .9458233 
             | 
    cgq_indu |  -.0015421     .00075    -2.06   0.040    -.0030152    -.000069 
         age |  -.0019128   .0017264    -1.11   0.268    -.0053035    .0014779 
      assets |   6.44e-07   1.78e-07     3.61   0.000     2.93e-07    9.95e-07 
    dist2def |   .0156283   .0026409     5.92   0.000     .0104414    .0208151 
       tier1 |   .1638601   .0204028     8.03   0.000     .1237877    .2039326 
     tier1sq |  -.0044132    .000713    -6.19   0.000    -.0058137   -.0030127 
       Agesq |   .0000135   .0000106     1.27   0.205    -7.39e-06    .0000344 
         y06 |   .6110489    .059867    10.21   0.000      .493466    .7286318 
         y07 |   .2910232   .0579904     5.02   0.000     .1771261    .4049203 
         y08 |  (omitted) 
         y09 |      .0725   .0540285     1.34   0.180    -.0336158    .1786157 
      Dsp400 |   .2260791   .0888747     2.54   0.011     .0515231    .4006351 
      Dsp500 |   .2720879    .119841     2.27   0.024     .0367118     .507464 
      Dsp600 |   .1076045    .066203     1.63   0.105    -.0224228    .2376319 
       Dcgq  |  -.2678996   .0559728    -4.79   0.000    -.3778341   -.1579652 
       _cons |  -1.311074   .1930497    -6.79   0.000    -1.690237   -.9319107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5-8 (continued) 
Fixed effects 
 
xtreg lnmc  L.lnmc cgq_indu age assets dist2def  tier1  tier1sq Agesq y06 y07 y08 
y09 Dsp400 Dsp500 Dsp600  dcgq, fe 
note: y06 omitted because of collinearity 
note: y09 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       595 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       200 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7397                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0008                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.0002                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(14,381)          =     77.34 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9918                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lnmc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnmc | 
         L1. |   .3789335   .0607068     6.24   0.000     .2595712    .4982959 
             | 
    cgq_indu |  -.0007219   .0019441    -0.37   0.711    -.0045444    .0031006 
         age |   -.326558   .0361174    -9.04   0.000    -.3975724   -.2555436 
      assets |   1.49e-06   4.60e-07     3.24   0.001     5.87e-07    2.39e-06 
    dist2def |   .0121159   .0036856     3.29   0.001     .0048692    .0193626 
       tier1 |     .19562   .0320937     6.10   0.000     .1325169     .258723 
     tier1sq |  -.0051145   .0011574    -4.42   0.000    -.0073902   -.0028388 
       agesq |   .0000779   .0001998     0.39   0.697    -.0003148    .0004707 
         y06 |          0  (omitted) 
         y07 |   .0735478   .0533439     1.38   0.169    -.0313376    .1784331 
         y08 |  -.0613436   .0499292    -1.23   0.220    -.1595148    .0368277 
         y09 |          0  (omitted) 
      Dsp400 |   .3117442   .1970732     1.58   0.115     -.075743    .6992314 
      Dsp500 |   .7916462   .4147395     1.91   0.057    -.0238187    1.607111 
      Dsp600 |   .6274196   .1422066     4.41   0.000     .3478116    .9070277 
        Dcgq |  -.5133242    .081848    -6.27   0.000    -.6742545   -.3523938 
       _cons |   22.64346    1.85385    12.21   0.000      18.9984    26.28852 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  15.011393 
     sigma_e |  .42717721 
         rho |  .99919086   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(199, 381) =     1.65            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 Appendices related to chapt. 6    
Appendix 6-1 Survey Questionnaire 
1 Name of the institution________________________________ 
2  Bank 
 Insurance company 
3 Name of the respondent?__________________________ 
Nationality _______________ 
Gender M/F (cross over as appropriate) 
4 Position of the respondent at the institution? 
5 A brief history of the institution 
 
6 What is the number of shareholders/owners? ____ 
7 What is the number of board directors? ____ 
8 Is the number of shareholder meetings regulated by law? 
 Yes, 
 No, 
 Not sure 
9 How is the shareholder meeting announced? (Please tick the appropriate 
box/es) 
 Company web site 
 Public media (electronic and printed) 
 Email  
 Written notification by post  
 Phone 
 Other (please specify) 
10 How far in advance is the shareholder meeting announced? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 1 week 
 2 weeks 
 1 month or more 
 Other (please specify) 
 Not sure 
11 Is the agenda for the shareholder meeting announced at the same time as the 
shareholder meeting? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes, 
 No, 
Note:  
Questions with multiple answers are denoted by the sentence “Please tick the appropriate box/es)” 
Questions with only one possible answer are denoted by “Please tick the appropriate box” 
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 Not sure 
12 What information, except for date and location in respect to the general 
meeting is announced? (Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Agenda 
 Materials to be approved at the meeting 
 Other (please specify)   
13 What (%) of shares is needed to put an item on the agenda of general 
meetings? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 10% 
 25% 
 33% 
 Other _______% (please specify)  
 Not sure 
14 What percentages of board members on average participate (either in person 
or by proxy) in the board meetings? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Over 50% 
 100% 
 Other (please specify) 
 Not sure 
15 How often does the board meet during a year? (Please tick the appropriate 
box) 
 Monthly, 
 Quarterly 
 Three times, 
 Twice 
 ____ (Other) 
 
16 Do you have the same person serving as the chairperson of the board and 
CEO? 
 Yes   
 No  
17 How many board meetings have been held in 2008? _____ 
18 Does the institution have a system of penalties for members who fail to 
attend the board meetings? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question) 
 Not sure 
19 What penalties do members who fail to attend the board meeting face? 
(please explain) 
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20 What % of shareholders’ votes is necessary to Elect/remove members of the 
board? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Not sure 
 50%+1 
 ______% (other)) 
21 Apart from shareholders, who participates in general shareholder meetings? 
(Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 CEO 
 Senior Manager or managers? 
 Internal audit person/committy representative 
 Not sure 
 Other (please specify 
 
 
22 Except for shareholders who else is entitled to a share in the profits of the 
corporation? (Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Managers  
 Employees 
 Not sure  
 Other (please specify) 
 
23 What % of shareholders (or votes) has to agree on amending the statutes? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Not sure 
 50% + 1 
 2/3 
 _____ % (Other, please specify) 
24 What % of shareholders has to agree on approving mergers/takeovers? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Not sure 
 50% + 1 
 2/3 
 _____ % (Other, please specify) 
25 Except for initial shares has your institution issued additional shares? (Please 
tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question)  
 Not sure 
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26 What procedures have to be followed for issuing additional shares?(Please 
describe) 
 
 
27 Are compensation schemes for board members announced at AGM? (Please 
tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
28 Who decides upon compensation schemes for board members? (Please tick 
the appropriate box) 
 Not sure, 
 AGM 
 Other (please explain) 
29 Do you disclose (make public) remuneration for board members? (Please tick 
the appropriate box) 
 Yes 
 Yes only to the respective regulatory/monitoring authorities  
 No 
30 Does the board deal with: (Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 corporate strategy,  
 major plans of action,  
 risk policy,  
 annual budgets (most recent date of approval:___________)  
 business plans (most recent date of approval: ___________) 
 Other 
 
31 For what period is the corporate strategy approved by the board? (Please tick 
the appropriate box) 
 Five years 
 Ten years 
 ___ years; Other 
32 Does the board set performance objectives for management? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
 Not sure 
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33 What performance objectives for managers does your institution employ? 
(Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Not sure 
 Number of clients 
 % of market share 
 Other (please explain) 
 
 
34 Do you have a bonus system for management? (Please tick the appropriate 
box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No  
35 How does your bonus system work? 
 
 
36 Do managers own shares of the company? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes  
 No 
37 Do you make public the information regarding ownership stake of managers? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
38 Do you disclose remuneration of managers? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes  
 Yes only to the respective regulatory/monitoring authorities  
 No 
39 Do you set up performance objectives for board members? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
 Not sure 
40 Can you describe what performance objectives does your institution employ 
for board members? 
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41 Who monitors the implementation of strategic plans and corporate 
performance and oversees major capital expenditures? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Board of directors 
 Top management 
 Both, board of directors and top management 
 Other (please explain) 
 
42 Does the Board have any of the following committees? (Please tick the 
appropriate box/es) 
 Audit Committee, 
 Remuneration Committee,  
 Appointment Committee,  
 Risk Assessment Committee, 
 Risk Management Committee, 
 Other (please explain) 
 
43 Does the board decide on a ’corporate governance practice’? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No  
 Not sure 
44 How does the board monitor corporate governance practices? 
45 Is it possible to vote in absentia? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question) 
46 How does a shareholder vote in absentia? (Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Postal system (voting by post) 
 Authorised representative (proxy voting) 
 Other (please explain procedure/method) 
 
47 Is there any cost to vote in absentia? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question) 
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48 What is the cost of voting in absentia? (Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Administrative fee 
 Complicated procedures to follow 
 Other (please explain) 
 
49 Does your institution issue more than one type of shares? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question) 
50 What type of shares does your institution have? (Please tick the appropriate 
box/es) 
 Ordinary 
 Preference share 
 Shares with more than one vote 
 Others (please specify) 
51 How do you address and deal with minority shareholder concerns? 
52 Does your institution have a policy (approved regulations) on conducting 
business with companies in which board members are important 
shareholders’ or employees? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question 
53 Can you please explain the policy which deals with the situation of conducting 
business with another company in which board member/s are important 
shareholders’ or employees? 
 
54 Does your institution have a policy on conducting business with companies in 
which members of management have ‘significant’ shares? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question 
55 Can you please explain the policy which deals with the situation of conducting 
business with another company in which member/s of management have 
shares? 
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56 Which of the following is considered a stakeholder by your company? 
 Borrowers 
 Depositors 
 The Insured 
 Employees 
 Community 
 Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
57 Can you describe what your company does to cultivate relations with its 
stakeholders? 
 
 
58 Does your institution have deposit insurance? (Please tick the appropriate 
box) 
 Yes – what amount ___________ 
 No  
 Not sure 
59 Does your institution have a representative of employees on the board? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
 Not sure 
60 Can you describe the election procedures for the employee’s representative 
at the board? 
 
61 Can minority shareholders have a representative at the board? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes  
 No 
 Not sure 
62 What percentage of shareholders’ votes is necessary for board membership? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
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 50% + 1 
 2/3 
 Others (please specify) _________ 
63 Do you publish the financial statements and operating results of the 
company? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No (if No, please skip the next question) 
64 Where do you publish your financial statements and operating results? 
(Please tick the appropriate box/es) 
 Own web page, 
 Company papers/publications/pamphlet, 
 Daily newspapers  
 Other (please specify) 
65 Do you publish the company’s strategic objectives? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
66 How do you publish the company’s strategic objectives? 
 
67 Do you publish the names of your large shareowners? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
68 What percentage of ownership is required for a shareowner to be declared? 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
 5% 
 Top 10 shareowners (sorted by: most to least shares) 
 Not sure 
 Other ______% (please specify) 
69 Do you publish information about board members? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
70 What information about board members is published? (Please tick the 
appropriate box/es) 
 Full CV 
 Their qualifications, 
 Other company directorships, 
 Selection process 
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 Remuneration 
 Other 
 
71 Do you have any independent member on the board of directors? 
(Independent means independent of managers and shareholders) (Please tick 
the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
72 How many independent board directors serve in your board? 
_______ 
73 What is your company’s policy for selecting and replacing key executives? 
74 What accounting standards are used to prepare and disclose company’s 
financial information? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Local 
 International 
 Combination of Local and International 
 Other (please specify) 
75 Do you have an internal auditing person/committee? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
76 Who does the internal auditing person/committee report to? (Please tick the 
appropriate box) 
 Board of directors 
 Not sure 
 Other 
77 Has the report of internal auditing person/committee been discussed at the 
board meetings? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes  
 No 
 Not sure 
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78 How often do you appoint a new (different from the current or previous) 
external auditor? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Every year 
 Every third year 
 Have had the same auditor for more than 3 years 
 Other (please explain) 
 Not sure 
 
79 Who does the external auditor report to? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Shareholders 
 Board of directors 
 Not sure 
 Other 
80 Do you publish your audited reports? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
81 Where do you publish your audited reports? (Please tick the appropriate 
box/es) 
 Own web page, 
 Company Newspapers, 
 Daily Newspapers, 
 Other (please specify) 
82 Do you have a Corporate Governance Policy? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (If Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
 Not sure 
83 Is your corporate governance policy aligned with OECD principles on 
Corporate Governance? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
84 Do you have a policy on human resource development and training? (Please 
tick the appropriate box) 
 Yes (if Yes, please go to the next question) 
 No 
 Not sure 
85 Can you briefly explain your human resource development and training 
policies? 
 
  Note:  
Questions with multiple answers are denoted by the sentence “Please tick the appropriate box/es)” 
Questions with only one possible answer are denoted by “Please tick the appropriate box” 
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Appendix 6-2 Analysis of Survey Questionnaire 
 Kosovo Montenegro 
 
Questionnaire questions 
 
Answers 
Banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Banks 
Number of shareholders 
Average 18.5 2.1 100.3 
Max 40 4 237 
Min 2 1 1 
How is the shareholders’ 
meeting announced? 
Co. website - - - 
Public media 1 1 8 
Email 4 5 2 
Written 
notification by 
post 
2 - 2 
Phone 2 1 - 
No response 1 1 - 
How far in advance is the 
shareholder meeting 
announced? 
One week 1 1 1 
Two weeks 2 1 1 
One month 2 3 8 
No response 1 1 - 
 
What other information, except 
for date and location, about the 
General Shareholder Meeting is 
announced? 
 
Agenda and 
materials to be 
approved  
6 3 
9 
Other - - 41 
No response - 3 
- 
What (%) of shares (or votes) is 
required to put an item on the 
50% +1 and 
more 
3 2 
12 
                                                          
1Information on how and where to get hold of the information and the proposed 
decisions for the upcoming meeting. 
2 100% since it is a 1 shareholder bank. 
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agenda of general meetings? 25% or less 2 - 13 
5% - - 8 
No response 1 4 - 
What % of shareholders’ votes 
is necessary to Elect/remove 
members of the board? 
50% +1  3 2 2 
5% - - 7 
Other 1 1 14 
No response 2 3 - 
What % of shareholders (or 
votes) is needed to amend the 
statutes? 
2/3 of 
shareholders 
3 3 
2 
50%+1   2 
All 
shareholders 
2 - 
1 
Other - 2 55 
No response 1 1 - 
What % of shareholders is 
needed to approve 
mergers/takeovers? 
2/3 of 
shareholders 
3 4 
8 
All 
shareholders 
1 - 
1 
Other 1 1 16 
No response 1 1 - 
 
  
                                                          
3 10% 
4 100% 
5 5% for four banks and 10% for one 
6 50%+1 
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Appendix 6-3 - The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 Kosovo Montenegro 
 
Questions 
 
Answers 
Banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Banks 
How do you address and deal 
with minority shareholder 
concerns? 
Formal 
mechanisms 
- - 
- 
Other 3 2 97 
No response 3 4 1 
Is it possible to vote in 
absentia? 
Yes 5 2 10 
No 1 1 - 
Other - 3 - 
Is there any cost to voting in 
absentia? 
Yes - - - 
No 5 2 10 
No response 1 4 - 
 
  
                                                          
7 All the banks responding to this question replied that there has been no minority shareholder 
problem so far (which is for sure the case for the two single-shareholder banks in the sample). 
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Appendix 6-4 - The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 Kosovo Montenegro 
 
Questions 
 
Answers 
Banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Banks 
Which of the following is 
considered a stakeholder by 
your company? 
Borrowers 3 - 3 
Depositors 6 - 2 
The insured - 1  - 
Employees 5  1  4 
The community 6 1  - 
Others - - 28 
No response - 5  4 
Does your institution have a 
deposit insurance system? 
Yes 1  - 7 
No 5  - 3 
Does your institution have a 
representative of employees on 
the board? 
Yes - 1  - 
No 6 5  10 
 
 
  
                                                          
8 One bank has listed clients and one has listed investors as stakeholders. 
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Appendix 6-5 - Disclosure and Transparency 
 
 Kosovo Montenegro 
 
Questions 
 
Answers 
Banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Banks 
Do you publish your 
financial statements and 
operating results? 
Yes 6 6 8 
No - - - 
Do you publish the 
company’s strategic 
objectives? 
Yes 4 2 2 
No 2 4 8 
Do you publish the names of 
your large shareowners? 
Yes 6 6 7 
No - - 3 
Is there a limit of ownership 
set, for a shareowner to be 
declared? 
Yes  3 - 6 
No  1 1 - 
No response 2 5 4 
Do you publish information 
about board members? 
Yes  6 4 5 
No - 2 4 
No response - - 1 
Do you have any 
independent member on the 
board of directors? 
Yes - 4 7 
No 6 2 2 
No response - - 1 
Do you disclose 
remuneration for managers 
and board members?9 
Yes - 1 1 
No 3 3 6 
Other (Yes, to 
Authorities) 
3 2 
 
3 
 
                                                          
9 For Montenegro this row contains information only for board members while for Kosova 
responses are for board members and managers. 
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Do you disclose 
remuneration for managers? 
Yes - - - 
No - - 4 
Other (Yes, to 
Authorities) 
- - 
6 
Does your institution have a 
policy on conducting 
business with companies in 
which board members are 
important shareholders’ or 
employees? 
Yes  4 5 
6 
No 2 1 
4 
Does your institution have a 
policy on conducting 
business with companies in 
which members of 
management have 
‘significant’ shares? 
Yes 5 - 5 
No 1 1 5 
No response - 5 - 
Do you publish your audited 
reports? 
Yes 6 610 10 
No - - - 
How often do you appoint a 
new (different from the 
current or previous) external 
auditor? 
Every third year 2 - 4 
Every fifth year 4 2 - 
Annual basis or 
less 
- 4 
6 
  
                                                          
10 One insurance company did not reply to this question since it was the first quarter of its 
functioning and there were no audited reports yet.  
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Appendix 6-6 - The Responsibilities of the Board 
 Kosovo Montenegro 
 
Questions 
 
Answers 
Banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Banks 
Average (%) of participation in 
board meetings? 
100% 6 2 5 
> 80% - 2 1 
Over 50% - - 4 
No response - 2 - 
Does the institution have a 
system of penalties for 
members who fail to attend the 
board meetings? 
Yes 2 1 4 
No 3 3 6 
No response - 2 - 
How many times did the board 
meet in 2008? 
Average 12 11.1 15.2 
Max number of 
meetings 
24 14 
19 
For what period is the corporate 
strategy approved by the board? 
One year  - - 1 
Three years 3 2 6 
Five years 3 4 2 
No response - - 1 
Does the board set performance 
objectives for management? 
Yes 6 6 9 
No - - 1 
Does the company have 
performance objectives for 
board members? 
Yes 3 1 1 
No 2 4 7 
No response 1 1 2 
Who monitors the 
implementation of strategic 
plans and corporate 
performance and oversees 
major capital expenditures? 
Board of 
directors 
- 4 
7 
Board of 
directors and 
management 
5 2 
3 
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Other 1 - 
111 
Does the board have any of the 
following committees? 
Audit 6 5 8 
Remuneration 1 -  
Appointment 2 -  
Risk 6 2 9 
Other 1 2 612 
Does the board decide on a 
‘corporate governance policy’? 
Yes 5 5 6 
No 1 1 4 
 
 
  
                                                          
11 One bank has reported that the AGM also monitors the implementation of strategic plans and 
corporate performance and oversees major capital expenditure. 
12 All these respondents have the ALCO committee.  
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Appendix 6-7 – Coding of the responses 
Q 
Value 
Assigned Condition 
7 1 if number of BoD > 5 and odd 
8 1 if the number of shareholder meetings regulated by law is answered Yes. 
9 1 
if email or written notification is sent to shareholders to announce the 
meeting. 
10 1 If the shareholder meeting is announced 1 month or more in advance. 
11 1 If the agenda is announced at the same time as the shareholder meeting. 
12 1 
if Agenda and Materials to be approved are announced  at the same time as 
the shareholder meeting. 
13 1 if 25% or less shares are required to put an item on the agenda. 
14 1 if 75% - 100% of board members participate in board meetings during the year. 
15 1 if the board meets during the year in quarterly basis or more often. 
16 1 if the chairperson and the CEO is not the same person. 
17 1 If the number of meetings in 2008 is more than 6. 
18 1 
if there is a system of penalties for board members failing to attend board 
meetings. 
20 1 if 50% + 1 or more shares are required to elect/remove board members. 
21 1 
if any or all of the following participate in general shareholder meetings: CEO, 
Senior Manager/s, Internal Audit/committee representative. 
22 1 if Employees are entitled to a share in the profits of the corporation.  
23 1 if 2/3 or more votes are required to amend the statutes. 
24 1 if 2/3 or more votes are required to approve mergers/takeovers. 
25 1 if the institution has issued additional shares. 
27 1 if compensation schemes for board members are announced at the AGM. 
28 1 if AGM decides upon compensation schemes for board members. 
29 1 
if the remuneration to board members is made public, or disclosed to relevant 
authorities. 
30 1 
if board deals with any of the following: corporate strategy, major plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets, business plans. 
31 1 if the corporate strategy is approved for 3 years or more. 
32 1 if board sets performance objectives for management. 
34 1 if there is a bonus system for management. 
36 1 if managers own shares of the company. 
37 1 if information regarding the ownership stake of managers is made public. 
38 1 
if remuneration of managers is made public or disclosed to relevant 
authorities. 
39 1 if performance objectives are set for board members. 
41 1 
if BoD alone or jointly with top management monitor the implementation of 
strategic plans, corporate performance and major expenditures. 
42 1 
if the board has 3 out of 5 listed committees which are: Audit, remuneration, 
appointment, risk assessment, risk management committee.  
43 1 if the board decide on corporate governance practice. 
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45 1 if it is possible to vote in absentia. 
47 1 if there are no costs to voting in absentia. 
49 1 if the institution issues more than one type of shares. 
52 1 
if the institution has approved policy/regulations on doing business with 
companies related to board members. 
54 1 
if the institution has a policy on doing business with companies related to 
members of management. 
56 1 
if the company recognizes 3 out of 5 listed groups as stakeholders: borrowers, 
depositors, the insured, employees, community. 
58 1 if company has deposit insurance. 
59 1 if the company has a representative of employees on the board. 
61 1 if minority shareholders can have a representative on the board. 
62 1 if 2/3 of votes are required to affect board membership. 
63 1 if the company publishes the financial results. 
64 1 
if the company publishes the financial results  in at least 2 out of 3 listed 
mediums: own web page, company papers/publications, daily newspapers. 
65 1 if  the company publishes the strategic objectives. 
67 1 if the company publishes the names of large shareholders. 
68 1 
if the company has a criteria to publish the shareowners which is 5% share 
ownership or a list of 10  largest shareholders. 
69 1 if the company publishes information about board members. 
70 1 
if the company publishes 3 out of 5 aspects of information about board 
members: full CV, qualifications, other company directorships, selection 
process, remuneration. 
71 1 if the company has independent board members. 
72 1 if the company has 2 or more independent board members. 
74 1 
if the company uses international accounting standards to prepare and 
disclose financial information. 
75 1 if the company has internal audit person or committee.  
76 1 if the internal audit reports to the BoD. 
77 1 if reports of internal audit have been discussed in board meetins. 
78 1 if the external audit is appointed each year or every third year. 
79 1 if the external audit reports to the BoD. 
80 1 if  the reports of external audit are published. 
81 1 
if the company publishes the audit reports in at least 2 out of 3 listed 
mediums: own web page, company papers/publications, daily newspapers. 
82 1 if the company has corporate governance policies.  
83 1 
if the corporate governance policies are in line with OECD corporate 
governance principles.  
84 1 if the company has a policy on human resource development and training. 
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Appendix 6-8 – Stata printouts of the main estimated model 
. regress  lnroe cgs assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    6.31 
       Model |   5.0880564     3   1.6960188           Prob > F      =  0.0082 
    Residual |  3.22526817    12  .268772348           R-squared     =  0.6120 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5150 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .51843 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cgs |     .01005   .0263478     0.38   0.710     -.047357     .067457 
      assets |   2.80e-06   6.75e-07     4.15   0.001     1.33e-06    4.27e-06 
          db |   1.011721   .3982786     2.54   0.026     .1439466    1.879495 
       _cons |   .9115449   1.098507     0.83   0.423    -1.481897    3.304987 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.20 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2735 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      13.25      8    0.1037 
            Skewness |       5.93      3    0.1151 
            Kurtosis |       0.89      1    0.3458 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      20.06     12    0.0659 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      1.43 
                  Prob > F =      0.2964 
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Appendix 6-9 – Stata printouts of the derived estimated model 
regress  lnroe P2 assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    9.84 
       Model |  5.91122898     3  1.97040966           Prob > F      =  0.0015 
    Residual |  2.40209559    12  .200174633           R-squared     =  0.7111 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6388 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .44741 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          P2 |   .1272639   .0613178     2.08   0.060    -.0063361    .2608638 
      assets |   3.11e-06   5.81e-07     5.36   0.000     1.85e-06    4.38e-06 
          db |   1.123326   .3095729     3.63   0.003     .4488245    1.797827 
       _cons |   .1422884   .6014988     0.24   0.817    -1.168265    1.452842 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.02 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8967 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      14.14      8    0.0782 
            Skewness |       3.36      3    0.3390 
            Kurtosis |       1.31      1    0.2522 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      18.81     12    0.0931 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      0.48 
                  Prob > F =      0.7054 
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Appendix 6-10 – Additional Stata printouts (specifications of the models with 
OECD principles 3-6 and the CGS) 
regress  lnroe P3 assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    7.52 
       Model |  5.42687983     3  1.80895994           Prob > F      =  0.0043 
    Residual |  2.88644474    12  .240537062           R-squared     =  0.6528 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5660 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .49045 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          P3 |   .1161759   .0926836     1.25   0.234    -.0857642    .3181161 
      assets |   2.88e-06   6.16e-07     4.68   0.001     1.54e-06    4.23e-06 
          db |   1.162947   .3720804     3.13   0.009     .3522533     1.97364 
       _cons |   .8878563    .408112     2.18   0.050    -.0013433    1.777056 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.01 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9039 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       8.09      8    0.4245 
            Skewness |       0.70      3    0.8722 
            Kurtosis |       1.73      1    0.1881 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      10.53     12    0.5697 
--------------------------------------------------- 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      2.14 
                  Prob > F =      0.1653 
 
. regress  lnroe P4 assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    6.35 
       Model |  5.10149412     3  1.70049804           Prob > F      =  0.0080 
    Residual |  3.21183046    12  .267652538           R-squared     =  0.6137 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5171 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .51735 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          P4 |  -.1059385   .2391036    -0.44   0.666    -.6269006    .4150236 
      assets |   2.68e-06   6.39e-07     4.20   0.001     1.29e-06    4.07e-06 
          db |   .9519698   .3444317     2.76   0.017     .2015176    1.702422 
       _cons |   1.436545   .3462043     4.15   0.001     .6822312     2.19086 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
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         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.42 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2340 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       5.38      8    0.7162 
            Skewness |       7.21      3    0.0656 
            Kurtosis |       1.05      1    0.3045 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      13.64     12    0.3242 
--------------------------------------------------- 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      2.01 
                  Prob > F =      0.1835 
 
. regress  lnroe P5 assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    8.19 
       Model |  5.58516558     3  1.86172186           Prob > F      =  0.0031 
    Residual |    2.728159    12  .227346583           R-squared     =  0.6718 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5898 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .47681 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          P5 |  -.0665402   .0433271    -1.54   0.151    -.1609417    .0278614 
      assets |   2.68e-06   5.85e-07     4.59   0.001     1.41e-06    3.96e-06 
          db |   .7100539    .347532     2.04   0.064    -.0471532    1.467261 
       _cons |     2.4443   .7609476     3.21   0.007     .7863373    4.102262 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     3.00 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0831 
 
. estat imtest 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      10.43      8    0.2359 
            Skewness |       9.05      3    0.0286 
            Kurtosis |       0.51      1    0.4771 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.99     12    0.0673 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      2.26 
                  Prob > F =      0.1499 
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. regress  lnroe P6 assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    6.66 
       Model |  5.19341864     3  1.73113955           Prob > F      =  0.0067 
    Residual |  3.11990593    12  .259992161           R-squared     =  0.6247 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5309 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .50989 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          P6 |    .059774   .0801879     0.75   0.470    -.1149404    .2344884 
      assets |   2.91e-06   6.79e-07     4.29   0.001     1.43e-06    4.39e-06 
          db |   .9962338   .3472612     2.87   0.014     .2396167    1.752851 
       _cons |   .7345856   .8187508     0.90   0.387    -1.049319     2.51849 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.96 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0854 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       6.53      8    0.5880 
            Skewness |       7.42      3    0.0597 
            Kurtosis |       0.13      1    0.7179 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      14.08     12    0.2956 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      1.57 
                  Prob > F =      0.2630 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regress  lnroe cgs assets db 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    12) =    6.31 
       Model |   5.0880564     3   1.6960188           Prob > F      =  0.0082 
    Residual |  3.22526817    12  .268772348           R-squared     =  0.6120 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5150 
       Total |  8.31332458    15  .554221638           Root MSE      =  .51843 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnroe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cgs |     .01005   .0263478     0.38   0.710     -.047357     .067457 
      assets |   2.80e-06   6.75e-07     4.15   0.001     1.33e-06    4.27e-06 
          db |   1.011721   .3982786     2.54   0.026     .1439466    1.879495 
       _cons |   .9115449   1.098507     0.83   0.423    -1.481897    3.304987 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estat hettest 
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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnroe 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.20 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2735 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      13.25      8    0.1037 
            Skewness |       5.93      3    0.1151 
            Kurtosis |       0.89      1    0.3458 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      20.06     12    0.0659 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnroe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 9) =      1.43 
                  Prob > F =      0.2964 
     
 
 
 
 
 
